On Aug 25, 7:09*am, Cookie wrote:
On Aug 24, 2:34*pm, T8 wrote:


On Aug 24, 9:52*am, Cookie wrote:

You really think ANY of the recent accidents are attributed to
dehydration?

Maybe.

Gee...and all that was needed was some water?

Since you were up at WB this summer...the guy who flew thru two
fences...dehydration????



Grrrrrrr. Sorry about the wall of text to follow.

I don't have a bag of excuses, thank you very much and I didn't say
that dehydration was the "cause" of the accident. You completely blew
off the point of my post. Yep, "all we need is water." "All we need
is oxygen." "All we need is to put the airplane together correctly."
If the PIC gets sufficiently dehydrated, his brain turns to oatmeal.
It's a process that although slower, can be nearly as debilitating as
hypoxia and just as dangerous as a disconnected control. Is aviation
physiology not something you acknowledge as an important part of
aviation safety? WTF is up with you? It's *every* bit as important
as putting the airplane together correctly. Sorry, that winds me up a
bit. Of COURSE it's the responsibility of the PIC. Is that clear
enough?

I am familiar with the facts of the accident you speak of. I saw the
flight log and the pics, I know the field (it's huge, maybe 2500 x
1200'). PIC set up really high, really crowded, turned way too early
and dove it straight onto the field (100 mph gps ground speed on short
final). As PIC, I think he probably understands he was responsible
for a) keeping landable areas in reach (check), b) selecting a good
option for landing (check), c) flying an appropriate pattern and
landing (massive fail).

I don't know that pilot personally. The only narrative I've heard
some third hand stuff, but I'm not going into that here.

This accident is, unfortunately, typical of what I have seen on the
contest circuit. The guy still trying to climb at 100 agl in flat
lands over scrub (beautiful fields 1/2 mile away), didn't work out,
busted glider. Two guys trying to do impossible final glides in heavy
rain/sink over wilderness (one busted glider in trees, miraculous
escape by pilot thanks to Gerhard's cockpit, one glider landing in
lake wing tip first, pilot unhurt, glider unhurt). A guy on a contest
ridge mission flying above and down wind of the crest... ridge gets
poochy and he falls off the *back* side of the ridge into miles and
miles of wilderness, gets directed by a heads up pilot into the first
clearing (not really landable, just a place to crash near a house) and
gets away with bumps and bruises, again thanks to Gerhard (plane
destroyed). And then there are two guys who tried to fly complete
landing patterns from around 200 agl on extended downwind. All sorts
of other options available (including a nice big runway going the
other way). One crashes on the numbers in an incipient stall/spin,
walks away with a bad back (another modern cockpit), the other just
barely gets away with it (lift in the pattern) and good thing too
because it's an older ship with an eggshell fuselage. Some of these
guys are friends of mine and probably reading and possibly getting
annoyed (sorry, I'll buy you a beer some time, just glad you were
lucky enough I can still do that).

I do think that there's a common thread here and it has to do with
intellectual tunnel vision. You've all heard of the "monkey trap"
http://tinyurl.com/3ayq6tk? I have my doubts about the reality of
this technique for catching monkeys, but it's useful in assessing
human reactions. I think we all have a tendency to get fixated on
executing a preconceived plan and have difficulty abandoning this for
"plan B". Some, I am convinced, simply don't formulate "plan B", but
that's another story. Some of the best advice I've ever heard for XC
soaring is this: "If your plan isn't working, you'd better get a new
plan" (thanks UH). To be ahead of the game, this needs to be a
continuous process with multiple contingencies, *all* the time. This
is why xc soaring is usually hard work. All of those accidents I just
recounted were completely avoidable, but only "by getting a new
plan". Dehydration, hypoxia, hangovers, or for chrissakes bees in the
cockpit may interfere with this process and it's important to
understand how and why. That doesn't make any of these "an excuse".
"See and avoid" applies to more than traffic.

One of my most satisfying flights in 08, my first season back on the
contest circuit in a few years, was a landout. What pleased me about
it was my decision making after I missed the gear shift, got low, was
pretty darned good. I found a field, scratched, got up a little and
field hopped my way to an eventual private airport landout. I *might*
have been able to make it to the finish. I had a small positive
number on final glide, some likely enroute convergence lift... but it
was hazy, a new to me and very technical site (New Castle) and
although I knew there were a few landable fields on the way home, I
was not going to put myself into a position where I might need to be
finding a place to park from less than 1000' agl at the state of local
knowledge I had at that point in time. My planning and transition to
alternates went really well. Moderate stress, no anxiety. That's the
way it's supposed to work. Result: shiny ship, $65 aeroretrieve,
home in time for dinner.

Back to tunnel vision. What I worry about is that the guys I have
spoken with (about half) after the fact don't always seem to "get
it". I know I'm not the only one to observe this. There's a certain
amount of re-invention of the circumstances going on and I hope that
deep inside they *do* acknowledge what really happened and how they
had a hand in it, had (usually) 2 or more perfectly safe, fairly easy
options to exercise once it should have been completely obvious plan
A wasn't working out. I don't know what to do about that. JJ (bless
him) means well, but safety isn't something that you can write down on
paper or install in a panel. These actions may provide useful aids to
safety conscious individuals but they would not have helped a bit in
the accidents I've recounted above. Those guys already had all the
knowledge, all the information, all the gizmos they needed to be
safe. I hope by now they realize that.

Now Cookie, it seems to me that based on what I've read from you, you
would agree with at least some of the foregoing. Either way it's fine
by me. I have a system, it seems to work for me. I can only work my
ass off to make sure that some day when these words float over my
grave it's not because I put myself there through some unforgivably
stupid act of incompetence or worse.

-Evan Ludeman / T8