"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Yet even before that date the RAF were fully operational
In April 1944 Bomber command flew 9700 sorties with
a loss rate of 2.7%.

After losing almost 100 aircraft in the Nuremburg raid of 3/31/44.


Indeed and in the month of march the loss rate was 3.6%
which was approx the same as the 8th AF was taking.

It was only being put onto invasion related targets that saved Bomber
Command
from the perception of visible and humiliating defeat, and only "the
favorable
situation created by the Americans", that allowed Harris to make the
rubble
jump in German cities later in the war.


Were the 8th AF also humiliated ?

They were switched to invasion targets too. The reality is that
the heavies were required to attack the transportation network
and defences in germany and France but continued to operate
over Germany, your fantasies notwithstanding

Now, the Americans had a similar situation. After 10/14/43, it was
conclusively shown that the unescorted bomber boxes couldn't operate over
German targets without prohibitive loss. The Americans were able to
interject
a technological antidote -- the Mustang.



As the British would do with windows, serrate , the Mosquito NF etc

Due to the nature of the British techniques and the unsuitability of their
aircraft to being escorted the way the Americans could, the Brits could
only
get back over German targets after the Americans deprived the German air
force
of fuel.

This has been shown to be untrue. The RAF operated over Germany every day
of the war. During most of spring and summer 1944 the Mosquito's of
the LNSF were delivering their 4000lb bomb loads to Berlin
almost on a nightly basis


And I remind you that Galland said that deliveries of aviation fuel
were inadequate before the RAF flew one sortie in the "Oil Campaign", and
I
further remind you that Harris sloughed off boming Oil targets as much as
he
dared.


All of which is of course irrelevant to your claim