"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
enmeshed in tactical operations.

Yes, but again, their exposure is an order of magnitude less than that
experienced by MC-130's and AC-130's.


Sure. In the last few conflicts as the Lexington institue piece made
clear, but what about a few years down the road?

SOF platforms like the Combat Talon and Spectre operate in airspace that is
much more dangerous than that experienced by the E-8 or ARL-M's.


With long range SAM and AAW systems readily available for export its
not something that can be counted on. You may have missed this little
article in a December issue of AW&ST:
"Russian guided-weapons builder Novator is continuing to work, albeit
slowly, on an ultralong-range air-to-air missile, with a version on
offer for export to a select customer set.
Designated article 172, the weapon was included on a model of the
Su-35 derivative of the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker, on display during the
Dubai air show. The export version, known as the 172S1, has a 300-km.
(186-mi.) range, compared with 400 km. for the original version
specified by the Russian air force. The missile, which is also
referred to (perhaps erroneously) as the KS-172, is intended to engage
specific high-value targets such as airborne warning and control
aircraft, air-to-ground surveillance and tanker platforms."

- Aerial refueling tankers penetrated to support ISR

I know of one report of a KC-135 going *towards* Baghdad at one point, but
did it enter within range of the surviving Iraqi AD assets? Doubt it.

There were public reports of tanker assets going "downtown". The
commanding general flew one mission purportedly to allay tanker crews'
fears.


To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use the
of the ACS:
http://www.defensenews.com/conferenc...3/2409450.html
...As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide early
intelligence that could help shape the first stages of battle,[LtCol]
Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group conference,
ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way." ...

Obviously to be done using oblique imaging or UAV's reporting to the
aircraft--you don't think they intend to conduct overflights of an enemy
possessing an decent IADS, do you?


And against an S-300(or equivalent) capapble opponent? They may have
to be risked to get the job done.
"UAV Wrangling" from aircraft is still in the early stages. Given
budget realities its likely going to be a capapbility somewhere up the
"spiral". Until then the standoff ranges will be measured for the
aircraft.

As I mentioned in previous posts, the aircraft in question make fine
civil transports, but shoot at them and you have death traps.

No, you have to *hit* them in order to make them a "deathtrap". How many
KC-135's, KC-10's, E-8's, EP-3's, or ARL-M's have been hit during combat
operations to date? None. How many have even been shot *at*? Again, AFAIK,
none.

As improtant as these aircraft are bcoming to our operational
doctrine, and as few of them as there are or will be, these vulnerable
aircraft will offer a rich target for an opponent with a big payback
no matter the cost to neutralize them. Looks like Novator for one is
already moving in on the business.

Since they are not going into the hot part of the bad guy's threat envelope,
why do they need to be survivable in terms of enemy weapons effects?

Because it appears the threats will be reaching out to them.

Later attempts to back engineer vulnerability improvements into former
transports have proven less than sucessful and expensive. The P-3
comes to mind.

None of which have been lost due to combat operations, IIRC.

Two P-3s were lost in 1968 to ground fire actually. Likely because of
vulenrability to hydrodynamic ram after a small caliber round hit
them. Same vulnerabilty that turned the DHL 'bus into a roman candle
after a small shrapnel hit. Same vulnerability that all civil
transports share.

Since the SOF platforms operate in an entirely different threat environment,
I fail to see the connection to programs like ACS. Remember that the ACS
platform will be one of the current flock of business jets (Gulfstream and
Bombadier being major competititors for that role right now). The E-10 is
going to use a 767 platform. Now why do you think you know something about
the unsuitability of these systems that the combined brain power of the
USAF, USN, and US Army don't?

Read through this selection of links and you will see that
vulnerabilty is a perennial back burner issue...Until losses bring it
front an center.
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/
This one in particular discusses historical lapses in this regard:
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/8.pdf