Evan Brennan wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
This another of your unsubstantiated pet beliefs. I can find no
authority, Argentine or British, who agrees. All say that the Vulcan
strike on Port Stanley convinced Argentina of possible attack and
that's what convinced them to reserve Group 8 for air defence of the
mainland.


But they didn't reserve Grupo 8 for the mainland

The facts prove that they did.

they returned to flying missions to East Falkland later

Only a few.

Nice to see you're now admitting that, in fact, they didn't reserve Grupo 8 for the mainland but did indeed continue to fly
missions over the Falklands, just as Grupo 8's Ops Officer Maj. Sanchez stated in the quote I provided. Just to drive the
point home, here's a quote from a source you seem to out a lot of credence in (which says a lot), Moro's "The History of the
South Atlantic Conflict", pp. 217-18, referring to the missions flown on D-Day, 21 May:

"The first diversionary mission [unclear if he's referring to Mirages or Lear Jets here] commenced at 0930 hours, and the
first attack squadron, code-named Nandu' (Ostrich) left the runway at 0944 hours [Guy Note: Apparently Southern Argentine
time, GMT-3, vs, the GMT-4 kept in Buenos Aires and the Falklands]. It comprised three Mirage-V Daggers. The mission:
attack naval targets in San Carlos Strait [Falkland Sound]. They were followed a minute later by the Perros (Dogs), backed
up, at 0953 and 0955 hours, by the Zorros (Foxes) and the Leones (Lions), flying identical formations on a mission with a
single objective. At 0956 and 100 hours, two flights of Mirage IIIs, _configured for air to air combat, screamed off to fly
top cover_."

Unfortunately, as a general rule these later escort/decoy missions were unproductive as they stayed up high, so the SHARs
ignored them and stayed low for the strikers. No combats resulted, but combat wasn't necessarily required, as long as they
could occupy the SHARs so that the strikers could get through. This didn't happen for the reasons stated above. The excuse
for the lack of aggressiveness from the Argentine side is that the Mirages couldn't come down low for lack of fuel. Let's
look at that claim again, delving once again into the technical minutiae you consider so unimportant.

The Mirages had an internal fuel capacity of 2,940l (777 USG), 470l (124 USG) less than the Daggers, so they were
undoubtedly more fuel limited. But they were even more fuel limited owing to decisions made by the Argentines themselves.
To start, with the strikers at low altitude and the SHARS likewise, there was absolutely no point in hauling around the
R.530. While it might provide some minimal threat at medium/high altitude, on the deck it was so much extra baggage,
especially when the Mirages had Magics available. Dumping the R.530s and replacing them with a 1,300l (343 USG) C/L drop
tank would have more than compensated (applying the rough rule of thumb for jets, that 1/2 of the fuel in a drop tank is
used to push the tank's extra drag, that provides 650l extra) for the Dagger's greater internal fuel load, and bought them
several minutes of endurance, even at low altitude.

But the even more basic point, which shows the whole Argentine claim about fuel limitations being the primary reason the
Mirages stopped challenging the SHARs as fallacious, is where the Mirages were based. Throughout the war, the Mirages
operated from a single southern airbase. The AAF fighter/strikers operated from 3 main bases during the war. From north to
south, they're San Julian, Rio Gallegos, and Rio Grande. Here are the distances from each base to Port Stanley, from three
different sources ("The Royal Navy and the Falklands War," "Falklands: the Air War" and the World Distance Calculator,

http://www.infoairports.com/freeserv...ddistance.html

using the base lat/long. as given in F:TAW):

San Julian - Port Stanley: 395nm / -- / 410nm

Rio Gallegos - Port Stanley: 420nm / 428nm / 430nm

Rio Grande - Port Stanley: 380nm / 381nm / 384nm

Guess which base the Mirages operated from throughout, despite the range/endurance limitations which became apparent on 1
May. That's right, the one furthest from the Falklands -- Rio Gallegos, along with Grupo 5's A-4Bs. At a minimum, moving
the Mirages from Rio Gallegos to Rio Grande would have eliminated 80nm from the round-trip distance, up to a maximum of
92nm. Put another way, assuming the Mirages would be cruising at 8 to 9 miles per minute (480-540kts), basing them at Rio
Grande saves them 9 to 10 minutes of fuel. Applying the rule of thumb that fuel burn at SL is triple that at the
tropopause, that still gives them 3+ minutes of extra endurance at SL, and this is without dumping the R.530 and replacing
it with a drop tank.

If they couldn't put them at Rio Grande for some reason, they could move them to San Julian (and move the Grupo 4 A-4Cs to
Rio Gallegos if necessary. That's where the KC-130s were based, so that would make sense), and still gain at least 40nm of
endurance. The Daggers were based at San Julian and Rio Grande throughout, so it made absolutely no sense to put the
shorter-ranged Mirages at Rio Gallegos, and then complain about how fuel-limited they were. BTW, San Carlos is between 38
and 52nm closer to the various bases than Port Stanley is. So, the idea that unsolvable fuel restrictions were the major
reason behind the Mirages being unable/unwilling to get into combat with the SHARs after 1 May is manifestly false.

However, even if you still believe the Mirages were too fuel-limited to be effective, that still doesn't explain why Daggers
weren't used for escort/cover on 21 May and subsequent, as the vast majority of Dagger sorties were so tasked on 1 May.
Some might say that it was because every sortie was needed for strike, but what mattered wasn't the number of strike sorties
launched, but how many made it to the target. Forfeiting the a/a battle had several negative effects for the AAF; it made
the strikers sitting ducks if the SHARs caught them, caused many sorties to be turned away by the controllers because SHARs
were in the area, and allowed the SHARs to operate against the strikers with ever increasing confidence, worrying less and
less about potential threats from escorts. These limitations were especially critical on 21-25 May, when the AoA was still
being established.

The escorts don't have to shoot down a single SHAR to be effective, they just have to keep them busy and/or looking over
their shoulder so the strikers can get through. It wouldn't have taken much; even a single two-ship escort/low-level CAP
per strike mission might have made a significant difference. And even if the escorts themselves get shot down, that's still
preferable to losing strikers, especially the Grupo 5 A-4Bs. At least the escorts would have a good chance of running away
from the SHARs, something the A-4s generally couldn't manage without a big head start, or the SHAR being at the end of its
CAP time.

Guy