I don't know if its heplfull but a Workmate of mine served aboard HMS
Plymouth during the conflict and has in the past related to me this tale of
when they were attacked by the daggers, the bomb hits and the depth charge
being triggered - i guess something like this would tend to stick in your
memory!!
He also said something about them bringing down an A4. There is A4 wreckage
in the museum that the Plymouth now is.
I'll have to give him a call and see if he can give me a few more details
BTW HMS Plymouth is now part of the Historic Warships Collection in
Birkenhead UK along with HMS Onyx, a Diesel Sub that also took part in the
conflict.
Lee Hutch
"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Evan has apparently declined my offer to analyse Moro's claim below for
accuracy (to absolutely no one's surprise), so to amuse myself I'll do so,
to
show just how easy it is to disprove it, based on the technical minutiae
that
Evan apparently finds so difficult to deal with.
For those who don't have access to Moro, here's his account of the Dagger
attack on June 8th, verbatim. My notes and interjections are in square
brackets, although I have resisted the temptation to make comments about
Moro's overly dramatic (for what purports to be a history) prose:
"The Mystery of the Frigate Plymouth.
"Just after all hell had broken loose in the wake of the A4-B [Sic. A-4B]
blitz [on Sir Tristram and Galahad at Port Pleasant], two formations of
Mirage-Vs Daggers, code-named Perro (Dog) and Gato (Cat), screamed in over
Pleasant Bay [False; they were over Falkland Sound, ca. 50 miles to the
NW],
bristling with 500-pound bombs [some of the mission pilots agree, others
say
1,000 lbers], gunners' trigger fingers at the ready on 30mm cannon. They
bore
in from the west, and as they came in, they spotted a frigate in the inlet
that was going to great lengths to conceal its presence. But it proved to
be
too late. The planes hugged the elevations around Pleasant Peninsula
[False:
see above], then lunged for the prey, coming in at 30 deg. on both the bow
and
the port side. Again bombs fell and cannons blazed as they made their
attack
run over the hapless vessel, whose gunners cut loose with everything they
had
in a vain attempt to drop their tormentors from the skies. The attackers
returned to base without a single loss [True]. Where had the British CAPs
been at the moment of truth? Something was strangely amiss with the Sea
Harriers [This inference is part of Moro's claim that both Hermes and
Invincible had been hit and damaged by AAF bombs/CANA Exocets, for which
the
evidence Moro uses is even more tenuous than for this case].
"The wounded frigate turned and, making slow headway (three knots), left
the
bay on an easterly heading. Apparently, four of the eight bombs hit the
ship's structure [True]. Initial reports from Great Britain indicated
that
none of them detonated, but later reports from the same sources told a
different tale [False. None detonated, although one set off a depth
charge].
"At the same time, the armed forces' operations electronic center [in
Stanley]
picked up a source of infrared radiation, similar to that given off by a
vessel afire, in the Falkland Sound area [Sure, they did! See end of
post].
There was no logical explanation for this, since there had been no
Argentine
attacks in that area [False]. Then, unexpectedly [only to Moro], Hastings
and
Jenkins revealed in late 1983 that the Rothesay class frigate Plymouth had
been attacked by Argentine aircraft (Mirage-V and A4-B) at the exact point
where radiation had been detected in Falkland Sound. A later publication
[also 1983 according to my copy] (Ethel [Sic.] and Price) re-states the
Plymouth's position at the same location.
"What really happened? British officials seemed to waffle in the days
immediately following the June 8 attack. Argentine analysts could be
certain
only of the events reported by their own men: that a Class [Sic. Type] 12
frigate had sustained an attack in Pleasant Bay by air-launched 500-pound
bombs. This was confirmed by aerial photographs [he is presumably
referring
to gun camera film from the Daggers rather than post-strike recon photos,
as
no such missions were flown to the area]. Data provided on the attack
against
the frigate [presumably the one supposedly attacked in Pleasant Bay]
report
serious damage [overstates the case] by the bombs from the Mirage-Vs which
had
not been revealed by the infrared radiation, thus agreeing with the
original
British report [of the attack on HMS Plymouth in Falkland Sound] that the
bombs had failed to detonate."
"The process of deduction has enabled the following events to be surmised
[here's where he really steps off the edge into fantasy based on wishful
thinking]:
1. The frigate targeted by the Daggers in Pleasant Bay was similar to the
Plymouth. One of the Argentine pilots saw the Marks F-16 during the
attack,
indicating that the frigate would be the HMS Diomede (similar to the
Plymouth)
[we'll be back to this].
2. The Plymouth may have fallen victim to a mistaken attack by a Harrier
squadron flying cover against Argentine troops at Port Howard, under
adverse
weather conditions and poor visibility [nice of him to admit that those
were
the conditions].
"The Royal Navy has sought to explain the events by attributing to
Argentine
Flyers 'an understandable navigational error,' which is not borne out
becauseof the distances involved and the pinpoint precision of the
Mirage-V's
navigation system."
I then summarized these claims and asked Evan to analyse them, as follows:
You have Moro, and from
references you've made to it, you apparently also have "Air War South
Atlantic." Using those two sources plus any others you wish (you'll
want to use a good naval reference like Jane's, Conway's etc. for the
era), why don't you analyse for us Moro's claim that:
1. The Dagger attack on June 8th hit a frigate other than HMS Plymouth
(Moro suggests HMS Diomede, owing to a pilot's claim that he saw "F
16" on the ship),
2. That said frigate was off Port Pleasant rather than in Falkland
Sound when attacked,
3. That Plymouth, which he agrees was in Falkland Sound, must have
been hit by a British air attack,
4. And that IR emissions from said frigate were detected from the
Argentine Ops Center (presumably in Port Stanley)?
Okay, how long does it take to determine, using only the three sources I
mentioned above and which Moro certainly had available to him, whether his
claims are valid? Not counting the time to retrieve the books from the
shelf,
library or what have you, I estimate between 30 seconds and one minute.
Let's
start with the simplest part first - Moro agrees that Plymouth was
attacked
while in Falkland Sound, indeed she was only a little way outside San
Carlos
Water on her way to an NGS mission of West Falkland when she was attacked.
Numerous photos of her show her burning as she retreats back into San
Carlos
Water, so her position is agreed by all sides.
Moro claims that the Daggers were absolutely sure of their position and
attacked a frigate in Pleasant Bay, and no Argentine attack, by Daggers or
any
other a/c, was made on a ship in Falkland Sound that day. Further, he
claims
that the ship attacked was a "Class 12" frigate, and that one of the
pilots
saw "F-16" on the ship, indicating it was HMS Diomede. Let's ignore the
information (which Moro had available to him in "Falklands: The Air War")
that
Diomede didn't deploy to the South Atlantic until well after the war was
over;
for the sake of argument we'll assume that British claims to that effect
are
all part of the big cover-up Moro charges the Brits with.
So, what proof do with have from the Argentine side as to what ship was
attacked by the Daggers that day? Their gunsight camera film, of course,
which Moro cites as proof. Fortunately for us, still frames of that film
have
been widely released by the AAF and published in numerous sources,
including
one photo in "Air War South Atlantic". And here's where Moro's claim
falls
completely apart. The frigate in the Dagger gunsights is very clearly a
Rothesay class, of which only two were with the task force at the time,
Plymouth and Yarmouth.
Even assuming HMS Diomede was in the South Atlantic at the time, it can't
be
her, because Diomede was a broad-beam Leander. The difference between the
two
classes is instantly recognizable from the beam, which is the angle all
the
attacks were made, as shown by the gun camera film. The photo in "AWSA"
is
cropped so only the section of the ship from the turret aft to the funnel
is
visible, but that's more than enough. Rothesay class ships have the
funnel
just aft of the mast and raked slightly aft, the two forming a noticeable
V at
the base. Leanders have the funnel well aft of the mast (guesstimating
30-50
feet), and the funnel is vertical not raked. In the gun camera photos,
the
funnel and mast are together, and the latter is raked. In gun camera
photos
available in other sources the other recognition features are plainly
visible
- Rothesays have the weather deck stepped-down aft of the Limbo mortar,
while
in Leanders the deck continues level all the way to the stern. Unmodified
broad-beam Leanders like Diomede have a mainmast aft mounting a Type 965
radar; Rothesays lack both mast (well, they have a sort of stump) and
radar.
The ship in the photos has a stepped down weather deck, and no mainmast or
Type 965. In other words, the Dagger gunsight photos are conclusive as to
the
ship type they attacked, and it was a Rothesay, not a Leander like
Diomede.
Unless, of course, Moro wants to contend that his own side was
participating
with the British in the great conspiracy to cover up British losses ;-)
What about the "F-16" one of the pilots believed he saw? British frigates
and
destroyers had painted out their hull-side pennant numbers during the war
(HMS
Yarmouth seems to have been an exception, as her port-side pennant number
"F101" is visible in photos taken while she was alongside the sinking HMS
Ardent), apparently leaving their pennant numbers only on the counter.
As an
aside, the AAF released gun camera film of the Dagger attack on Broadsword
on
21 May, where they apparently 'added' a pennant number, F08, to the
picture.
Unfortunately for Argentine credibility, that number had last been used in
the
1960s by HMS Urania; Broadsword's own pennant number was F88. Of course,
the
Brits _could_ have painted a false pennant number on her themselves, but
normal practice was to just paint them out entirely, and besides, she
could be
identified from her sister Brilliant by the difference in her funnel,
number
or no number. This was definitely a case where they should have left well
enough alone.
Getting back on track, we know the ship wasn't Diomede (or any other
Leander),
so how could the pilot have thought he saw "F-16"? I'll point out that
the
attacks were made at speeds between 550-575 knots, at an angle to the
ship,
the pilots were being shot at, and the ship was making quite a lot of
smoke,
not exactly conditions conducive to reading a number accurately. And yet,
the
pilot did a pretty good job -- HMS Plymouth's pennant number was F126, and
the
photo of her at anchor in San Carlos Water shortly after the attack
appears to
show that the '2' has been somewhat worn away. It's a bit hard to say for
sure because funnel smoke and possibly smoke from the fire is drifting
across
the stern, making the number hard to see at all, at least in the print in
the
book.
Finally, getting back to the "big coverup" theory of Moro, couldn't it be
that
there were more Rothesays in the theater during the war than the Brits
admitted, and it was one of _those_ which was attacked in Port Pleasant?
A
reasonable question, except for the gun camera photos and the numerous
photos
taken of the damage to HMS Plymouth, immediately after the attack. In
every
still frame I've seen of the attack on Plymouth, including the one
reprinted
in "AWSA", a hole can be seen in the after end of the funnel about half
way
up, made by one of the bombs (which passed through without exploding) of
the
first Dagger to attack. So, we know that whichever Rothesay they
attacked, it
will have that entrance hole in the funnel, and also show signs of the
bomb's
exit on the other side. AWSA has three photos related to the attack; the
gun
camera still mentioned above, and two photos showing the damage to
Plymouth
immediately after she'd anchored in San Carlos Water shortly after the
attack,
both of which, including a closeup of the funnel, show the hole in the
funnel
and the damage made by the bomb's exit.
But maybe the ship was hit in Port Pleasant, then steamed around to San
Carlos
Water? At the 3 knots that Moro claims, that would be quite a feat to get
there in daylight, as it's well over 90nm by sea -- even at 28 knots they
couldn't make it given the time the attack occurred. In short, the total
time
needed to analyse and disprove Moro's claim, based primarily on evidence
from
_his own side_ along with other sources he used, was considerably less
than
the time it took you to read the above. And that ignores Commodore
Clapp's
account (which hadn't been published when Moro wrote his book) that no
frigate
was anywhere near Port Pleasant at the time, because Clapp didn't feel
they
could add anything to the defense beyond a couple of 20 or 40mm guns,
owing to
the short warning time and surrounding terrain that would prevent
radar-guided
weapons from working; it would just be another target. Clapp also said
that
he'd tasked Plymouth with a NGS mission against a target in West Falkland,
that he'd wanted her to stay inside the headlands of the entrance to SCW
to
keep her inside the AA defenses, but her Captain had decided he preferred
a
firing position outside it.
There are numerous other sources which Moro failed to use or didn't have
access to at the time, which just pile proof on proof as to the British
version of events rather than Moro's being the correct one. For instance,
what about Moro's claim that the Daggers couldn't have been in Falkland
Sound,
owing to the pinpoint precision of their navigation system? While some
French
built Mirage 5s had INS or Doppler nav systems, the Israeli-built Daggers
don't seem to have had anything like that at the time. Here's Salvador
Mafe'
Huertas, who interviewed several Grupo 6 pilots, describing their fit at
the
time of the war in "Dassault Mirage III/V":
"The equipment was fairly basic, with VOR, DME, ILS and an
Israeli-developed
RWR . . . At the beginning of 1982, the FAA [Fuerza Aerea Argentina; I've
used
AAF for them to avoid confusion with the British FAA] was working with the
Israelis on a plan to update and modernize its Daggers, but the whole
scheme
was brought to an abrupt halt by the Argentine occupation of a
little-known
group of islands in the South Atlantic."
This upgrade did eventually come about, known as the "Finger" program,
completed in several stages finishing up with Finger IIIB. It included an
INS. So it appears that the Daggers lacked "pin-point" navigation
capability
at the time; even the best INS at the time would drift ca. 1 mile/hr, not
enough to put them in Falkland Sound instead of ca. 50 miles away in Port
Pleasant, but "pin-point" only in relative terms. VOR/TACAN is line of
sight,
so that's out of the question on the deck even if they hadn't been well
out of
range. Further indication of their lack of onboard navigation systems, if
that were needed, is provided by the following account of the mission in
Mafe'
Huertas, describing the lead up to the attack:
"The five remaining a/c [one Dagger had suffered a bird-strike just after
take-off] were joined by Learjet TC-23 [Sic. T-23. Trasnports that were
primarily used or modified for cargo hauling added the 'C' after the
'T' --
the Lears were just plain 'T', as contemporary photos show] of Grupo 1 de
Aerofotografico, which would act as pathfinder, _using its state of the
art
navigation system [Omega and INS] to guide the formation towards the
south-west coast of West Falkland_ [my emphasis]. From there, the Daggers
would establish a northwest heading towards Falkland Sound, intending
later to
turn east, crossing southern east Falkland to make the attack from the
west.
The weather began to deteriorate, and in order to avoid the worst of the
low
cloud, rain and snow squalls, the formation deviated slightly from from
the
planned route. Crossing Falkland Sound on their north-easterly heading
they
were amazed to find the Type 12 frigate [actually Rothesay class, but they
were slightly modified Type 12s, the Whitby class], HMS Plymouth (F 126)."
Surprise having been lost for an attack in Port Pleasant, they decided to
attack her instead. Finally, we come to Moro's most ludicrous claim of
all
regarding this incident:
"At the same time, the armed forces' operations electronic center [in
Stanley]
picked up a source of infrared radiation, similar to that given off by a
vessel afire, in the Falkland Sound area."
I wrote in an earlier post that this one could be argued (more accurately,
debunked) based on basic physical phenomena. I leave it to the rest of
you to
evaluate the likelihood of some kind of IR sensor being able to detect a
ship
on fire, when the detector is located at least 50nm away from the supposed
fire, with no direct line of sight to it (lots of several hundred foot
high
hills in the way), and the weather is low cloud, rain and snow squalls,
i.e.
lots of moisture in the air to absorb IR radiation and reduce the range to
near zero.
So, if any of you are tempted to read Ruben Moro's "The History of the
South
Atlantic Conflict," you're now aware of the effort Moro put in
establishing
the 'truth' of his more unlikely claims. Objective history, it ain't, but
it
does serve to illustrate the mindset of nationalist partisans like Moro.
He
reminds me of Venik, Mikhael Petukhov, et al., but at least Moro was an
actual
participant in the war (he was a Lt. Col. at the time flying C-130s,
possibly
including some missions into Stanley).
Guy
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