Yet even before that date the RAF were fully operational
In April 1944 Bomber command flew 9700 sorties with
a loss rate of 2.7%.

After losing almost 100 aircraft in the Nuremburg raid of 3/31/44.

It was only being put onto invasion related targets that saved Bomber Command
from the perception of visible and humiliating defeat, and only "the favorable
situation created by the Americans", that allowed Harris to make the rubble
jump in German cities later in the war.

Now, the Americans had a similar situation. After 10/14/43, it was
conclusively shown that the unescorted bomber boxes couldn't operate over
German targets without prohibitive loss. The Americans were able to interject
a technological antidote -- the Mustang.

Due to the nature of the British techniques and the unsuitability of their
aircraft to being escorted the way the Americans could, the Brits could only
get back over German targets after the Americans deprived the German air force
of fuel. And I remind you that Galland said that deliveries of aviation fuel
were inadequate before the RAF flew one sortie in the "Oil Campaign", and I
further remind you that Harris sloughed off boming Oil targets as much as he
dared.

Walt