Apart from the observation that there are many misconceptions about how
"forward bases" are used, I would add that it's not just about
"...prosecuting the air war...". Ask the guys getting shot at on the
ground. Forward bases can provide increased sortie generation, reach, time
on station, and reduced use of what are critical assets -- airborne tankers.
If anybody thinks tanker availability isn't an issue, talk to the Navy. Or
talk to air planners who worked at the CAOC during OAF. Or how about
OEF...?

Most 'forward bases' have been used simply for fuel, obviating the logistics
issues that most cite as prohibitive. In simple terms, when you don't need
much more than a couple thousand feet of hard surface (e.g. a road, an
old/repaired airfield), and you can get some fuel bladders there via 53s or
Battle Hercs, your options increase dramatically. The Air Force actually
used a FW forward site during OIF before the USMC did. Was that an
"operational imperative," or was the USAF "showing their stuff?" The Marine
Corps waited to use a location further north (within about 60nm of Baghdad)
in anticipation of having to support ops north/well north of Baghdad. In
addition to a large number of RW sorties (Army and Marine), it supported
about 200 Harrier sorties before major combat ops ended. Earlier, four
Harriers landed and fueled on a road location that some of the helicopters
were using further south, but it was deemed too narrow and too unsecure and
not used for FW again.

Forward basing is often less about how a jet takes off and lands than it is
about having the support assets necessary to conduct various levels of
airfield operations at austere/expeditionary locations. That's why the
Marine Corps has the MWSSs (Marine Wing Support Squadrons). Forward bases
are typically formed from what's available -- the MWSS's rarely have to
start from scratch, though the Wing has the ability to do so if necessary.
During ODS, the primary airfield the Harriers used wasn't on anybody's dance
card. If it had been such an easy thing to use, others would have been all
over it since it was further north by a considerable margin. The
difference? -- 3300 sorties.

"Mark" wrote in message
m...
To clarify my point (slightly)...

If you need the JSF VSTOL capability to use a particular 'forward base',
how
would you get the airlift into the proposed airfield? It's not so much
the
forward basing per se.... to a 'conventional' NATO standard (8000 ft)
airstrip I'll sign on... send the conventional JSF. But to an airfield
where you need VSTOL to operate; the support logistics I see as being a
potential show stopper to effective operations.

wrt 'been done'....

Afghanistan/Desert Storm... very small numbers; very limited overall
impact
on capability to successfully prosecute air war (just a subjective
opinion)
Was is this forward basing done because it could only be done by Harriers,
or was it a matter that it so-happened to be Harriers. Was it an
operational imperative or an opportunity seized by USMC to "show their
stuff"?? I see a difference.

Mark

"Dweezil Dwarftosser" wrote in message
...
Mark wrote:

And the ordnance, force protection personnel and equipment, aircraft
support
equipment, food/water, etc etc etc....

Of course - but I wonder if you realize that a standard
squadron mobility package (18.U.E., 24 U.E) in the tactical
forces was set up to contain all of the people, equipment,
and supplies for at least 30 days of autonomous operations?
(With the very low munitions capacity of today's much smaller
fighters, it should be even easier to transport the required
munitions - almost always the largest tonnage component of
the package.)

Besides - an FOL would likely use a very small number of
aircraft (4? 6 to include spares?) for a very short time,
measured in days - before moving on to a different location;
perhaps swapped out with fresh aircraft/personnel/supplies
from the more-rearward located base.)

The forward basing "feature" of the VSTOL is way oversold (IMHO)

Perhaps. It would be a new ballgame for the USAF, anyway.