"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Tom Cervo
writes
quoting Hackworth
Hey, I am one of those: I took a swing at Clark during the Kosovo
campaign when
I thought he screwed up the operation, and I called him a "Perfumed
Prince."
Only years later did I discover from his book and other research that I
was
wrong-the blame should have been worn by British timidity and William
Cohen,
U.S. SecDef at the time.

snip


"British timidity"? Just how many reservists was the US mobilising for a
ground offensive into Kosovo? I seem to recall the option being
categorically ruled out in the US... but we were getting ready to sign
Queen's Orders.

Personally, I could care less what Hackworth has to say about anything--IMO
he is a bit like James Dunnigan and Tom Clancy, in that he apparently
enamored with the sound of his own voice and impresses himself if nobody
else. But Paul, you do need to go back and check your facts--while Clinton &
Company had indeed ruled out the ground option early on (rating as one of
his administration's bigger military mistakes--it was stupid to give
Milosevich the additional breathing room it afforded him), they did
subsequently revisit the issue, and they *did* announce that it was back
into play (that latter cite is one that even you folks in the UK should have
heard of at the time).

http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archi...0/hed207.shtml

news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/ europe/newsid_359000/359481.stm

1st ID(M) was pulled from the V Corps WFX and began readying for either
contingency (ground invasion or stabilization operations); engineers started
rather openly evaluating bridges and transport nets in Albania and
Macedonia, and TF Hawk grew from a simple AH-64 deployment into a sizeable
combined arms force, with armored, mech infantry, artillery, and engineer
support. No, we did not activate reservists at that point, but then again,
unlike other contingency operations fought outside Europe, this one was
happening at NATO's back door, and USAREUR was not exactly destitute of
resources to support a one or two division effort without having to resort
to major mobilization.

(Out of interest, just why was Clark condemned to rely
on the UK's famously reluctant, fearful and combat-averse Parachute
Regiment, when he presumably had his choice of US and other NATO units
to dispatch?)


Sorry, but Hackworth is more interested in pandering to prejudice than
rational analysis. (For instance, his cheerful bluster about the
"useless" 9mm pistol and the "ineffective" M16 family... tell you what,
he can stand in front of me and I'll put a few rounds from either into
him; then he can tell me how "ineffective" they are)

He has also spent his ire at other US targets--he was especially deriscive
of the National Guard (though he has apparently piped down on that one over
the last year or two). Just make sure you don't shoot him where he wore that
unauthorized ranger tab he was bragging about...

Brooks