"Bill Phillips" wrote in message
...

It depends on when you divert the resources.

Once you have built bombers you are restricted in what you can do with
them.

However change early enough and you can build almost anything instead,
such
as a tank that could take on Tigers and Panthers 1 to 1. Note:
resources
are
a quality issue as well as a quantity one, better equipment could have
actually reduced the logistic burden by achieving a given effect with
less
equipment.

Then you would have had to scrap the entire US military production
strategy,
which was based upon getting a LOT of "good enough" stuff produced as
opposed to the German approach of building a few really good items--we
know
which side lost, so I would side with the winning strategy.

I can't find any evidence that the USAAF were pursuing this strategy; on
average its aircraft were as good or better than the enemy's.

Your own example was in regards to *tanks* for gosh sakes! If you want USAAF
examples, ask yourself why, despite the availability of better aircraft,
projects like the P-40 continued in production as long as they did? Why did
the B-25 continue in production when the B-26, and later the A-26, were
already entering service in great numbers? Because the US valued mass,
that's why.


Much the same can be said of rifles, artillery, ships, etc.

OK. You think the M3 Grease Gun was the best possible quality SMG we could
produce? Of course not--but it provided the *numbers* that we could not
acheive with the Thompson production. In regards to tanks, the Sherman was
adequate in many ways, good in a few ways, and barely adequate in others
(such as firepower)--but we were still rolling the original 75mm version off
the lines when the war ended. Were Liberty and Victory ships the highest
quality merchent vessels going? No again--but by golly we could turn them
out like pretzels. Artillery? We did fairly well in that area--but more due
to better tactics and C-2 than any inherent advantage of the guns--and
again, turning out zillions of guns also helped.


So it appears that this "entire" strategy was only applied to tanks.

See above.



Even if it was put into air power then it could have won the battle of
the
Atlantic earlier

That is not assured. merely tossing a few hundred more aircraft over the
ocean was not going to stop the German subs; it took a combination of
aircraft and emerging technology (i.e., small radars capable of seeing
the
surfaced little buggers).

I am well aware of the need for technology, I am also aware that the first
airborne radars went to the bombers, so that they could bomb through
cloud.

That would be because those first radars would have been LOUSY U-Boat
detectors.


Then you would have had to factor in that the
germans, not being subjected to any kind of CBO, would have produced
even
*m
ore* boats ata faster pace, and trained them more effectively since
there
was not the additional effect on their POL supplies, not to mention the
fact
that all of those flak crews and resources would have been reprogrammed
to
face your other threats, and their Luftwaffe would have been better able
to
support operations on *both* fronts, etc, ad nauseum.

Given that German war production went up under bombing, I doubt that the
extra effort going to the front line would be anything like as large as
the
effort freed from our bombing offensive.

Logic failure. Get back to the subject at hand--the sheer number of
personnel dedicated to the flak forces, the number of guns that went to
support that defense effort that were NOT available to directly support the
Wehrmacht, the critical resources that went into producing those guns and
ammo that instead could have flowed also to the Wehrmacht efforts, the lack
of Luftwaffe support over the battlefield because of the need to resist the
CBO, etc.


and some more CAS and air transport would have been useful
for the advance across Europe. For example a little more air power
would
have turned Operation Market Garden into a victory.

No freakin' way. The weather shut out air support almost altogether
during
a
critical window of that operation, and a few more C-47's would NOT have
affected the outcome at Arnhem.

The biggest single problem at Arnhem was that the RAF took 3 lifts to drop
the British airborne div and the Polish Bde.

No, the biggest "single problem" was that they went to Arnhem in the first
place, amidst reforming German Panzer units that light airborne troopies
were ill equipped to fight, while depending upon an unrealistic advance rate
from the XXX Corps ground elements along a single axis of advance. Had they
been able to drop the Polich Brigade on day one that would have just allowed
the German's to roll them up with the majority of the British division,
instead of having it available to support the withdrawl of what British
elements were able to finally accomplish that move.


If they had all been dropped on the first lift then they would have
quickly
seized the bridges, and established a strong defensive position around
them.
Add a supply drop on D+1 and some CAS to weaken the Germans and they could
have easily held during the bad weather, and weeks after.

I sincerely doubt that. It would not have changed the fact that they were
dropped too far from their objective, nor would it have changed the fact
that they were facing a lot of German troops and tanks that they had not
planned on encountering. In all likelihood, you would have just given the
Nazis a larger bag of POW's to handle when it was all over.

Brooks