"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
news
In message , Cub Driver
writes
This is, in fact, the very error Bush is repeating today. He is
creating today a situation in which the full military might of
the USA is merely sufficient to keep a few thousand terrorists
at bay.

An interesting point, but I'm not sure it's entirely accurate. Iraq
hardly represents the "full military might" of the U.S.

It's serious in that you've got very few forces available for other
crises. If $SOMEWHERE blows up, the US is going to have some seriously
unpalatable choices to make.

Please clarify that claim a bit. Looking at the most recently posted ORBAT
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita..._orbat_toe.htm), I count two
full AC heavy divisions (1st AD and 1st ID(M)), one AC airborne division
(minus) (82nd), a portion of 1st CAV DIV (big minus), one BCT each from the
25th and 10th LID's, one Stryker BCT from the 2nd ID, and two ACR's (one a
minus), along with three ARNG seperate enhanced brigades (30th, 39th, and
81st). Add one BCT (plus) assigned to OEF in Afghanistan. Which means that
for the AC in terms of major combat elements we have some three full combat
divisions, plus the major portions of some four other divisions still at
their home stations (if you toss out the recently returned units, you still
have a total of three combat brigades in the "ready to deploy" category, two
more in the train-up for deployment category, and the two forward deployed
brigades in the 2nd ID). Backed up by the twelve remaining ARNG enhanced
brigades (five of whom are recently returned from other operations, leaving
seven, and the eight ARNG combat divisions.

Given the scale of the deployment for the offensive phase of OIF as a model,
it appears we are in none too severe a condition to handle a pretty
significant contingency operation, especially when you condsider that you
have the USMC units as well, with only a single MARDIV (minus) deployed to
Iraq, leaving at least one MARDIV available for operations elsewhere (and
one plus MARDIV in the train/reconstitute role).


We took nearly
as many casualties in the Battle of the Bulge as there are troops
stationed in Iraq,

We lost more troops on the first day of the Somme than are currently in
Iraq, but that doesn't mean our current forces aren't seriously
stretched at the moment. There were a *lot* more men under arms in 1944
or 1916 than we have now.

Is there a significant deployment load preasent--yes. Would it result in
serious consequences if another contingency arose suddenly? No. (Some wonk
like Henry will undoubtedly start squealing about the DPRK, and how we have
to be able to send zillions of ground troopies over there to play in the
meatgrinder--but that is no longer the case, with the ROK's three field
armies being capable of handling the lion's share of the ground combat fight
if one were to arise--and that has been the situation there for a number of
years now, as even our own DoD has recognized).


and the Air Force and Navy are hardly engaged. And
the troops are doing many more jobs than keeping terrorists at bay.
They are, in effect, re-creating the country.

True, but that still means they're committed and unavailable for other
tasks.

But you apparently don't have a very good understanding of just how many
more forces we still have in our pockets.

snip


Short of those options, the US has tied a large portion of its strength
into Iraq for some time, and that's a serious impact (because it's not
just the troops the it's the troops recovering from the deployment,
and the troops preparing to go out there, that eat into your available
strength)

And those are accounted for in the numbers I gave you above.

Brooks



--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk