In article , ArtKramr
writes
THE PILOT WHO WOULDN'T FLY


SNIP of interesting, if sad, story

I am not really qualified to comment on the case of a single flier who
seemed to be doing fine until he got dropped on his head; I can only
admire those who manage to soldier on until the end; and feel sympathy
for those who cannot. However, it is not as if all aircrew come off the
production line, fully quality controlled in all respects, and
guaranteed to function fully for as long as necessary.

In late 1945, a study was made into the psychological disorders in
flying personnel of the RAF during WWII. This highlighted the fact that
the selection process for aircrew could not filter out all of the
candidates who would one day have a problem. It is a maxim of
management that when a man fails in his job the manager must share in
the blame for having put him there in the first place. During the war,
medical officers and flying instructors were briefed to watch for
temperamental unsuitability - they didn't always get it right.

The findings of the 1945 report are quite interesting, and a brief
summary follows:

Year by year there were about 3000 cases of nervous breakdown and 300
cases of lack of confidence, which showed that the selection process was
at least fairly uniform in its application. One third of the cases of
neurosis occurred in Bomber Command, one third in Training Command, and
the rest were spread amongst Coastal Command, Transport Command, and
Fighter Command. One third broke down without experience of operational
flying, one third broke down with less than 100 hours operational
flying, and one third broke down with more than 100 hours operational
flying.

Types of nervous breakdown were chiefly anxiety and hysteria, both
accounting for over 90 percent of cases. Almost all cases (98.4
percent) had an underlying psychological rather than a physical basis.

Of the cases of psychological disorder, 22.5 percent returned to full
flying, 3.5 percent returned to limited flying, and 72 percent were
grounded. 1.9 percent had to be invalided out.

One conclusion drawn was that psychiatric assessment was not appropriate
at aircrew entry, but should be one medical factor to be taken into
account at the final selection board.

So, although the RAF necessarily used the LMF tag to keep the waverers
in the job, privately it had a good understanding of the statistical
probabilities of the number of aircrew that would break down in any
period of time, and they knew that it was ultimately an issue of proper
selection processes.

That was a distinct improvement on the WWI practice of the British army
of allowing kids in their mid-teens to lie about their age and enter the
war; and then shoot them when they (unsurprisingly) cracked. It is said
that the army simply could not afford to acknowledge the fact of shell-
shock - although the army of 1939-45 seemed to have managed things a bit
better and only used the firing squad when it seemed to be absolutely
necessary to stop things unravelling. The execution of Eddie Slovik in
January 1945 owed more to a view of practical necessities during the
Battle of the Bulge than to the 'shock' of finding a deserter; there
were an incredible number - Hitler executed 50,000 men for cowardice; a
price in manpower paid for not correctly choosing between the men who
should be holding muskets; and those who should be away from the front
line.

I guess we just cannot expect sympathy and an objective view of the
human condition to reign supreme during wartime. As ever; management is
at fault, but believes it cannot afford to admit it.

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth