"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message ...
"sid" wrote in message
m...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
enmeshed in tactical operations.

At least two of your Lexington Institute "pieces" have endorsed the ACS and
E-10, with their commercial aircraft platforms--what does this say about
your theory that using commercial derivitive platforms is unacceptable?

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031218.asp

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031211.asp

One "piece" does advocate the E-10. The other is a bit of an oblique
endorsement of the G-450 over the EMB-145. It doesn't advocate civil
airframes for the mission per se.
Neither bears any real relationshop to the ISR lessons learned
presentation.
"Russian guided-weapons builder Novator is continuing to work, albeit
slowly, on an ultralong-range air-to-air missile, with a version on
offer for export to a select customer set.
referred to (perhaps erroneously) as the KS-172, is intended to engage
specific high-value targets such as airborne warning and control
aircraft, air-to-ground surveillance and tanker platforms."

What was there to miss? The acknowlegement that the pace of development on
this rather strange weapon is "slow"? How would it be targeted? 300 to 400
km is an awful long way for a fighter radar to "see", much less target.

The fact that there is a market for the capability to counter our ISR
assets and someone that is working on providing that capability is not
something to be missed.
Sure--going "downtown" after the IADS, or what was left of it pre-war, was
further destroyed. We lost *one* aircraft over Baghdad--an A-10 to an
SA-7/SA-18, IIRC. How much of a threat do you think that SA-18 was to any
KC-135's orbiting at 25K or so feet?

This is one of the accounts:
"In a risky bid to extend strike missions by making it easier for
planes to refuel, he ordered tanker aircraft -- which are relatively
vulnerable, because they lack their own warning radar and armaments --
to venture into Iraqi airspace, even though Iraq's dense air defense
network had not been eliminated."

Apparently this was early, before dominance was assured. I'll see if I
can find the AW$ST issue that reported the story. Do you think that
mag is a somewhat credible source?

To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use the
of the ACS:
http://www.defensenews.com/conferenc...3/2409450.html
...As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide early
intelligence that could help shape the first stages of battle,[LtCol]
Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group conference,
ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way." ...

Obviously to be done using oblique imaging or UAV's reporting to the
aircraft--you don't think they intend to conduct overflights of an enemy
possessing an decent IADS, do you?
Well, if it has to be done...The OP-2E story is a bit of a cuationary
tale.
It appears that there are (or at least were when this was written)real
issues with just such analysis abot the survivability of these
programs:
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/SIGINTWP.pdf

Let's get this straight--you see a strong potential of AAM's that can engage
our E-10's at 300-400 km, but you think managing an existing UAV from an
airborne operator's station is too tough to handle? I find that a bit hard
to digest.

I don't think its too hard to handle; our flawed budget process may
not get the capability to the warfighters in a timely fashion.
Regardless of when we field an operationally workable airborne
controlled UAV force the GMTI 767-400 and the ACS configured EMB-145
or G-450 are expected to use onboard sensors. for decades to come. In
the years ahead their vulnerabilities could well be exploited.
No, you have to *hit* them in order to make them a "deathtrap". How many
KC-135's, KC-10's, E-8's, EP-3's, or ARL-M's have been hit during combat
operations to date? None. How many have even been shot *at*? Again,
AFAIK, none.
So? That proves we have been up against inept opponents in recent
scraps thats all. As an FYI the Navy is moving the P-3s away from the
overland tactical support role.


Two P-3s were lost in 1968 to ground fire actually. Likely because of
vulenrability to hydrodynamic ram after a small caliber round hit
them. Same vulnerabilty that turned the DHL 'bus into a roman candle
after a small shrapnel hit. Same vulnerability that all civil
transports share.

Checking around, there was one confirmed shoot-down of a P-3 in SEA (both
following incidents VP-26 Orions). One was an "unknown" (may have very well
gone down due to accident), the other took a burst of .50 cal while doing a
*low level* pass over a suspect LCM, which set set no. 4 engine on fire. The
crew apparently tried to put as much distance between them and the bad guys
as possible before attempting to ditch, and the wing snapped in the vicinity
of the aforementioned fire. Note that these guys were doing visual recon
from low level--they did not have the super synthetic aperture radars we
have today. The EP-3 does not conduct low level missions, nor do the
ARL-M/RC-12. So what is the applicability of the loss of one P-3 that got
hammered by .50 cal (which can be tough on any airframe, even those designed
to military specs--my brother lost a UH-1 Dustoff bird during Lam Son 719 to
a .50 cal, and more than a couple of A-1's, etc., were allegedly brought
down by 12.7mm and *below* calibers) to current programs like the E-10 and
ACS?

The unknown was almost certainly shot down. Also, if you read the
account of the second carefully you will see it wasn't an engine fire
but an uncontrollable fuel tank fire. They weren't trying to ditch,
but instead make a small field on an island which they had a visual
on. The wing burned through as they were about to land.
Hydrodynamic ram killed that airplane and its crew. The navy tried an
abortive program to mitigate the effects with foam in the tanks but it
was a mess and they took the foam back out. The 767 EMB-145 and G-450
have no protection whatsoever against hydrodynamic ram fires. Not that
it imposssible to engineer in though:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/newsletter_2000_spring.htm
Did you read this BTW:
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/8.pdf
In it you will see where a lack of recognition to vulnerability issues
caused the loss of many aircraft in Vietnam.



Great--for aircraft going into the thick of the combat. E-10 and ACS won't
be.

They threat will be reaching out to them in the next few years.