"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
The fact that the USAF,USN, USA, etc., are not going to place those assets
in a situation of undue risk is patently obvious. The fact that your Russian
"super AAM" is nothing more than a concept at present does not change that.

Gee, I thought that the ISR assets were expected to assist in the
conduct of a war. Recent experiences aside, wars are slam full of
"undue risk".
Thats whole issue here, while SOF aircraft are thought of, and built
as, warplanes, the Boeings, Embraers, and Gulfstreams contemplated for
these roles have no such engineering.
Fact is they are very vulnerable platforms that are being considered
for vital missions and that potential adversaries are building weapons
to field against.
Yet these aircraft will be expected to take part in warfare. As few
platforms that the ISR force has or will have, and as important as
they are to the conduct of contemporary and contemplated US military
ops, a capable opponent will find them juicy targets and he can buy
the equipment to do something about it.
A commander may well be forced to put these aircraft into areas of
"undue risk" to get the job done (as was done with the OP-2Es), or
risk not getting the job done at all.

That some AF units seem to be exempt from the possibility of taking
enemy fire has been a long term inherent cultural issue apparently.
I'm not the only one to say it either:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...jun/cahoon.htm
C-17 drivers just recently went through combat certification for the
first time. The question begs, why weren't they treated as warfighters
all along?

Sure, its not a real problem today, it won't be next year either, but
then again the ACS and E-10 won't be fielded until how many years down
the road? By the time they are operational, and S-400 s-300 equipped
opponent could well render them impotent.
This is not being planned for. Apparently you missed this part of this
"piece"?:
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/SIGINTWP.pdf
"ADA Susceptibility: GR/CS and ARL susceptibility to SA 10 and SA 12
threats was
the cornerstone of the argument to eliminate them from the system.
While it is true that they are susceptible to the threats, they are no
less so than many of the retained systems. Rivet Joint,EP3, ES3, all
retained by the study, fly at altitudes similar to Army systems. Their
survivability will require stand-off as well. GR/CS normally flies in
the same vicinity as JSTARS and AWACS, two targets an enemy would
likely pursue with more vigor than an RC12. Discussions
made it clear that the entire air campaign was not considered in the
analysis. In fact, constraints of the ADA threat were not uniformly
applied. Had it been so, many other platforms would have to become
HAPs as well (JSTARS, AWACS)."
As an FYI those SAM systems have advertised standoff ranges greater
than that of JSTARS and ACS.
I'm not the only one thinking of this either:
http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Articl...hiveIssueID=22

"For example, the standoff range for defending against SAMs
[surface-to-air missiles] is changing, and you will have to go to
space. Then you may want to move JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar System] and AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System]
capabilities into space. So past elements that have given situational
awareness in the theater may involve trade-ups."

"In a risky bid to extend strike missions by making it easier for
planes to refuel, he ordered tanker aircraft -- which are relatively
vulnerable, because they lack their own warning radar and armaments --
to venture into Iraqi airspace, even though Iraq's dense air defense
network had not been eliminated."
Credible, yes. But what does he mean by "eliminated"? We know that they
continued to pop off MANPADS even as the troops and marines entered into the
city--but again, those MANPADS were no threat to the tankers.

So why were they concerned. Obviously the longer range threat had not
been rendered below the "undue threat" threshold.

What vulnerabilities? The supposed vulnerability to a missile that has yet
been built, guided by a system not yet developed, while engaging in
overflights through an IADS that just won't happen? Not much of a
"vulnerability" you have illustrated there.


You are wrong about this. Besides, you mean susceptability here??? My
beef is vulnerability issues, there is a difference.
But to the point, the S-300 and S-400 are entirely capapble of
countering our ISR assets. Thats a fact.:
http://www.house.gov/pitts/initiativ...ew-brief-9.htm
(the google cached version works)
"The Russians sold the SA-10 (Russian designation S-300, NATO:Grumble)
to China, and recently agreed to sell them to Iran. The Russians are
aggressively marketing these systems and China may also build versions
for export, just as they did with the single digit SAMs. Several more
countries may acquire and field these systems within the next 10
years. The major factor preventing proliferation is the high price
tag of these systems. However, the Russians are also developing and
selling improvement kits to the single digit SAMs to provide near
double-digit SAMs performance at a fraction of the cost.'
'In short, the battlefield 10 years from now may be a far more
dangerous place than today, and it will take a toll on our pilots if
we do not act to mitigate the increased threat."

As an FYI the Navy is moving the P-3s away from the
overland tactical support role.
What?

Yes. P-3s(Not talking about EP-3s) and MMA will not be used in the
overland role due to vulenrability issues.
Did you miss this as well?
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/111803ISR.pdf
"However, Navy leadership removing P-3 from overland missions in
hostile airspace due to survivability concerns."

Gee, the VP-26 vet who wrote up the description I read must have had all of
his facts wrong. He indicated that the engine was lost, and the fire was in
that vicinity--whether or not it also involved the fuel tankage is a moot
point.

Here's what it says. Note the "unclear" part:
"Several rounds ripped into the outer portion of their starboard wing,
knocking out #4 engine and starting a fire. They pulled the emergency
handle and succeeded in feathering the prop, but could not extinguish
the flames. It was unclear whether the fire originated from the engine
nacelle or from within the wing itself."
I will standby this statement.
The wing burned through as they were about to land.
Hydrodynamic ram killed that airplane and its crew.

FYI, *any* airplane with an uncontrolled fire in its engine/wing is
susceptable to subsequent structural failure. And you ignored the fact that
aircraft designed exclusively for military use have also been lost to .50
cal and below hits--so where is this much greater vulnerability of the P-3
in view of that fact?

Any civil transport, such as this one was (before being modified), is
terribly vulnerable:
http://www.concordesst.com/accident/...es/flames1.jpg
But much can be done to mitigate the effects. And is being done on
"War"planes:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2003_fall.pdf
"When it comes to providing aircraft fuel system ballis-tic tolerance
capability, it is necessary to understand that protecting from a
catastrophic explosion in a fuel tank ullage cannot be accomplished
solely with self-sealing fuel cells. To provide the desired level of
ballistic tolerance requires a hand-in-hand compli-mentary approach
which incorpo-rates both self-sealing fuel cells and OBIGGS.
Ultimately, it is necessary to incorporate the appropriate fuel system
requirements verbiage requir-ing a self-sealing capability and that
damage from certain high explosive incendiary and/or armor piercing
incendiary rounds must not cause catastrophic explosion. This will
drive a solution, which provides the proper level of survivability
protec-tion for both permanently mounted and auxiliary internal fuel
cells."

I also note that in the first few sentences the authors identify the
difference between "susceptability" and "vulnerability"--the latter does not
come into play if the former is controlled such that hits don't occur--which
will be the predominant environment that the ACS and E-10 will operate in.

Glad you found out the difference between the two. I think you fit
firmly in the camp described below. Its a very wrong and hubris filled
view, but I'll let some much more credible sources speak make the
case:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2003_fall.pdf

If you took a poll of operators in the fleet and asked them what they
wanted most on their aircraft, they would say—
1)advanced sensors,
2)range and speed,
3)long range and very accurate weapons,
4)low observable technology, and
50)vulnerability reduction.
Yes that was number 50, not number 5. There are two reasons for this.
First, vulnerability reduction technology is not very sexy. A cool new
radar that can identify a target at 500 miles is always preferable to
a fuel tank liner. And second, most operators just assume that basic
vulnerability reduction features such as fire protection and
redundancy are a given in aircraft design. If you asked an operator if
he would prefer target ID at only 400 miles while guaranteeing he
would not burn up in flight because of a fuel leak, you might get a
different answer.

http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2001_summer.pdf

"Vietnam and the experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war clearly
rattled the confidence of those who felt that high-performance
military aircraft were relatively invulnerable to enemy defenses
simply on the basis of high
transonic or supersonic dash speed, or because of perceived pilot
excellence. Both of these translated into technological and cultural
hubris and numerous aircrew paid the price for such delusions."
....But that fact hints at the survivability battles yet to come. The
history of military aviation has witnessed a seesaw battle between the
offensive
power of the airplane and the defensive snap of its victims.
In an era—
• When the size of deployed coalition air power
forces is likely to shrink,
• When future aircraft production runs may be measured
in dozens rather than several hundred or several
thousand,
• When potential opponents will have little difficulty
in acquiring advanced Flanker-equivalent threat aircraft
and the weapons systems for those aircraft to
hold air and surface targets hostage,
• When the SA-10 equivalent weapon will undoubtedly
become the common currency of air defense in
much the same fashion that the SA-2 was in the
'60's and the SA-6 in the '70's and onwards, and
The challenge for those having responsibility to
ensure the survivability of our joint service aerospace
forces is, if anything, even more demanding than it has
been in the past.