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Old December 27th 03, 10:25 PM
Dudley Henriques
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"Brian Colwell" wrote in message
news:IrmHb.853153$9l5.589270@pd7tw2no...

"Dudley Henriques" wrote in message
nk.net...

"Jim Yanik" wrote in message
.. .
"Gord Beaman" ) wrote in
:

"No Spam!" wrote:

We might have stopped another try in Paris, but since apparently at
least one of the people we wanted to talk to (reportedly the one

with
a
pilot's license) was either warned off or for some other unknown

reason
was a no-show means we might not get as much good intel out of the
botched try as we might have.

This seems to argue for less safeguards so as to 'get better
intel' but I believe that the consequence of failing to quash a
hijack attempt is much too dangerous to take chances with
therefore we should do all in our power to prevent any attempt.

I'm also slightly against arming pilots because to endanger these
'Most Essential to Flight" units (pilots) in -any- way isn't
smart...

well,if there's any hijack attempt,their lives already ARE in danger.
We learned that on 9-11-01.


we should put all effort into keeping miscreants out of
the cockpit. I just can't believe that a secure double door
system coupled with an iron clad -procedure- is that hard to
design or that expensive. Just imagine the cost to an airline of
one successful hijack, not just for the hardware, more than
likely that'd be mostly covered by insurance but imagine the cost
in missed revenue due to public apprehension.
--

-Gord.


There's no room for a "double door" on many aircraft,and cockpit doors

get
opened for food or toilet breaks,or other reasons.And there's still

the
chance of an 'inside job',someone who could open the door for

hijackers,or
tamper with it.I note that in AvLeak,someone reported a "reinforced"
cockpit door being knocked open with a beverage cart.

And the cost to arm a pilot is minimal,yet very effective,and COULD be
implemented almost immediately,in much less time than to reengineer

cockpit
doors.One day's training would suffice,IMO.
--
Jim Yanik
jyanik-at-kua.net


One factor about this issue that's not instantly apparent in all this
discussion about arming or not arming pilots is the fact that armed

pilots
change the hijack model before the fact; in the planning stage!
Anyone contemplating a hijacking would have to factor in to their
operational equation the fact that the pilots are armed. This changes

the
whole model for a projected hijacking.
Dudley Henriques
International Fighter Pilots Fellowship
Commercial Pilot/ CFI Retired
For personal email, please replace
the z's with e's.
dhenriquesATzarthlinkDOTnzt


I would suggest, in the event of an attempted hijacking, the days of the
passengers sitting passively by, have long gone by !!! There is no
alternative than to take some kind of action, regardless.

BMC

From what I'm hearing in the airline pilot community, this is the current
thinking out there. Much concentration is going into a focus on large long
range cargo flights because of exactly this scenario.
I can not envision a situation after 9-11 where the pax just sit there and
allow the aircraft to be taken by people with anything less than guns. The
current thinking seems to be that airport security, as bad as it is, will
catch the guns and explosives, leaving nothing but smuggled hand weapons
like the ones used before as on board options for the hijackers. I sure hope
this is right! You never know about these things. They do a model on every
conceivable scenario; then it;s the one they missed that is executed.
I'm also hearing that it will be an on course target rather than an off
course target that's chosen, since a transponder hit by center or any course
deviation from filed past a specific parameter will trigger a fighter
rolling off the alert pads.
Dudley Henriques
International Fighter Pilots Fellowship
Commercial Pilot/ CFI Retired
For personal email, please replace
the z's with e's.
dhenriquesATzarthlinkDOTnzt