WalterM140 wrote in message ...
I wrote:
I don't see anything he posted that refutes Galland.
Mr. Willshaw writes:
Translation:
I propose to ignore any and all evidence that disagrees with
my pre-conceived notions.
I am sure glad you posted that. Sometimes it feels like it's just me and
Sinclair.
Hmm, I receive nice emails including contacts who have helped me
find much useful information, apart from other people's public postings
refuting the silly claims Walter tries to run.
My pre-conceived notions don't show me that the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy
bombers available for day to day operations prior to mid-May, 1943.
My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that these aircraft bombed using only
the "mark I eyeball."
So far we are back in the motherhood area, the exaggerations are
simply deleted for the moment.
My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans began bringing the day
fighters home in April, 1943.
Now the first attempt to slip in misleading information, please supply
the units and dates of their arrival, and note the increase in the overall
numbers of Luftwaffe fighters during the first half of 1943. We want
the April transfers, not the final total in August. As a hint, ignore JG 11,
it was formed in April 1943, and be aware of the rotation of fighter
units to the Reich for refitting, and note JG1 on 17 May 1943 was
around half strength compared with 27 July 1943, since it was used
to form JG11. Then the key point, tell us how this means the Luftwaffe
was "denuding" the other fronts of fighters which was the original claim.
My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans felt the need to
disperse the aircraft production in May, 1943.
Now the a bigger attempt at fiction, a "request" is turned into action,
ignoring the lack of dispersal work actually done.
My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that this reinforces what Galland said
-- the day bombers received more attention than the night bombers as 1943 wore
on, even though the night bombers were more numerous.
The largest 8th Air Force raid on Germany in December 1943 was
722 bombers on 24 December, the largest Bomber Command raid
was 712 bombers on the 29th (there were larger night raids in November)
Using the figures in E R Hooton Eagle in Flames,
December 1943 bomber sorties to Germany night 3,389, day 3,692
(140 from the 15th Air Force). The day bombers had fighter escorts,
some 4,926 sorties, the night bombers an extra 35 nightfighter and
electronic warfare sorties.
There were an additional 1,137 day heavy bomber and 288 night
bomber sorties to non German targets in western Europe.
However now we have "day bomber" as the criteria, which means
the sorties of the lights and mediums. In this case the number
of day bomber sorties exceeded the night sorties in November
1943, 4,790 to 4,607 and in December 1943 the numbers were
7,733 to 3,677. These ignore the thousands of day fighter sorties,
12,263 to be precise.
It is clear the day defence in the west became the priority over the
day defences in the south and east in the July/August 1943 period.
There does not seem to have been any time when the night defence
was deprived of resources in favour of the day defences, as late
as 31 May 1944, using Alfred Price's figures, there were 1,091 day
and 742 night fighters in the west, plus 142 single engined fighters in
the JG300 series units which were used day and night. It was things
like the bomber force that were sacrificed to build up the fighter force.
Galland may claim there was some sort of priority day versus night
but the numbers say it was day over the west versus day over the
other fronts.
My pre-conceived notions don't show me, but the data above does -- that it was
not all "area bombing" as one RAF apologist -- maybe it was you -- suggested.
When stuck answer another question, not the one being asked, and
throw an accusation without any supporting evidence.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
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