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Old April 17th 04, 08:31 PM
Keith Willshaw
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"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Given that the oil campaign didnt happen until late summer 1944 that's a
remarkable claim.


The 15th AF hit Ploesti repeatedly in April.


By which point Ploesti was far less important than the
German synthetic plants

The 8th AF reduced German avgas production by 50% in May -- with just

three
days of raids.


Yet even before that date the RAF were fully operational
In April 1944 Bomber command flew 9700 sorties with
a loss rate of 2.7%. In fact far from facing destruction in
the spring of 1944 the RAF was flying almost twice as
many sorties as it had in spring 43 and seeing lower loss
rates.

The so called 'Battle of Berlin' was indeed a costly failure for
the RAF and clearly it should have been curtailed earlier
but to describe the RAF as defeated at this point is a
grave error as the German in Normandy would find as
bomber command turned its attention to transportation and
troop targets.

During 1944 of around 525,000 sorties flown by the RAF
180,000 were against industrial towns, 93,000 against troop
concentrations, 100,000 against transportation targets and
around 48,000 against oil targets


Look what Galland said:

"As early as June, 1944, the month the invasion started, we felt very

badly the
effects of the consolidated offensive. Fuel production suddenly sank so

low
that it could no longer satisfy the urgent demands. Speer, when

interrogated
by the Allies stated that from June on, it had been impossible to get

enough
aviation fuel. While it was possible with the greatest effort to keep up

at
least a minimum production of motor and diesel fuel, the repair work on

the
plants where normal fuel was converted to octane constituted difficulties

which
were impossible to overcome. The enemy soon found out how much time we

needed
for reconstruction and for resuming production. Shortly before this date

was
reached under tremendous strain came the next devastating raid."

-- "The First and the Last" p. 210 by Adof Galland

If not for the USAAF operating by day, it would have been impossible for

the
RAF to operate by night over Germany after the invasion. Bomber Command

was
defeated by the Germans in the Spring of 1944. It was only the situation
created by "American Air Policy", that allowed Bomber Command to return to

"the
night blitzing of cities."

All this occured before the RAF dropped any bombs at all on Oil targets as

part
of the "Oil Campaign".


The RAF conducted its first raids on German oil targets
as early as 1941. This however is not the point. The
German night fighters were NOT grounded by lack of
fuel, indeed they continued to fly well into 1945.

Their real problem was that by late 1944 there were
more Mosquito NF's hunting Luftwaffe planes than
the Germans out in the skies over the Reich

Again, to return to the WSJ review of "A Long Way to Bombs Away", -- that
review didn't show what really happened. Maybe the book was as badly

flawed.
I haven't seen it and don't plan to.


So you are criticisng something you
havent seen, hmmm.

Keith