Andy wrote:
On Feb 28, 1:52 pm, Gary Evans wrote:

My short version is that judgement IMO is more important than flying
skills or hours logged. Judgement is what may keep you from exceeding
your ability whatever that may be and getting yourself into a
situation from which there is no recovery.

Ok, pick a list of 10 people that died in gliding accidents in the
last 10 years and say how many of those exhibited poor judgment until
just before the accident that killed them.

Andy,

Because to answer your question with 'my own specific accident analyses'
has significant potential to result in causing pain to previously
scarred emotions of 'strangers-to-me,' feel free to contact me by e-mail
if you wish, and I'll be happy to provide my assessments of what you
ask...the proviso being further dissemination by you must not tread in
the territory I'm trying to avoid on RAS. Strictly a 'trying to be
sensitive' aspect of my personality...
- - - - - -

It's easy to say he screwed up, now he's dead, but unless unless there
is a pattern of prior poor judgment how are we any closer to avoiding
the problem? If there was a pattern then perhaps intervention was the
solution. If not, then what?

I don't view my accident assessments as simply as what's written above,
though at least one of the dead glider pilots I once knew fit into the
category as you've written it. Ultimately, his death was -IMHO - due to
flying with a 'thin margin' for 'personality reasons.' (He snagged a
dead tree on a mountainside soon after release on what may have not yet
been a soarable day...quite possibly a buzz job to give some hikers a
moment of 'How cool!' joy. Even so, his death stunned me, because I'd
previously thought his [basically good, IMO] judgment would've been
sufficient to protect him from such an event. The snag stuck up from a
mountainside, not a mountaintop ridge. Yet, he took an avoidable risk,
and it killed him. Did he ask himself ahead of time, "What might go
wrong?" I'd like to know...)

To your question of 'prior pattern' allow me to add 'unthinking
ignorance' and 'momentary thoughtlessness' because all can lead to
risker in-flight decisions than what might otherwise be the case if
neither is present. And all can kill a pilot.

I knew a 'good judgment overall' pilot who died after - apparently -
getting into an unplanned spin in a ship type the airfoil suggested (to
me, anyway) was 'stall-docile.' I believe it inadvertent, because had it
happened half a mile east, he'd have had another 3000' for
recovery/bailout. But how he got into the spin perplexes me to this day
(it happened in the early 1980s)...yet he did. Do I KNOW that if he'd
actively considered the possibility of an inadvertent spin that he would
have flown differently that day? Of course not. But if we could ask him
if he had truly believed that he *might* depart controlled flight while
~1500' above a ridge line would he have 'somehow' been flying
differently that day, I suspect his answer would be something along the
lines of, "THAT's a silly question...of COURSE I would have!" Maybe it
would have been only to be quicker with forward stick when the more
stalled wing began to pay out...as distinct (say) from thermalling at a
higher speed, or whatever. But he seemed to be an individual who
definitely enjoyed life, and had many reasons to want it to continue.
Yet - for some reason(s) - he flew in such a manner as to lead directly
to his death. If he really and truly thought his flying might lead to
such an unhappy circumstance, I believe he would have 'somehow' flown
differently, and might still be with us today. At the very least, if he
had any doubt about recovering from an inadvertent spin - and I choose
to believe reasonable pilots do! - he would have at least practiced them
under different circumstances, if he thought about his situation at all.
I hope you see what sort of mindset I'd hope to encourage every
gliderpilot to develop...i.e. to 'continuously' ask themselves ahead of
time some equivalent of "What could go wrong?" and then to fly 'sensibly
accordingly.'

Personally, I never spun my V-tailed HP-14 because I surmised it might
be short of rudder for recovery purposes (don't know, of course...but
what could go wrong?!?). Nor have I spun my Zuni I (though I know others
from the same mold have been intentionally spun), because I don't want
to ask it to fly 'so near to redline' as a sensible pullout would
require. Once again, that's my answer in this particular instance to
"What could go wrong?" Did I ask both to ease into the separated flow
regimes? Have I abused and aggravated the ZUni on possible spin-entry
modes? Yes I have (and still occasionally do), including negative flap
entries. Do I play Joe Test Pilot? Both being experimentally licensed,
by my definition I am every time I fly, but more to the point I believe
that each moment of each flight could result in my self-induced death if
I'm not mentally up on things/the situation/my reactions. THAT's my
'inoculation' and not merely 'fear' or 'belief.'


Even pilots with superior skills and superior judgment sometimes find
themselves in a situation that exceeds their abilities. Sometimes they
die, sometimes they get lucky and learn from it. Sometimes they tell
the rest of us about it and we all learn from it.

BTDT...my first microburst encounter (I've now had 3) was - and remains
should the same happen again - a 'roll of the dice' situation
life-n-death-wise. Today it takes little thought to induce an adrenaline
reaction 15+ years after it happened. That noted, there *were* signs
(virga) of enthusiastic lift decay...just that I never imagined
'considering everything else' that day, the enthusiasm would include a
microburst directly over me. Heck, *I* thought I was being conservative
by heading back for the field miles ahead of the most recently nearest
virga. I like to think my most likely method of dying that day would've
been sink-/lift-induced under-/over-shoot into a
'horizontal-ground-contact-situation' as opposed to a
vertical-ground-impact. Atmospherically speaking, under-/over-shoot was
my situation by the time I'd worked my way to base leg into a 3,000+
strip. There's little doubt in my mind, that someone with my outlook
would have attributed my death after the fact to "I wonder what in hell
happened to Whelan? He seems to have screwed up horribly badly."

Hoping to avoid all semblance of arrogance, I imagine I'd be OK with
that epitaph...under those circumstances. If I die in a sailplane
*after* doing the best I could reasonably be expected (by someone with
my own outlook) to do, then I like to imagine I'd attribute my piloting
death to 'fate' rather than (say) myself...the dumb/inattentive/***t. If
I die in a sailplane I sincerely hope to not embarrass or puzzle my
living piloting friends. WAY too many soaring accidents (as I judge from
years-continuing review of NTSB files and every accident factoid I can
get my hands on) would do one or both of those if I were being read about.
- - - - - -

I still don't have a clue what point the OP was trying to make. I
hope it was a valid one and I come to understand it because I've lost
too many friends in glider accidents.

"Me too," regarding dead soaring pilot friends/acquaintances...and but
two of their deaths seem to me to be remotely assignable to 'fate' and
both of those pilots in hindsight might reasonably conclude each had
been given warnings or hints that 'fate' might intervene. One was a (20+
years bygone, now) 'Dick Johnson-like' possible medical situation; the
other was almost certainly influenced by self-made starved glue joints.
(For the record, and just by way of trying to shed further light on how
I think about the risks of soaring flight, I choose to attribute the
recent Boulder midair to 'fate.' I did not know any of the folks involved.)

As to your first point above Andy, FWIW if you ever feel invulnerable or
'absolutely safe' aloft in a glider, my fundamental reasoning is your
assumptions could do with additional self-scrutiny. :-)

Respectfully,
Bob - chicken-man - W.