On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 12:32:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:
"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:
I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to
designate
targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated.
That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an
incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require
some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with
pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of
trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech,
mud-reliable sort of weapon.
I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator and
operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace using
existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode could
come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already
envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along a
transportation link.
OK, I misunderstood your initial post. When you said "direct control
of the men on the ground" I assumed you were suggesting an organic UAV
capability in the maneuver element. What you explain now, is simply a
full-blown tactical system with everything but the pilot-in-the-loop.
At some future time, data processing may make that practical, but
right now the wetware is still the most size/weight effective
solution.
The loiterer doesn't seem a practical model over an ongoing
engagement. Much too MANPAD intensive to be tolerated. Certainly the
current use of UAVs as recce platforms or even very limited (due to
small payload) interdiction systems is working well. CAS, however is
often very critical in terms of "danger close" criteria, run-in
directions, and other factors.
Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the
ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he
seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a
detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked
vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports
what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a
difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS.
CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet. The only
thing that was holding back the technology was the moral issue of having a
flying machine kill without an operator, but that was answered by CIA years
ago.
Some CAS is done from a heavy type at altitude with JDAM, but I think
the questioner's phrase "Traditional CAS" refers to troops-in-contact
and immediate fire support situations which may require a nose-to-nose
look at the enemy. I'll be the first to agree that modern weapons with
stand-off capability and high accuracy make the definitions of what
CAS really is more debatable.
I don't think there is any moral issue involved with or without an
operator. If the targeting is against a military objective, I'm
comfortable.
You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace
coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of
aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or
flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver
ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem.
Atonomous UAVs are the future, reguardless of the screeching of the fighter
mafia.
I don't think I was screeching. I agree that there is a bright future
for UAVs with increasing missions. But, I don't go so far as to accept
the sensationalized concept of video game whiz-kids snapped off the
back streets of the inner city to do the job. If you check out the
operators of the current crop of UAVs, you'll find a lot of active and
former fighter types. The hands and the mind still function pretty
well long after the body quits tolerating the high-G environment.
And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an
unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made
few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic.
The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue incidents
is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality in
this forum.
Sorry, I won't accept that assertion. The A-10s record is very good
with regard to CAS. And, there is nothing inherent about "the
machine"--it is as vulnerable to fratricide mistakes as any other
system. Taking the pilot out of the loop is the real issue and there's
no evidence to indicate that the potential for fratricide goes down.
I'd contend that taking the man out of the system will increase the
probability of error.
Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8
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