"Gord Beaman" ) wrote in
:

"No Spam!" wrote:

We might have stopped another try in Paris, but since apparently at
least one of the people we wanted to talk to (reportedly the one with a
pilot's license) was either warned off or for some other unknown reason
was a no-show means we might not get as much good intel out of the
botched try as we might have.

This seems to argue for less safeguards so as to 'get better
intel' but I believe that the consequence of failing to quash a
hijack attempt is much too dangerous to take chances with
therefore we should do all in our power to prevent any attempt.

I'm also slightly against arming pilots because to endanger these
'Most Essential to Flight" units (pilots) in -any- way isn't
smart...

well,if there's any hijack attempt,their lives already ARE in danger.
We learned that on 9-11-01.


we should put all effort into keeping miscreants out of
the cockpit. I just can't believe that a secure double door
system coupled with an iron clad -procedure- is that hard to
design or that expensive. Just imagine the cost to an airline of
one successful hijack, not just for the hardware, more than
likely that'd be mostly covered by insurance but imagine the cost
in missed revenue due to public apprehension.
--

-Gord.


There's no room for a "double door" on many aircraft,and cockpit doors get
opened for food or toilet breaks,or other reasons.And there's still the
chance of an 'inside job',someone who could open the door for hijackers,or
tamper with it.I note that in AvLeak,someone reported a "reinforced"
cockpit door being knocked open with a beverage cart.

And the cost to arm a pilot is minimal,yet very effective,and COULD be
implemented almost immediately,in much less time than to reengineer cockpit
doors.One day's training would suffice,IMO.
--
Jim Yanik
jyanik-at-kua.net