"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 12:32:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:



I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to
designate
targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be
eliminated.

That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an
incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require
some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with
pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of
trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech,
mud-reliable sort of weapon.

I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator
and
operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace
using
existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode
could
come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already
envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along
a
transportation link.

OK, I misunderstood your initial post. When you said "direct control
of the men on the ground" I assumed you were suggesting an organic UAV
capability in the maneuver element. What you explain now, is simply a
full-blown tactical system with everything but the pilot-in-the-loop.
At some future time, data processing may make that practical, but
right now the wetware is still the most size/weight effective
solution.

Actually, the ground forces are well on their way to having UAV's as an
organic element, even down to the platoon level. The USMC has already
initiated production of the small Dragoneye, which is essentially about a
two man load--the operator uses a laptop to control the aircraft and observe
the intel feed (and no, it is unlikely to be any kind of weapons carrier).
The Army has established a squadron/battalion sized ISR element to serve in
its new Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, and I believe the plan is to have them
operate their own small UAV's in the not-too-distant future.

snip


I don't think I was screeching. I agree that there is a bright future
for UAVs with increasing missions. But, I don't go so far as to accept
the sensationalized concept of video game whiz-kids snapped off the
back streets of the inner city to do the job. If you check out the
operators of the current crop of UAVs, you'll find a lot of active and
former fighter types. The hands and the mind still function pretty
well long after the body quits tolerating the high-G environment.

The objective right now for the ground forces is to get useful UAV's into
operation at the lowest possible echelons. From what I have seen regarding
Dragoneye, it is a pretty simple system to operate. I would imagine the
Army's new focus on rotary UAV's will also emphasize ease of operation (I
doubt the Army wants to commit rated pilots to flying its UAV's as the USAF
has been doing); trying to attach additional qualified pilots to each and
every meneuver brigade/battalion, etc., to operate their organic UAV's would
impinge upon the pool of pilots available to fly the manned aircraft in the
AVN BDE's.


And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an
unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made
few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic.

The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue
incidents
is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality
in
this forum.

Sorry, I won't accept that assertion.

You are correct there. IIRC there were two A-10 frat incidents during ODS
(one engagement of a British Warrior AFV and one of a USMC LAV); on the
other hand, there was also a rather nasty AH-64 frat incident (hit a Bradley
IIRC). So there is no real preponderance of evidence to support the idea
that the A-10 was "poor" in comparison to the rotary assets in this
regard--one incident versus two incidents is statistically meaningless.

The A-10s record is very good
with regard to CAS. And, there is nothing inherent about "the
machine"--it is as vulnerable to fratricide mistakes as any other
system. Taking the pilot out of the loop is the real issue and there's
no evidence to indicate that the potential for fratricide goes down.
I'd contend that taking the man out of the system will increase the
probability of error.

Yep. It will be quite a while before the crunchies would be comfortable with
the idea of autonomous UCAV's flying the CAS missions, especially those TIC
missions you mentioned earlier.

Brooks




Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8