This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.
WalterM140 wrote in message ...
Mr. Sinclair:
Walter will now go look up Mighty 8th War Diary for 27 September 1943,
"Remarks First Pathfinder (PFF) mission lead by H2S equipped B-17s
of 482 BG". Or two months earlier than claimed.
Well, from 27 Sept. to November 1 is @ 35 days, but I appreciate the
correction.
Walter wrote "The first radar assisted bombing by the 8th AF was in
November, 1943", missing all the strikes in September and October,
so I wrote 2 months since I did not know how many strikes were
missed in November as well. Like the above choice of 1 November
as the cut off date, there were no 8th Air Force strikes on the 1st or
the 2nd, it was the 3rd where Freeman notes "First use of H2X PFF"
The point is that the Germans began redeploying the day fighters for home
defense in April and decided to disperse the fighter production factories in
May, 1943. This was well before even the 9/27/43 date, and it belies the point
the other poster made, that it was all "area bombing".
Can people see the disconnect here? Walter is trying to run the line
the Luftwaffe had a major reaction to small USAAF raids, and
somehow linking that to area bombing.
And it really is amazing that the 8th AF was able to do this when you remember
how many raids were run on U-boat pens and airfields in France and the like.
And also when you recall that the 8th never had more than @ 100 heavy bombers
on any given raid before mid-May, 1943.
What is really amazing is the way Walter is simply assuming his readers
have zero memories,
snip the same old crap
The snipped stuff includes the "evidence" Walter produced to support
his claims about the USAAF effects on the Germans in the April and
May 1943 period. Things like the fighter deployment in December
1943 and the reduction in the attempts to contest French airspace in
1944.
The evidence has to be deleted, and the editorial put back in, with a
change, Walter now admits a jump in USAAF raid size in mid May 1943.
The list of the redeployed fighter units is still missing, last time it included
training units.
In percentage terms the amount of visual bombing of Germany by the
8th for the last 4 months of 1943 went like
September 47.1, October 72.1, November 27.6 and December 30.4.
The reason the amount of radar bombing is so high in the overall figure
for 1943 is that for the year the 8th dropped some 27,185 tons of bombs
on Germany, 19,554 of these in the last 4 months of the year.
"All told, the strength of the fighter force in North West Germany, France
and
the Low Countries rose from 270 in April, 1943 to 630 by August."
-- "The Mighty Eighth", p. 54 by Roger Freeman.
Ok now we are in August 1943 when the USAAF was running raids of
a "few" dozen bombers, 15 is being defined as few it seems.
The 8ith AF activated 5 new groups in May, 1943. The number of available
heavies rose from @ 100 to @ 250. But as noted, the Germans had begun
redeploying the day fighters in April and plant dispersion in May.
Note the deletion of things like the claim "As much as they could", it is
time for the motherhood statements, ignore the overclaiming about the
size and timing of the Luftwaffe fighter deployments. They were not
as early nor as large as Walter wants to claim.
"American bombing in the summer of 1943 had limited the planned
expansion of the Luftwaffe's forces. This expansion had begun in
mid-1941 when Goring ordered Milch to increase aircraft production
sufficiently to quadruple front-line strength. Hitler accelerated the
effort with additional demands for greater aircraft production in
1942. Milch merged existing factories into larger complexes in order
to increase production.
By the way, merging plants has a habit of temporarily lowering
production as people adjust to the new way of working.
That too, would be a result of daylight precison bombing.
If Hitler stubbed his toe in 1943 Walter would claim it was the result
of the USAAF strikes.
In the 1942/43 period Milch drove an increase in the efficiency of
the German aircraft industry, it started before the USAAF entered
the war, but Walter will claim it as a USAAF success.
In June 1941 German aircraft acceptances were 880, down from
1,078 in March, and stayed below 1,000 for the rest of the year.
In June 1942 1,235. In June 1943 2,258. In June 1944 3,597.
USSBS figures.
Pedantry.
Translation, the numbers do not fit the fiction so they need to
be ignored.
Though efficiency of scale helped raise
output, it also made the American bombing effort easier by
concentrating production in a few large complexes. Eighth's bombing
efforts in the first half of 1943 were small by later standards, but
they forced the Air Ministry to request the dispersal of Germany's
aircraft manufacturing industry in May 1943.
Forced is an interesting word given there had been one raid on
German production facilities by the end of May 1943, which had
16 bombers lost and 2 written off out of 116 sent. The other raids
the 8th launched were against French and Belgian aircraft industry
and repair facilities.
First the data, the first raid on German aircraft factories was 17 April,
the next raid was 28 July 1943.
The Germans perhaps could see the writing on the wall. It was in this time
frame I believe that Knoke called the Yank bombing accuracy "fantastic".
So in other words it was not what the USAAF did in May 1943
but rather what the USAAF might be able to do in a later period,
but Walter will claim it as an April/May 1943 victory and ignore
the fact dispersal did not happen until well after May 1943.
Walter turns the contingency plan into reality long before it was
implemented.
Walter likes the Knocke quote, the fighter pilot was busy assessing
USAAF bombing patterns while under fire from his own flak and
lining up for an attack.
snip
Of the quote which notes little was done about dispersing the aircraft
industry for another 2 to 3 months.
The USSBS figures are acceptances and go like this
9/43 2,214, 10/43 2,372, 11/43 2,077, 12/43 1,702, 1/44 2,410,
2/44 1,988, 3/44 2,640.
Who cares?
Walter prefers to avoid facts, like try and figure out what the bombing
raids actually did.
The point is that daylight precision bombing was effective. The Germans were
very alarmed and took dramatic steps to combat it. It wasn't, as one poster
said all "area bombing."
Let us see now, "very alarmed and took dramatic steps", is the air ministry
actually saying it looks like our factories will be bombed, we had best think
about dispersal, and then doing nothing for months.
So assuming the 10/43 and 1/44 figures are the "correct" level of
production the production loss is around 1,000 aircraft in November
and December 1943.
Try and stay on point. I know you love your statistics, but the point here is
that it wasn't, as one poster said all "area bombing."
The point is quite clear, Walter is massively overclaiming the early
effects of the USAAF bombing. And then dismissing the probable
direct and indirect effects on aircraft production by the day and night
bombing, since they happen too late in the year for his current claims.
The other point is Bomber Command's two strikes on Kassel
in October 1943, the first started large fires at both the Henschel
and Fieseler works, the second started a firestorm, with all 3
Henschel plants badly damaged, they were making V-1s at
the time, the Fieseler works were making Fw190.
That doesn't have much to do with the 8th AF, and certainly sheds little light
on the effects of daylight precision bombing.
Walter is claiming only the USAAF bombing forced the changes.
So another
reason to disperse in November and December 1943.
The decision to disperse was taken in May, 1943.
No Walter, the quote says a request was made in May 1943 to disperse,
not a decision was taken, the decision would need to be taken at a higher
level than the air ministry. The actual work was much later in the year.
At that time, what the
Germans had seen was that the USAAF had @ 100 heavy bombers
available on a daily basis.
The German decision to increase day fighter production was taken
before the USAAF entered the war, and long before any USAAF
bombers flew over France. Walter likes to simply connect facts
with the "USAAF did this" link.
Walter is simply mixing up the potential threat with the actual
strength. The potential was hundreds of bombers, the actual
strength was not doing any lasting damage.
Looking at the USSBS Fw190 acceptances by plant, the 1943 peak
in July was 325 , production was between 263 and 325 January to
October 1943 inclusive, then 242 in November, 203 in December,
then 383 in January.
Try and stay on point.
Walter ignores what the actual production was, he prefers a quote
that he tries to imply gives the credit for any production loss to the
USAAF, preferably in early 1943 at the moment.
It would be nice to say there was only one reason for a given
effect but there rarely is.
snip of more pointless pedantry
Translation. a critique that showed the Milch plan for fighter expansion
was probably not achievable even without the bombing has to be
deleted, since that means the effects Walter is claiming have to be
reduced.
Above all what has to be deleted is another standard Walter method.
Cutting a quote to fit. So when Goering makes his remarks about
priority for Reich defense Walter is not going to admit he simply
cut out the fact it was made the day after the Hamburg firestorm, and
tried to give the credit to the USAAF alone.
I will put the text back in
""Perhaps the best measure of the Eighth's success through the early summer
[1943] was its impact on the Luftwaffe. Eighth Air Force had forced the German
high command both to withdraw fighter units from other theaters to defend the
Reich and to form larger formations with more heavily armed fighters, thus
reducing their efficiency against U.S. fighters...On July 28, 1943, during a
meeting to evaluate the damage Germay had suffered Goring ordered Milch to give
the defence of the Reich the "main emphasis" in Luftwaffe planning. This order
was less significant than at frst apparent because in actual experience, if not
policy the defense of the Reich had been receiving priority since the Spring."
-- Ibid, pp. 100-109.
So daylight precison bombing -- and only by visual means -- caused the Germans
both to disperse their factories and also to concentrate the German day
fighters against them.
Note the little dots between "U.S. fighters...On July 28, 1943, " the
truncation of the quote.
On the night of July 27/28 the RAF created the firestorm in Hamburg.
Walter will now fill in the missing text, the bits he does not like to mention.
It is a simple situation to obtain the books Walter uses and see how he
truncates quotes and ignores anything he does not like.
It was the firestorm at Hamburg that caused Goering to have the
conversation that produced the quote mentioned above. Defense
of the Reich day and night was on the table."
And MacFarlane and Newton appear incorrect when they claim the
priority in the early spring was home defence, when the priority was
stopping the allies taking North Africa and the build up for the summer
offensive in the east.
It's seconded by Freeman.
No Walter, Freeman notes an increase by/in August 1943, that is
not April and May 1943.
Finally the USAAF heavy bomber forces were flying 200 sorties in
a day in June 1943, the start of summer and 300 a day in late July.
The force expanded. Prior to about mid-May, the 8th AF had @100 heavy bombers
available on any given day. And the Germans were so concerned about this
relatively small force that the needs of the Eastern Front and Mediteranean
were slighted.
All people have to do is note Walter's proof is deployments in August
1943, and how he claims the effects are May 1943.
Amd I remind you again that in this time frame, the 8th was only sending
several dozen B-17's out on its raids, usually less than 100.
On 28 July 1943 the 8th despatched 302 bombers, on 26 July 303
bombers, on 25 July 323, on 24 July 305 and so on. It had been
despatching 200 at a time since May.
The decision to redeploy the day fighters and disperse the aircraft production
date from April and May, respectively.
The reality is Walter's proof of the above claims is missing, and ignores
what the Germans actually did.
The 8th
activated 5 new groups in Mid-May, 1943, pretty much doubling its strength.
By
by May, the Germans had, as Galland says, begun putting more emphasis on
opposing the B-17's than they were against the night bombers.
So far Walter has not mentioned a single thing about what the
night bombers were doing, or the strength of the nightfighter
defences and how that changed in 1943.
As Galland notes, the Germans were putting more emphasis on opposing the
numerically smaller day raiders. And as we know, the night fighters were sent
to attack the day bombers as early as February, 1943.
In February 1943 Galland said they had solved the problem of the 4 engined
bomber by day.
When it comes to priorities Galland is simply wrong, especially in early
to mid 1943. Check out when he was in the Mediterranean for example
and the increase in day and night fighter strength. The Germans could
not ignore the Hamburg firestorm.
The sending of nightfighters out in daylight is really a basic point in
favour of the Germans doing nothing, double timing the existing
units, not sending new units.
Simply Walter has taken quotes applying to July and August 1943
and used them to "prove" his claims for April and May 1943.
Both MeFarland et al and Freeman confirm German decisions from April and
May to support what Galland said.
Walter has basically assembled a whole lot of quotes that show German
activity from around August 1943 onwards, and is busy claiming they
were really done in April and May 1943.
The claim, by another poster, that it was all "area bombing" is just false.
The majority was non visual, the majority of non visual strikes were
around as accurate as the night strikes the RAF called area attacks.
Not in April and May, 1943.
The majority of the 8th's campaign was non visual.
Daylight precision bombing had a definite affect on the Germans, and they
preceived it as a greater threat than the night bombing. And this was well
before the first bomb was dropped by the USAAF using radar or other
non-visual targeting.
As can be seen from above Walter will simply erase the RAF if
he has to and give all the "good" effects to the USAAF.
The RAF was not doing daylight precision bombing in April and May,
1943. The USAAF was.
Just ignore the reason why Goering was so concerned on 28 July 1943.
Walter needs to erase the RAF for a while.
nd, yes we are now back in May 1943.
Walter has supplied fighter figures for August 1943, fighter locations for
December 1943, the note the Luftwaffe stopped heavily contesting
French airspace in 1944, all to show how the Luftwaffe deployed against
USAAF bombers in early to mid 1943. Anyone else see the disconnect?
The day fighters began to redeploy in April, per Freeman.
Freeman notes the fighter strengths in April and August 1943,
Walter announces this means extra fighters were sent in April.
Why not May, June or July?
Walter the overall Luftwaffe fighter strength rose in the first few
months of 1943 and the number of fighters in the west actually
dropped as a percentage of the total force between January
and April 1944, it then recovered to slightly more than the
January percentage of total force by June. It looks like the
majority of the reinforcements arrived in May around the same
time as the new USAAF bomb groups, of which the Luftwaffe
would have been aware, they had a good handle on allied
aircraft strengths from prisoner interrogations and radio watches.
Walter wants to claim major redeployments "denuding" other
fronts and so on.
McFarland et al
refers to the "Spring"; and the decision to disperse the aircraft production
was taken in May, and gathered impetus later. What the Germans had
seen, what information they had to go on to make these decisions, was
the operations of @ 100 unescorted heavy bombers.
So the aircraft industry making contingency plans but not carrying them
out until attacks actually happened in the second half of is proof of
USAAF lasting damage in April and May 1943 correct? Interesting
disconnect.
So show us the fighter redeployments, not the before and after
figures from Freeman.
snip
This is what has been snipped, to the next "" the actual numbers,
E R Hooton, Eagle in Flames, reports the following day fighter dispositions,
(Based on the figures in K Gunderlach Die Deutsche Luftwaffe in Mittelmeer
1940-45. Band I 1940-1942. Band 2 1943-1945, page 716).
All for the year 1943, table is date, Luftflotte Mitte (Reich) / Luftflotte 3 /
total Mitte + Reich / total fighters / % in west.
20 Jan / 163 / 241 / 404 / 1,090 / 37.1
20 Apr / 188 / 232 / 420 / 1,328 / 31.6
20 Jun / 343 / 353 / 696 / 1,704 / 40.1
20 Sep / 677 / 222 / 899 / 1,500 / 59.9
20 Dec / 572 / 312 / 884 / 1,588 / 55.7.
Alfred Price in his survey says Mitte had 309 and Luftflotte three 250
day fighters on 17 May 1943.
Galland is on record as stating in February 1943 the defences had
solved the problem of the 4 engined day bomber, he later changed
his mind.
So looking at the above we can see the Luftwaffe increased the fighter
force in the west throughout 1943. The increase was slow at first and
was slower than the increases on other fronts, that is until June/July 1943,
the other fronts had not suffered any "denuding" of fighters. This is not
surprising given the attempts to support the Kursk offensive and also
resist the invasion of Sicily.
According to the Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe by the British Air
Ministry the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean received over 40%
of new fighter production in the period 1 May to 15 July 1943,
plus additional units.
It can also be seen above the Luftwaffe tried to defend non German
airspace with the way the number of fighters in Luftflotte 3 increased
by June 1943. There was more going on than raids by a "few" dozen
USAAF bombers on Germany.
You're forgetting the 7/28/43 meeting of Goring and Milch:
"Perhaps the best measure of the Eighth's success through the early summer
[1943] was its impact on the Luftwaffe. Eighth Air Force had forced the German
high command both to withdraw fighter units from other theaters to defend the
Reich and to form larger formations with more heavily armed fighters, thus
reducing their efficiency against U.S. fighters...On July 28, 1943, during a
meeting to evaluate the damage Germay had suffered Goring ordered Milch to give
the defence of the Reich the "main emphasis" in Luftwaffe planning. This order
was less significant than at frst apparent because in actual experience, if not
policy the defense of the Reich had been receiving priority since the Spring."
-- To Command the Sky, pp. 100-109.
I have covered this quote above, Walter chose to delete my reply to it
when he first used it, the reply is above.
Simply Walter is deleting the events of the 27/28 July in Hamburg.
There was a reason Goering was so worried on 28 July.
Note by the way the running together of quotes 10 pages apart.
In July, after the battles over Sicily and Kursk, you can really see the
shift in fighter deployments.
That began in the Spring.
Walter the trouble you have is quote simple, you are significantly
overclaiming the German reaction, and deleting the evidence that
contradicts the fiction.
Under this sort of pressure the results are clear, in terms of both numbers
and percentage allocations, the Luftwaffe was forced into redeploying
in the west. But this happened when the USAAF was flying 300 aircraft
missions to Germany, as well as many more missions to France and
the low countries, not when "a few dozen" bombers were flying during
the first few months of 1943.
Acting on decisions made when only @ 100 B-17/B-24's's were available
on a day to day basis and well before any non-visual targetting had been
attempted.
No Walter, the Luftwaffe redeployments in 1943 occurred later than what
you are trying to claim. The priorities until around the middle of the year
were the east and south, when those operations failed as well as the
increase in pressure from the west the west became the priority.
It is a strong achievement, mainly by the USAAF, to force the Luftwaffe
to make such a change, the cheap shot here is trying to claim the
change occurred much earlier.
The decisions were made by the Germans when the USAAF had @100
heavy bombers available for day to day operations and well before any
non-visual targetting was used.
Yes folks, repeat the fiction in the hope it becomes "truth", just ignore
the actual size of the missions in May for a start. By the way the USAAF
had more than 100 bombers available for day to day operations in April
and May 1943, they flew missions of around 100 aircraft, which is not
the same thing.
snip
The deleted text,
"G Aders in The History of the German night fighter force gives the night
fighter strength as
10 December 1942, 375, 10 February 1943 477, 26 August 1943 627.
Note this is all nightfighters on all fronts, the majority were in the west.
Again not surprising given the effects of raids like Hamburg. The
Germans reacted to the allied challenges by strengthening the day
and night defences, holding off as long as possible as usual."
Checking Freeman, "Mighty Eighth War Dairy", I see the following numbers of
bombers dispatched:
3/18/43: 103
3/22/43: 102
3/31/43: 102
4/4/43: 97
4/17/43: 115
5/13/43: 97
So when the Germans were deploying their fighter units to fight the 8th AF
and
deciding to disperse their aircraft industry, the Americans were penetrating
occupied Europe with several dozen bombers, on average.
So several dozen is being defined as 8 to 9.
Yes, I'd say 8 or 9 is several. I'd also say again that RAF strength was at
least 3 times higher, and note again that in late July, 1943, Goring is telling
Milch to give day fighter production the "main emphasis".
Thanks Walters, you always manage to give a good example of how
you simply twist words and invent meanings,
"Goring ordered Milch to give the defence of the Reich the "main emphasis"
in Luftwaffe planning" is the quote, see above, and this was the day after the
Hamburg firestorm. Now it is turned into "day fighter production".
The reality is Walter simply deletes bits he does not want and then
changes the meanings of the text he does like.
People can go back and note the quotes used say things like,
"in the summer of 1943"
People can then note the list of missions kindly provided by Walter
for the spring of 1943.
They can certainly see that the Germans took decisions in April and May
respectively that repositioned the day fighters to oppose the USAAF and
disperse the aircraft factories.
Walter will simply ignore the fact he is overclaiming the extent
of the German reactions.
Not for him to note the second strike on 13 May 1943, another 72
bombers, or 14 May with 217 bombers sent, or 15 May with 193
bombers sent, 17 May with 239 bombers sent. Perhaps to slide
forward to the first raid in June 1943, the 11th, with 252 bombers sent.
Now we are in summer.
But the Germans took in hand decisions based on a sortie rate of @100
bombers a day through mid-May.
Note Walter does not bother to tell us why the decision to drop the
extra strike on 13 May and subsequent strikes was taken. After all the
production dispersal decision was supposed to happen in May, when
the USAAF was flying 200 bombers at a time, not the 100. So simply
delete any day that had more than around 100 bombers flying.
Walter will now tell us what day in May the dispersal decision was
taken and also what the Luftwaffe expected the USAAF strength to
grow to, in say May 1943
If they were acting on what a larger force --might-- do,
then you have to give them credit. But they were certainly reacting to a force
that was carrying out --precision daylight bombing--.
The Luftwaffe was reacting to a probable increase in the threat from
the west, and did so later than Walter is trying to claim, Kursk and
Sicily had priorities.
Also if the heavies were doing precision bombing then the mediums
were doing very precise bombing and the fighter bombers ultra
precise bombing.
The Luftwaffe was reacting either to future threats (dispersal plans) or
the threats of the day (deployments). Walter is simply exaggerating
when the reactions occurred and how big they were. You can see
that by the way the fighter deployment numbers were deleted.
It is quite simple, take the USAAF strength from spring, the results
from the summer, the Luftwaffe reaction from the summer and then
claim it all happened in spring so the USAAF looks like a bunch of
super airmen.
Pretty much, yeah. When you think that they were only going out in good weather
conditions, only striking by visual means, and usually without escort fighters
in the target areas, they do look like super airmen. Especially when you
consider that the RAF had about three times the frontline strength.
Yes folks,
It is quite simple, take the USAAF strength from spring, the results
from the summer, the Luftwaffe reaction from the summer and then
claim it all happened in spring so the USAAF looks like a bunch of
super airmen.
Oh yes, the majority of the 8ths strikes in the first half of the year
were over France, and they had fighter cover.
I didn't do what you suggest, any way. The German decisions were taken in April
and May, at a time when the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy bombers available.
Walter simply deleted the 200+ USAAF raids in May 1943 and refuses
to provide figures for the claimed fighter deployments.
Checking "The Hardest Victory" p. 126, shows that Bomber Command
had @ 600 aircraft available, with @ 350 available on any given night, by
the summer of --1942--.
Now we are in 1942 for some reason.
I was in a hurry.
snip
More figures deleted,
In the summer of 1942 Bomber
Command managed to drop 18,208 tons of bombs, in the summer of
1943 the 8th managed 9,860 tons of bombs.
Actually the ratio Bomber Command to the 8th, using the figures above
is 1.85 to 1, throw in the 950 or so tons of bombs by the USAAF
mediums and heavies and it becomes 1.68 to 1. (Walter tried for 3 to 1)
On 30 June 1942, according to Aders there were 255 nightfighters.
Note by the way Walter has not bothered to give nightfighter numbers
and deployments.
By the way when the 8th air force was running raids of hundreds
of aircraft the Luftwaffe was using day fighter assets, the JG300
series units, as night fighters.
We've done this before. JG 300 was not a day fighter unit. It used singel
engine aircraft, but it was not a day fighter unit.
Walter you are going to have to try harder, the Luftwaffe diverted
airmen and day fighters into night fighter units in the second half
of 1943. Under your logic this shows the USAAF was not effective
in the 1943/44 period, the logic is junk of course.
You also might note the JG300 etc units scored in the region of
1,000 day kill claims in 1944, to 350 night kill claims. The day
claims started in January 1944 and in the first 3 months of the
year were 45 day to 66 night claims.
JG300 was created in June 1943, JG301 and 302 in October,
between them they managed around 180 night and 1 day kill
claims in 1943.
Hastings says:
"When the former bomber pilot Major Hajo Hermann formed his first "Wild Boar"
squadrons in July that year [1943], he found himself obliged to recruit among
failed bomber pilots and disgraced aircrew rejected by other units."
--"Bomber Command" p. 270 by Max Hastings.
This ignores the fact JG Hermann was the first unit raised and after
it had been proved the expansion began, Aders notes the instructor
level pilots used. It is fun to see the attempt to make instrument trained
pilots, a relative rarity in the Luftwaffe, turned into the dregs.
On the other hand, the Germans did sent out their best night fighter pilots to
oppose the 8th AF.
The time is early February, 1943:
"In fact, though, Jabs, Grimm and Naumann each claimed the destruction of a
B-17 from their first stiff daylight combat with the Fortresses, all eight of
IV/NJG 1's aircraft that had been engaged emerged from it in a damaged state.
Consequently for the succeeding night patrols the Gruppe had to draw on
machines that were less operationally serviceable.
[As Galland said, opposing the day bombers took priority over opposing the
night bombers, even though the latter were much more numerous.]
Want to know something folks, the western nightfighter units
claimed 18 day kills January to July 1943 inclusive, according to
Tony Wood's list, they claimed 852 night kills according to Tony
and 902 according to Aders.
So priority is 2% of kills. Note the experiment above showed the
problems with non formation attacks on USAAF formations, not
a priority to day defence.
IV/NJG 1 sent up 8 out of a nominal 30 aircraft.
You see the technique is simple, try and discredit the night fighter
pilots sent against the RAF and play up the pilots sent against the
USAAF.
Eight aircraft, with all
their sensitive special equipmenmt so essential for night fighting in darkness,
had been put out of action. And it was the same story with most of the other
night-fighter Gruppen, now also thrown into the daylight battle.
But if machines were utimately replaceable, men were not--and such combats
always ended in the loss of highly qualified crews.
Always ended, so every time a nightfighter squadron attacked at
day they always lost at least a crew killed?
These were individualistic
warriors, whose metier, after being put on the track of a mighty Lancaster
bomber, was to stalk it in the darkness with their own radar sets and shoot it
down by surprise. Of this technique they had become masters, but in daylight
it was unthinkable and their skill was wasted.
Yet they continued to be used in this way. On February 26, 1943, Captain Jabs
took off with three duty flights to intercept a formation of B-24 Liberators
returning from a raid on Emden. With them for the first time on a daylight
operation was the squadron was the squadron commander of 12/NJG 1, Captain
Lugwig Becker, the night fighter arm's leading expert in technique. What was
such technique against all the guns of the Liberators? His companions lost
sight of him at the outset of the attack and neither he nor his radio-operator,
Staub, were seen again, though all available aircraft searched the sea until
dark. Missing from his first daylight mission was the man who by his skill at
night had not been hit for months, and who after forty-four victories had that
very day been informed of his award of the Oak Leaves of the Knigt's Cross.
To the night fighters his death brought disquiet. Was the Luftwaffe in such a
bad way that specialists like Becker had to be squandered on missions
completely foreign to their training?"
Luftwaffe War Diaries, p. 303 by Cajus Bekker
This at a time (February, 1943) when the USAAF was attacking solely by visual
means and never with more than several dozen bombers.
Congratulations Walter in discovering the fact the experiment by
the nightfighters was a loser. Going to mention the result was
a continuation of the attacks on a lower level but with the experienced
crews excluded from day operations?
Under Walter's rules of logic it
shows bad things about the USAAF, as opposed to everyone
else's rules of logic which state it shows bad things about Walter.
People can judge for themselves.
Under Walter's rules of logic it
shows bad things about the USAAF, as opposed to everyone
else's rules of logic which state it shows bad things about Walter.
To most people the night fighter use in daylight and day fighter use
at night show improvisation and a Luftwaffe high command largely
misusing its assets, for Walter night fighters in daylight is the only
part considered, it fits the fiction.
It's not fiction to say that the Germans began returning day fighter units to
Germany in April and began dispersing their aircraft production in May. It's
not fiction to say that opposing the day bombers was officially given the
highest priority in July.
Fiction 1, the overstatement in the rise of Luftwaffe fighter strength in
the west, in terms of numbers and timing.
Fiction 2, the dispersal of German aircraft production starting in May 1943
(in both cases supposed to happen while the USAAF was flying 100
aircraft missions as well)
Fiction 3, the idea the day bombers were given the highest priority
in July 1943, the day after the Hamburg firestorm. Go look at the
quote above and see how Walter simply changes the meaning
and refuses to put in the missing parts.
At the end of 1942 the night fighter force was 5 Geschwader controlling
15 gruppen, except some of the gruppen were still staffel size, by the
middle of 1942 there were 6 operational Geschwader plus 1 training
unit controlling 22 gruppen, 18 of which were in the Reich.
Off point.
You see folks, Walter does not want to see a rise in Luftwaffe nightfighter
forces, that destroys the fiction of the day bombers being given the
priorities he claims for them.
Interestingly enough Alfred Prices' Luftwaffe OOB for 27 July 1942
and 17 May 1943, give the following. In the west in 1942 388 day
and 282 night fighters, in 1943 559 day and 407 night fighters,
increases of 44.1 and 44.3% respectively.
The 8th had gone from 0 to 200 aircraft missions. Harris says
bomber command had gone from 388 to 790 average daily
availability, aircraft and crews, including the day bombers.
It looks like the day bomber strength was around 90 in July 1942
and 110 in May 1943.
The Germans began returning day fighter units to Germany in April
and began dispersing their aircraft production in May. It's not fiction to say
that opposing the day bombers was officially given the highest priority in
July
Fiction 1, the overstatement in the rise of Luftwaffe fighter strength in
the west, in terms of numbers and timing.
Fiction 2, the dispersal of German aircraft production starting in May 1943.
(in both cases supposed to happen while the USAAF was flying 100
aircraft missions as well)
Fiction 3, the idea the day bombers were given the highest priority
in July 1943, the day after the Hamburg firestorm. Go look at the
quote above and see how Walter simply changes the meaning
and refuses to put in the missing parts.
The Germans reacted to the increasing pressure by day and night,
by beefing up the defences then firstly defeating the unescorted day
raids and then defeating the night raids. The allies then struck back.
The way the air war fluctuated, no absolutes.
We came out on top.
The army put tanks on the Luftwaffe runways, it made a big difference.
snip
Translation Walter has convicted Harris, the messy evidence side of
things is irrelevant.
I haven't mentioned Harris in this thread.
Walter's words,
"But Bomber Command was kept at its Sisyphean task by the almost criminally
incompetent Arthur Harris until the very end."
You see Walter hopes no one has a memory, since he contradicts
himself within hours or days, showing just how much fiction he writes.
What -is- clear is that the Germans reacted very strongly to the application of
daylight precision bombing, did so when the number of aircraft actually over
Europe was pretty small and when those aircraft were only bombing by visual
means.
Walter will take the results of the second half of 1943, apply it to
the first half of 1943 and thereby "prove" his claim.
It wasn't all "area bombing."
By the looks of it non visual bombing was over 50%, the USSBS says
around 2/3 of this was blind, so just over 1/3 of the 8th efforts.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
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