On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 08:35:39 -0700, (Harry
Andreas) wrote:

In article , Ed Rasimus
wrote:


A few USAF F/A-18s should get the point across.

I don't understand your fascination with USAF F/A-18s. It is most
assuredly a non-stealthy airframe and one not dedicated or even very
well suited to the air dominance mission. IOW, it isn't an A/A fighter
by any stretch.

Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with the
F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
F-22 to conclusion. Right now, other than cancellation, there's nothing
really forcing their hand, and (whether you agree or not) IMO
cancellation at this late stage is improbable, and they know it.

It's nice to have an interpreter aboard. Occasionally the terseness at
the end of the long repeated, multiple-entry threads leaves me
confused. Might be an age thing.

Just curious, what is your recollection of the debate surrounding
USAF's buy of the F-4 ?

Not an age thing, I guess. I'm not as old as you accuse me of being!

The USAF F-4 came on board in FY 62. The operational airplanes were
entering the inventory in CY '64, the same year I went on active duty.
I didn't know or hear much about the debate as lowly 2/Lt. I was just
happy to go to UPT at Willy and then get my first choice of assignment
and go to Nellis. At Willy, when I saw my first F-4 up close on the
transient flight line I was awed at its size. At Nellis, when I taxied
by the Weapons School flight line in my Thunderchief, it looked a bit
smaller.

Never liked the smoke, the second seat and the lack of a gun. When I
got in the airplane in '72, it finally had a gun (that came in '68),
but still smoked.

I will, however, agree with Walt (as I almost inevitably do) that had
the program remained on timeline and operational airframes been
delivered a decade ago, the unit cost would be lower, the avionics
would be more mature and the politics would be irrelevant.

Agree. But someone bit off more than they could chew.

I don't know what was going on across town in Burbank, but at
Hawthorne, I was appalled by the lack of accountability in the
program. A lot was falling through cracks, but I've got little to
compare it to in terms of total industry standards. I do know that the
simulation program was going well, the cockpit displays/symbology was
a thorny problem and the trade/off work was incredibly complex. The
interface with the customer, however, was ongoing and very productive.

The SPO officers were regular visitors and flew a lot of the
simulation stuff with the Northrop staff. They ranged from Captains to
B/G's, all operationally experienced tactical aviators, so they had a
tight hand in defining the requirements.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8