"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
. ..

"Thomas Schoene" wrote
Kevin Brooks wrote:
"Paul F Austin" wrote
"robert arndt" wrote

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
was last-war's weapon.

Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.

I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
conclusion.

What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches
were
getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
that
didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns
and
IR
MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major
threats
to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
large
sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
radar signature reduction.

If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when operating
at
low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as the
alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get
even
worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost unmanned
weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources to
cue
a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important,
carrying
heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
persist in the interdiction area_is_.

Why? Maybe the lesson should instead be to refrain from using attack helos
in the deep fight (what you call the "interdiction area", I presume) when
(a) the terrain is unsuitable, and/or (b) the normal SEAD support package is
not provided. Ever been in the woods when helos were operating around you?
Or in rugged terrain? During those situations it is hard to find the helo
during daylight hours; at night you are hopelessly confused. In those kind
of environments the deep attack option becomes more tenable. Even in the
situation that the 11th AVN encountered during their dissapointing OIF deep
attack mission might have had a very different outcome had the SEAD arty
support been included (it was not executed due to collateral damage
concerns). Again, you are reading a bit too much into the results of a
single mission which was conducted under rather unique circumstances, and
very likely with some serious planning flaws included in the mix.

Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary UCAV
R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support the
Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.

Brooks