On 21 Dec 2003 13:59:25 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

And, on this day in 1972, the Linebacker II operation experienced the
worst losses of the campaign with six B-52s downed over Hanoi. The
Eleven Days of Christmas, however, drove the recalcitrant North
Vietnamese back to the bargaining table and resulted in the release of
our POWs by March of '73.

And, arguably proved once and for all the Douhet principle that
strategic bombing can be decisive politically without ground invasion.
IMNSHO!


You know Ed, I believed (past tense) this too, its what the Air Force teaches
at every step of PME, but after completing a masters course about the air war
in Vietnam, I'm not so convinced anymore.

You hit upon one good reason for guys writing memoirs. Too quickly we
wind up with the participants and on-scene observers passing away and
only the historians interpreting stacks of OPREP-4s and cryptic
correspondence then interpreting the runes in the politically correct
light of the day.

As a participant in LB I and II, I would have to debate the
conclusions of the course you took.

I may get drubbed out of the B-52
community, but I think the BUFFs could have sat the whole thing out and by
early January 1973, Le Duc Tho would have still signed the Paris Peace Accord.

The sequence of events from the beginning of the Paris peace talks
through the various political cycles of American presidential politics
make that conclusion debatable. Linebacker started to get the NVN and
VC back to the table. As it progressed they observed the typical
gradualism that had characterized each previous bombing cycle. By
October, Kissinger announced the "light at the end of the tunnel" and
we paused again, only to see the resolve of the NVN and VC return.
When they didn't follow through, Nixon unleased LB II, which raised
the stakes considerably.

Most of the targets hit by the BUFFs, had already been hit the previous Spring
and Fall during Linebacker I. This is where people usually say; "the bombing
demoralized the population and the politicians of North Vietnam".

The intensity of night one where the original frag was for 150 BUFF
sorties. Do the math, even if all of them weren't "big belly" D's.
That's a lot of bombs falling in an area the size of Connecticutt. The
24 hour a day campaign of LB II was unprecedented.

There are
stories, most from former POWs being held in Hanoi, about the psychological
effect the bombing had on the North Vietnamese, but no proof or any evidence
that the communist party leadership was aware, or if they were, even cared
about the psychological effect on their people. Marshall L. Michel (heck Ed,
you may even know this guy?) wrote an outstanding book titled; "The Eleven Days
of Christmas" where he interviewed NV SA-2 commanders and crews.

I know Marshall quite well. You'll find my name mentioned on page 82
of his book.

One SA-2
commander said the politicians who visited his battalian, located close to the
party headquarters, up until the last day, were confident and supportive,
hardly the actions of a demoralized population. Additionally, the government
ordered residence of Hanoi to evacuate, if they were non-essential, and to send
their children to the camps in the country side, both orders were violated en
mass, most Hanoi residents stayed put.

While I have great respect for Marshall's efforts in gaining the NVN
perspective of LB II, let us not forget that he was interviewing
functionaries of a Communist government and their statements "might"
reflect typical revisionism. (For similar conflicting testimonies you
might compare Marshall's "Clashes" with Toperczer on MiG kills.)

Another great book addressing this
issue is Mark Clodfelter's "The Limits of Air Power".

Clodfelter certainly gained renown with his interpretation of the
events, but not all historians agree with him. You might also look at
Wayne Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back" or Karl Eschmann's "Linebacker."

Anyway, just a few opinions to counter current day "common logic". Regardless
of their effect on North Vietnamese politicans, the BUFFs provided moral
support to POWs (fact) and the crews layed the ground work for every BUFF
mission flown today (fact).

Probably most critical (and the major contribution of Marshall's
"Eleven Days" is the acknowledgement that the LeMay elitism of the
strategic bomber force as a "specified" command and not eligible to be
CHOPped to the theater operational commanders is gone. Now, we find
operational aircraft are operational aircraft and wars are fought with
the resources available against the enemy and not in a parochial fight
against each other.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8