Evan Brennan wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote in message
...
Evan Brennan wrote:
The entire emotional palette of your pet beliefs is predicated
on the idea that the Sea Harrier, but not fuel consumption of
the Argentine jets, was the main influence on the tactics of
Argentine flights from the mainland to the Falklands.

I've never claimed anything of the kind, but feel free to point out
where you think I did.

But you said:
"they [Mirages] avoided the Sea harriers, but didn't on May 1st.
So what changed? The answer is, they got beat early, and decided to
throw in the A-A towel"

Yes, I did, and they did.

I said there wasnt' much ACM in the first place, for lack of fuel.

And I agree that was one of the issues. It still doesn't explain why the
fuel wasn't lacking on 1 May, but was subsequently.

And, everyone but yourself agrees that the bombing by the Vulcan
influenced Argentina to reserve the Mirage for local air defense.

I never said that it wasn't one of the factors (actually worries about Chile
seem to have been of equal if not greater significance). I question whether
such a decision would have been reached if they hadn't felt so totaly
outclassed by the Brits on 1 May. But again, even if they wished to hold
the Mirages back, the Daggers had the fuel to be effective. If they can
make it all the way to Port Stanley with 100nm on the deck carrying bombs
and 50 or so without on the way back, they sure as hell can get to the San
Carlos area using a high altitude cruise, with a reasonable amount of fuel
for CAP.

Fuel reserves played a part

The main part, where Argentine fast jets were concerned.

Certainly a significant part, especially with the Mirages.

Then there's the huge advantage of the AIM-9L on the British side;

Not a huge advantage, and one more psychological than practical, but it was
unquestionably there. As I've previously stated, the Brits would have won
just the same if they'd only had AIM-9Gs, with a slightly lower number of
kills and pK, and might even have lost a SHAR or two. Let's be clear he
Do you think Argentina would have won if that had been the case?

then the prewar ACM exercises that gave the British an important
edge.

As far as being much better trained in general than the argentine pilots,
and having the confidence of knowing that they had beaten far better
aircraft/weapon systems than Mirages, I'd agree. As far as the limited
tests against the Mirage, I doubt that was all that important. It was
obvious that the Mirage would want to take the fight towards the upper right
side of the envelope, while the Harriers wanted to be closer to the lower
left. Since neither side got into fully developed ACM, the fine points of
each a/c's performance advantages/disadvantages were essentially irrelevant
-- it was sight, turn, shoot, repeat or bug out as appropriate.

Then there was the matter of the Black Buck raid that caused
redeployment of the Mirage.

Aactually, it appears that the redeployment may have been even less than I
supposed. Huertas says they flew AD sorties from Rio Gallegos throughout,
mainly over the Andes and around Tierra del Fuego, and provides an account
by the Grupo 8 Ops officer, Major Sanchez, who did just that. He mentions
that he returned once to Rio Gallegos from a decoy mission over the
Falklands that had lasted "more than two hours [not exactly short on
endurance there, although obviously they were avoiding combat], and as my
a/c was being refueled on the ramp I received an urgent scramble order, so
the refueling was cut short and I launched with only internal fuel."

If they could fly missions to East Falkland on 1 May and then again much
later in the month, all the while maintaining an AD alert commitment, they
clearly could have done so during the critical 21-25 May period.
Personally, I'd have been tempted to launch escort missions with Magics only
and three tanks, or maybe mix the older and newer Mirages, giving the lead
just an R.530 and two tanks (no Magics or O/B pylons/racks), and the wingman
two Magics and 3 tanks, to boost endurance. Worth a try.

But let's assume that the reasons given for not flying Mirage escorts was
based purely on the perceived Vulcan threat. That doesn't explain why they
didn't use Daggers as escorts.

The Harrier itself was a lesser factor,
in comparison.

Except that it was the Harrier that was shooting them down, and which was
almost as fuel limited as they were.

weapons played a part, a/c capability played a part, tactics played
a part

The Argentine Mirage pilots felt they may have had a better chance
in a brief fight at high altitude, where their aircraft (but not
necessarily their missiles) had better performance. And better fuel
efficiency. But the Harrier pilots were unwilling to climb up there to
meet them.

Of course they were unwilling; you don't fight where your opponents fight
best, but make him fight where you fight best. Both sides adhered to that
philosophy, which is why most of the combats on 1 May were inconclusive --
it's just good tactics, and Sharkey covers all of this in his rules 1
through 4 of the Layman's Guide. Where the Argentine pilots fell down was
in not applying Rule 5, especially after 1 May: "The fifth rule is to
approach every fight in a _totally_ aggressive manner but without ignoring
Rules 1 to 4. Under-confidence and a half-hearted approach never won any
battle, either in the air or the ground. The pilot's motto should always be
'You can if you think you can!'"

It's clear from comments by Zini, Rotolo etc. that the AAF A-4 pilots
considered themselves as good as lost if a SHAR spotted them, and the
Mirage/Dagger pilots seem to be in just about the same mood post 1 May.

You have
implied elsewhere that there was a significant amount of
manuevering, positioning and set-up by the Argentine jets on
May 1st, which is not true. In fact there was minimal ACM by
them, and even less later. More to follow.

I've never claimed that there was a significant amount of ACM
(I'd say a grand total of two occasions), but there was "maneuvering,
positioning and set up", on May 1st, albeit limited. If you think
I've claimed otherwise, please provide a cite.

Well you did say the Daggers and Mirages "forfeited the match and gave
the Brits a free ride after May 1st, because the Brits had achieved a
moral ascendancy over them" -- not because there was any question of
Argentine jets having enough fuel to carry out dogfights using their
inferior missiles.

Yes, I did, which exactly describes the situation. The AAF Mirage/Daggers
had gone 0:3 on 1 May, and conceded the fight from that point on. The
Daggers at least had enough fuel to fight for a couple of minutes, although
they'd be dumb to do so if they could avoid it. Slashing attacks should be
the name of their game.

To repeat, there wasn't much ACM anyhow but you seemed to be implying
that there was, and that it suddenly stopped mainly because of the
Harrier.

And to repeat, at no point did I ever say there was much ACM, nor did I
imply it. I said they stopped flying CAP/escort missions after 1 May,
conceding the A/A battle to the Brits. They did, end of story.

We know they rarely did so, the question is "why not, when
they had done so for a large number of sorties on May 1st?"

Oh? How many Daggers carried air-to-air missiles on May 1st?
We already know the Skyhawks did not.

According to "F:TAW", 12 A/A Dagger sorties were tasked on 1 May,
with 11 launched

Since when is '11' a "large number" of sorties?'. : )

On 1 May, the AAF planned to launch 28 A-4 strike sorties, 6 Canberra strike
sorties, plus 10 Mirage and 12 Dagger escort sorties, a total of 56. The
actual totals were slightly different, as the Daggers launched some strike
sorties as well and the Mirages apparently put up a couple more. Only 35
sorties "reached targets"; apparently none of the A-4 sorties did, and only
three of the Dagger strikers. When you only launch 15 or so total Dagger
sorties on 1 May, 11 (12 planned) is a large number, especially when you add
in the Mirages. 21 or 23 out of perhaps 60 is a goodly total, and as a
percentage of sorties that did their jobs, it's far higher. Of course, if
you want to claim that 11 or 21/23 isn't "large" under any circumstances, I
suggest you check out how many SHAR sorties there were on 1 May, and then
remember that many of these would be sent up when no AAF a/c were present.

and your conspiracy
theory that a few decoy flights somehow proves that the Mirages were
not held back because they anticipated bombings of the mainland.

Not a conspiracy theory, just an acknowledgement that there were other
reasons why they conceded the A/A battle to the Brits after 1 May

This another of your unsubstantiated pet beliefs. I can find no
authority, Argentine or British, who agrees. All say that the Vulcan
strike on Port Stanley convinced Argentina of possible attack and
that's what convinced them to reserve Group 8 for air defence of the
mainland.


But they didn't reserve Grupo 8 for the mainland, they returned to flying
missions to East Falkland later (while still sitting AD alert) , they just
wouldn't put the Mirages in a position where they might come into contact
with SHARs. The Vulcans were still at Ascension, able to attack any point
in Argentina.

If Moro is a propagandist -- Sharkey is Dr. Goebbels.


Hardly. At least Sharkey's got success on his side

I'm sure the French Mirage pilots would say just that to Sharkey
regarding their success against his beloved Sea Harrier. ; )

And just what is the exchange ratio in actual combat between the SHAR and
Mirage/Dagger? 11:0. What's the exchange ratio of French Mirage pilots
against Sharkey's squadron? AFAIK, they never flew against them when he was
CO, but 801 flew against far better a/c, and more than held their own. Do I
think this means that the SHAR is the world's greatest fighter and can never
be beaten by Mirages (or any other a/c), no matter who's flying them, what
weapons they have or what the tactical situation is? Of course not. I'm on
record repeatedly over the years repeating the favorite saying of a friend
of mine: "The most important factor in A/A combat is the quality of the
ejection seat baggage." Operational and technical factors can also play a
large part, as they did here. The Harrier can be beaten, just as any a/c
can be. But if you listened to the conventional wisdom before the war, both
the usual clueless pundits as well as numerous professionals who should have
known better said that the SHAR didn't stand a chance against the Mirage.
Sharkey said Bull****! (in the same way that Adm. Leach said that Britain
could retake the Falklands, when the Army and Navy CoSs along with Nott were
doing their doom and gloom bit), and he was right in the only arena that
mattered, that of actual combat. That's success.

Guy