On Mon, 29 Dec 2003 19:31:04 GMT, Scott Ferrin
wrote:


I'm not talking about factoring in built-in air to ground capability,
I'm talking about strictly air to air and escort.

A number of factors are involved. One, is the loss of scheduling
flexibility by adding another discrete system to the total package.
More supply, maintenance, avionics, engine, operations, etc. Keep in
mind that the A/A mission was very limited. While MiGs were a threat,
they operated almost exclusively in the defensive intercept role and
predominantly in Route Pack VI. Missions anywhere else had little need
for escort or CAP.

The F-104 didn't have particularly good endurance for the CAP role and
didn't have much of an A/A radar for running its own intercepts.

The probe/drogue refueling system adds additional tanker requirements
(although limited drogue tankers were flown for F-100F and B-66
support).

Low altitude engagements with the early AIM-9 (during the 65-66 time
frame when they were deployed, the version was AIM-9B) weren't very
reliable. The seeker head was virtually useless against ground clutter
and needed high altitude/blue-sky to discriminate. Gun engagements for
F-104 vs MiG-17 wouldn't be very successful as the high-wing loaded,
large turn radius 104 wouldn't match the -17's manueverability.

When F-104s were tasked as escort for F-105 Wild Weasel flights in RP
VI, a pair were lost on 1 August '66. Without RHAW, the airplane was
restricted after that to more permissive environments flying limited
interdiction missions.

Overall, the 104 performance in SEA was less than stellar.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8