Mr. Sinclair:

Walter will now go look up Mighty 8th War Diary for 27 September 1943,
"Remarks First Pathfinder (PFF) mission lead by H2S equipped B-17s
of 482 BG". Or two months earlier than claimed.

Well, from 27 Sept. to November 1 is @ 35 days, but I appreciate the
correction.

The point is that the Germans began redeploying the day fighters for home
defense in April and decided to disperse the fighter production factories in
May, 1943. This was well before even the 9/27/43 date, and it belies the point
the other poster made, that it was all "area bombing".

And it really is amazing that the 8th AF was able to do this when you remember
how many raids were run on U-boat pens and airfields in France and the like.
And also when you recall that the 8th never had more than @ 100 heavy bombers
on any given raid before mid-May, 1943.

snip the same old crap

"All told, the strength of the fighter force in North West Germany, France
and
the Low Countries rose from 270 in April, 1943 to 630 by August."

-- "The Mighty Eighth", p. 54 by Roger Freeman.

Ok now we are in August 1943 when the USAAF was running raids of
a "few" dozen bombers, 15 is being defined as few it seems.

The 8ith AF activated 5 new groups in May, 1943. The number of available
heavies rose from @ 100 to @ 250. But as noted, the Germans had begun
redeploying the day fighters in April and plant dispersion in May.

"American bombing in the summer of 1943 had limited the planned
expansion of the Luftwaffe's forces. This expansion had begun in
mid-1941 when Goring ordered Milch to increase aircraft production
sufficiently to quadruple front-line strength. Hitler accelerated the
effort with additional demands for greater aircraft production in
1942. Milch merged existing factories into larger complexes in order
to increase production.

By the way, merging plants has a habit of temporarily lowering
production as people adjust to the new way of working.

That too, would be a result of daylight precison bombing.


In June 1941 German aircraft acceptances were 880, down from
1,078 in March, and stayed below 1,000 for the rest of the year.

In June 1942 1,235. In June 1943 2,258. In June 1944 3,597.

USSBS figures.

Pedantry.


Though efficiency of scale helped raise
output, it also made the American bombing effort easier by
concentrating production in a few large complexes. Eighth's bombing
efforts in the first half of 1943 were small by later standards, but
they forced the Air Ministry to request the dispersal of Germany's
aircraft manufacturing industry in May 1943.

Forced is an interesting word given there had been one raid on
German production facilities by the end of May 1943, which had
16 bombers lost and 2 written off out of 116 sent. The other raids
the 8th launched were against French and Belgian aircraft industry
and repair facilities.

The Germans perhaps could see the writing on the wall. It was in this time
frame I believe that Knoke called the Yank bombing accuracy "fantastic".

snip


The USSBS figures are acceptances and go like this
9/43 2,214, 10/43 2,372, 11/43 2,077, 12/43 1,702, 1/44 2,410,
2/44 1,988, 3/44 2,640.

Who cares?

The point is that daylight precision bombing was effective. The Germans were
very alarmed and took dramatic steps to combat it. It wasn't, as one poster
said all "area bombing."

So assuming the 10/43 and 1/44 figures are the "correct" level of
production the production loss is around 1,000 aircraft in November
and December 1943.

Try and stay on point. I know you love your statistics, but the point here is
that it wasn't, as one poster said all "area bombing."

The other point is Bomber Command's two strikes on Kassel
in October 1943, the first started large fires at both the Henschel
and Fieseler works, the second started a firestorm, with all 3
Henschel plants badly damaged, they were making V-1s at
the time, the Fieseler works were making Fw190.

That doesn't have much to do with the 8th AF, and certainly sheds little light
on the effects of daylight precision bombing.

So another
reason to disperse in November and December 1943.

The decision to disperse was taken in May, 1943. At that time, what the
Germans had seen was that the USAAF had @ 100 heavy bombers available on a
daily basis.

Looking at the USSBS Fw190 acceptances by plant, the 1943 peak
in July was 325 , production was between 263 and 325 January to
October 1943 inclusive, then 242 in November, 203 in December,
then 383 in January.

Try and stay on point.

snip of more pointless pedantry

And MacFarlane and Newton appear incorrect when they claim the
priority in the early spring was home defence, when the priority was
stopping the allies taking North Africa and the build up for the summer
offensive in the east.


It's seconded by Freeman.

Finally the USAAF heavy bomber forces were flying 200 sorties in
a day in June 1943, the start of summer and 300 a day in late July.

The force expanded. Prior to about mid-May, the 8th AF had @100 heavy bombers
available on any given day. And the Germans were so concerned about this
relatively small force that the needs of the Eastern Front and Mediteranean
were slighted.

Amd I remind you again that in this time frame, the 8th was only sending
several dozen B-17's out on its raids, usually less than 100.

On 28 July 1943 the 8th despatched 302 bombers, on 26 July 303
bombers, on 25 July 323, on 24 July 305 and so on. It had been
despatching 200 at a time since May.

The decision to redeploy the day fighters and disperse the aircraft production
date from April and May, respectively.

The 8th
activated 5 new groups in Mid-May, 1943, pretty much doubling its strength.
By
by May, the Germans had, as Galland says, begun putting more emphasis on
opposing the B-17's than they were against the night bombers.

So far Walter has not mentioned a single thing about what the
night bombers were doing, or the strength of the nightfighter
defences and how that changed in 1943.

As Galland notes, the Germans were putting more emphasis on opposing the
numerically smaller day raiders. And as we know, the night fighters were sent
to attack the day bombers as early as February, 1943.

Simply Walter has taken quotes applying to July and August 1943
and used them to "prove" his claims for April and May 1943.

Both MeFarland et al and Freeman confirm German decisions from April and May to
support what Galland said.

The claim, by another poster, that it was all "area bombing" is just false.

The majority was non visual, the majority of non visual strikes were
around as accurate as the night strikes the RAF called area attacks.

Not in April and May, 1943.

Daylight precision bombing had a definite affect on the Germans, and they
preceived it as a greater threat than the night bombing. And this was well
before the first bomb was dropped by the USAAF using radar or other
non-visual
targeting.

As can be seen from above Walter will simply erase the RAF if
he has to and give all the "good" effects to the USAAF.

The RAF was not doing daylight precision bombing in April and May, 1943. The
USAAF was.

nd, yes we are now back in May 1943.

Walter has supplied fighter figures for August 1943, fighter locations for
December 1943, the note the Luftwaffe stopped heavily contesting
French airspace in 1944, all to show
how the Luftwaffe deployed against
USAAF bombers in early to mid 1943. Anyone else see the disconnect?


The day fighters began to redeploy in April, per Freeman. McFarland et al
refers to the "Spring"; and the decision to disperse the aircraft production
was taken in May, and gathered impetus later. What the Germans had seen, what
information they had to go on to make these decisions, was the operations of @
100 unescorted heavy bombers.

snip

It can also be seen above the Luftwaffe tried to defend non German
airspace with the way the number of fighters in Luftflotte 3 increased
by June 1943. There was more going on than raids by a "few" dozen
USAAF bombers on Germany.

You're forgetting the 7/28/43 meeting of Goring and Milch:

"Perhaps the best measure of the Eighth's success through the early summer
[1943] was its impact on the Luftwaffe. Eighth Air Force had forced the German
high command both to withdraw fighter units from other theaters to defend the
Reich and to form larger formations with more heavily armed fighters, thus
reducing their efficiency against U.S. fighters...On July 28, 1943, during a
meeting to evaluate the damage Germay had suffered Goring ordered Milch to give
the defence of the Reich the "main emphasis" in Luftwaffe planning. This order
was less significant than at frst apparent because in actual experience, if not
policy the defense of the Reich had been receiving priority since the Spring."

-- To Command the Sky, pp. 100-109.

In July, after the battles over Sicily and Kursk, you can really see the
shift in fighter deployments.

That began in the Spring.

Under this sort of pressure the results are clear, in terms of both numbers
and percentage allocations, the Luftwaffe was forced into redeploying
in the west. But this happened when the USAAF was flying 300 aircraft
missions to Germany, as well as many more missions to France and
the low countries, not when "a few dozen" bombers were flying during
the first few months of 1943.

Acting on decisions made when only @ 100 B-17/B-24's's were available on a day
to day basis and well before any non-visual targetting had been attempted.

It is a strong achievement, mainly by the USAAF, to force the Luftwaffe
to make such a change, the cheap shot here is trying to claim the
change occurred much earlier.

The decisions were made by the Germans when the USAAF had @100 heavy bombers
available for day to day operations and well before any non-visual targetting
was used.

snip

Checking Freeman, "Mighty Eighth War Dairy", I see the following numbers of
bombers dispatched:

3/18/43: 103
3/22/43: 102
3/31/43: 102
4/4/43: 97
4/17/43: 115
5/13/43: 97

So when the Germans were deploying their fighter units to fight the 8th AF
and
deciding to disperse their aircraft industry, the Americans were penetrating
occupied Europe with several dozen bombers, on average.

So several dozen is being defined as 8 to 9.


Yes, I'd say 8 or 9 is several. I'd also say again that RAF strength was at
least 3 times higher, and note again that in late July, 1943, Goring is telling
Milch to give day fighter production the "main emphasis".


People can go back and note the quotes used say things like,

"in the summer of 1943"

People can then note the list of missions kindly provided by Walter
for the spring of 1943.


They can certainly see that the Germans took decisions in April and May
respectively that repositioned the day fighters to oppose the USAAF and
disperse the aircraft factories.

Not for him to note the second strike on 13 May 1943, another 72
bombers, or 14 May with 217 bombers sent, or 15 May with 193
bombers sent, 17 May with 239 bombers sent. Perhaps to slide
forward to the first raid in June 1943, the 11th, with 252 bombers sent.
Now we are in summer.

But the Germans took in hand decisions based on a sortie rate of @100 bombers a
day through mid-May. If they were acting on what a larger force --might-- do,
then you have to give them credit. But they were certainly reacting to a force
that was carrying out --precision daylight bombing--.


It is quite simple, take the USAAF strength from spring, the results
from the summer, the Luftwaffe reaction from the summer and then
claim it all happened in spring so the USAAF looks like a bunch of
super airmen.

Pretty much, yeah. When you think that they were only going out in good weather
conditions, only striking by visual means, and usually without escort fighters
in the target areas, they do look like super airmen. Especially when you
consider that the RAF had about three times the frontline strength.

I didn't do what you suggest, any way. The German decisions were taken in April
and May, at a time when the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy bombers available.


Checking "The Hardest Victory" p. 126, shows that Bomber Command had @ 600
aircraft available, with @ 350 available on any given night, by the summer
of
--1942--.

Now we are in 1942 for some reason.

I was in a hurry.

snip

By the way when the 8th air force was running raids of hundreds
of aircraft the Luftwaffe was using day fighter assets, the JG300
series units, as night fighters.

We've done this before. JG 300 was not a day fighter unit. It used singel
engine aircraft, but it was not a day fighter unit.

Hastings says:

"When the former bomber pilot Major Hajo Hermann formed his first "Wild Boar"
squadrons in July that year [1943], he found himself obliged to recruit among
failed bomber pilots and disgraced aircrew rejected by other units."

--"Bomber Command" p. 270 by Max Hastings.

On the other hand, the Germans did sent out their best night fighter pilots to
oppose the 8th AF.

The time is early February, 1943:

"In fact, though, Jabs, Grimm and Naumann each claimed the destruction of a
B-17 from their first stiff daylight combat with the Fortresses, all eight of
IV/NJG 1's aircraft that had been engaged emerged from it in a damaged state.
Consequently for the succeeding night patrols the Gruppe had to draw on
machines that were less operationally serviceable.

[As Galland said, opposing the day bombers took priority over opposing the
night bombers, even though the latter were much more numerous.]

Eight aircraft, with all
their sensitive special equipmenmt so essential for night fighting in darkness,
had been put out of action. And it was the same story with most of the other
night-fighter Gruppen, now also thrown into the daylight battle.

But if machines were utimately replaceable, men were not--and such combats
always ended in the loss of highly qualified crews. These were individualistic
warriors, whose metier, after being put on the track of a mighty Lancaster
bomber, was to stalk it in the darkness with their own radar sets and shoot it
down by surprise. Of this technique they had become masters, but in daylight
it was unthinkable and their skill was wasted.

Yet they continued to be used in this way. On February 26, 1943, Captain Jabs
took off with three duty flights to intercept a formation of B-24 Liberators
returning from a raid on Emden. With them for the first time on a daylight
operation was the squadron was the squadron commander of 12/NJG 1, Captain
Lugwig Becker, the night fighter arm's leading expert in technique. What was
such technique against all the guns of the Liberators? His companions lost
sight of him at the outset of the attack and neither he nor his radio-operator,
Staub, were seen again, though all available aircraft searched the sea until
dark. Missing from his first daylight mission was the man who by his skill at
night had not been hit for months, and who after forty-four victories had that
very day been informed of his award of the Oak Leaves of the Knigt's Cross.
To the night fighters his death brought disquiet. Was the Luftwaffe in such a
bad way that specialists like Becker had to be squandered on missions
completely foreign to their training?"

Luftwaffe War Diaries, p. 303 by Cajus Bekker

This at a time (February, 1943) when the USAAF was attacking solely by visual
means and never with more than several dozen bombers.

Under Walter's rules of logic it
shows bad things about the USAAF, as opposed to everyone
else's rules of logic which state it shows bad things about Walter.

People can judge for themselves.


To most people the night fighter use in daylight and day fighter use
at night show improvisation and a Luftwaffe high command largely
misusing its assets, for Walter night fighters in daylight is the only
part considered, it fits the fiction.

It's not fiction to say that the Germans began returning day fighter units to
Germany in April and began dispersing their aircraft production in May. It's
not fiction to say that opposing the day bombers was officially given the
highest priority in July.



At the end of 1942 the night fighter force was 5 Geschwader controlling
15 gruppen, except some of the gruppen were still staffel size, by the
middle of 1942 there were 6 operational Geschwader plus 1 training
unit controlling 22 gruppen, 18 of which were in the Reich.

Off point. The Germans began returning day fighter units to Germany in April
and began dispersing their aircraft production in May. It's not fiction to say
that opposing the day bombers was officially given the highest priority in
July.



The Germans reacted to the increasing pressure by day and night,
by beefing up the defences then firstly defeating the unescorted day
raids and then defeating the night raids. The allies then struck back.
The way the air war fluctuated, no absolutes.


We came out on top.

snip

Translation Walter has convicted Harris, the messy evidence side of
things is irrelevant.


I haven't mentioned Harris in this thread.

What -is- clear is that the Germans reacted very strongly to the application of
daylight precision bombing, did so when the number of aircraft actually over
Europe was pretty small and when those aircraft were only bombing by visual
means.

It wasn't all "area bombing."

Walt