This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
I wrote:
I don't see anything he posted that refutes Galland.

Mr. Willshaw writes:
Translation:

I propose to ignore any and all evidence that disagrees with
my pre-conceived notions.

I am sure glad you posted that. Sometimes it feels like it's just me and
Sinclair.

Deleted text,

"Hmm, I receive nice emails including contacts who have helped me
find much useful information, apart from other people's public postings
refuting the silly claims Walter tries to run."

My pre-conceived notions don't show me that the USAAF had only @ 100
heavy bombers available for day to day operations prior to mid-May, 1943.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that these aircraft bombed using only
the "mark I eyeball."

So far we are back in the motherhood area, the exaggerations are
simply deleted for the moment.

It's not a motherhood statement to say that all the bombing in this period was
visual. It's what happened.

Yes start again at the basics, try and hope everyone who wants to
follow the thread has forgotten the exaggerated claims, just start
again. Hence the non reply to my post of a few days ago, the
twisted logic becomes too much so start again.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans began bringing the
day fighters home in April, 1943.

Now the first attempt to slip in misleading information...

I've certainly said it before. I guess you mean that stating that the bombing
was all visual wasn't false, it was just a "motherhood statement." It's still
true.

Ah yes, when in doubt take someone's words and change the context,
my reply to the "day fighters home" point, moved to "visual bombing".

please supply
the units and dates of their arrival,

"Thus, despite the mounting production, the number of serviceable dayfighters
available for the defence of Germany rose only slowly: from 120 in March and
April to 162 in early May, 255 in early June and 300 in July.

Note folks, the attempt is being made to tell us what happened in
April and early May 1944. The 162 serviceable fighters in early
May 1943 can be compared with the 127 serviceable fighters in
July 1942.

You see the reason the fighter force in the west expanded slowly
before July/August 1943 was the priorities given to the other fronts.

Note how the quote below is yet again dispositions by August.

By the end of August, under pressure of the American daylight offensive, the
home defence force reached its all-time "high" in first-line aircraft: 405 Me
109s and Fw 190s, plus one twin-engined Geschwaderwith about eighty Me
1l0s and Me 410s.
Though some were newly formed units, most of them had had to be withdrawn
from other fronts. From southern Italy Il/JG 27 under Captain Schroer moved to
Wiesbaden-Erbenheim,

Present 17 May 1943 according to Price, though he says I/JG27
and it looks like this unit was present in March or earlier, refitting
after the fighting in Africa

II/JG 51 under Captain Rammelt to Neubiberg near Munich,

Not present on 17 May 1943.

while. a single Gruppe of the renowned "Greenheart" Geschwader, IIl/JG 54 under
Major Reinhard Seiler, was posted from northern Russia to Oldenburg and
Nordholtz on HeIigoland Bight. .

Present 17 May 1943, with an extra staffel operating as a fighter
bomber unit against England.

Two complete Geschwader were also brought home: JG 3 ("Udet") under
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilcke from the southern sector of the eastern front;

According to Price on 17 May 1943 I/JG3 was reforming in the Reich, in
other words a typical refit period back at home.

JG 26 ("Schlageter") under Major Priller from the English Channel, where its
experience of combat with the British and Americans was perhaps un.rivalled.
Both now were stationed on the lower Rhine and in Holland, right on the enemy
approach routes.

As of 17 May JG26 was still under Luftflotte 3 control, with two
gruppen not operational it seems.

Even the Me 1 I Os, long obsolete in daylight and lately relegated to a host of
inconsequential tasks, were given a new lease of life. Provided they could
evade combat with enemy fighters, their firepower could still make dents in the
heavy bombers."

No ZG units present in May 1943. Hence the trials with nightfighters.

-- "Luftwaffe War Diaries, p. 319

Yes when in doubt find the Luftwaffe dispositions in August 1943 and
try and claim them as the April dispositions.

So the day defense force rose from April to May by 1/3, at a time when the
USAAF had no more than 100 heavy bombers available day to day, and was only
bombing by visual means.

Go look up the figures Walter, in early May your serviceable figure,
says 162, up from 120 in early April. A whole 40 fighters, this is
really denuding the other fronts, this is really bringing many units
home, given a gruppe is 30 fighters. The movement in the serviceable
figures tells more about the mechanics than the number of fighters
assigned to home defence. Instead announce how the Luftwaffe
increased the fighter strength by a whole 1/3, wow, 42 fighters. I
mean 30 fighters is say a new gruppe formed.

The RAF started night bombing of Germany in May 1940, by 17 August
1940 the night fighter force had grown from near zero to 102 aircraft,
by the end of the year NJG 1, 2 and 3 had been created, though they
were certainly not at full strength. They had 245 aircraft between them
on 24 June 1941.

In August 1940 the RAF were running a maximum of 150 aircraft night
raids, around 170 in June 1941, with an increase in quality, fewer
Blenheims.

So if the moving of 30 serviceable fighters in April 1943 is significant
the moving of much larger numbers of fighters is even more significant.
Walter simply ignores where his "logic" leads to.

As a hint, ignore JG 11,
it was formed in April 1943, and be aware of the rotation of fighter
units to the Reich for refitting, and note JG1 on 17 May 1943 was
around half strength compared with 27 July 1943, since it was used
to form JG11.

Thanks for making my points for me.

Yes folks, when Walter is stuck he simply ignores facts and pretends.

But let's look at something else, the effect of the first year of Harris in
charge of BC, also from the LWD:

"The success of Bomber Command's offensive was however, questionable. Although
many German cities lay in ruins, had the objective been acheived? Had German
industry been destroyed, or the morale of the population undermined? Nothing
of the sort had taken place."

LWD, p. 309

So we see that the first year of bombing by Bomber Command under Harris had no apreciable effect.

Presumably Bekker is talking about the Bomber Command attack as of
February 1943

Yes folks, see the disconnect, Bomber Command is judged on the
destruction of German morale and industry. The 8th air force on the
increase in the Luftwaffe day fighter force in the west, nice neat
double standard, and ignoring the contributions of the medium and
light bombers as well, those B-26 raids.

On 27 July 1942 there were 195 operational night fighters in Germany,
on 17 May 1943 there were 355 operational night fighters in Germany.
How about that.

But the first year of USAAF operations -- 8/17/42 -- 8/17/43, we see the Reich
day fighter force brought to it's 'all time 'high'", to fight against the Day
Bombers. This is pretty much what Galland said -- the USAAF received higher
priority even though still numerically inferior.

This is really funny, apparently the Luftwaffe fighter force in Germany
hit an all time high in August 1943, not April 1940 or even during
1944, no folks in August 1943 the force hit an all time high.

If you want to use serviceable aircraft as the criteria then on 27
July 1941 the Luftwaffe had 198 serviceable fighters in France
and a further 127 in Germany. So in early April 1943 the
Luftwaffe had the same fighter force in Germany as in July 1942.

On 17 May 1943 there were 218 serviceable day fighters in Germany,
counting the 20 fighters in the refitting JG 3 units, up from 127 in
July 1942, there were 178 serviceable fighters in France.

So from July 1942 to mid May 1943 the number of serviceable day
fighters in Germany goes from 127 to either 198 or 218 depending on
the status of JG3, the number of night fighters goes from 195 to 355.
Overall the number of serviceable day fighters in the west goes from
325 to 376 or 396. Remembering it was not until June 1943 that the
8th flew more heavy bomber missions to Germany than the rest of
western Europe.

The increase in day fighters is considered proof the 8th was going
great and mighty things, the increase in night fighters is ignored,
instead the criteria for night bombing is damage on the ground.

The Luftwaffe increased the night defences by 82%, the German
day defences by either 56 or 72% and the western day defences
by either 16 or 22%. Walter awards the 8th the "effective airforce"
tag on the basis of the increase in serviceable fighter deployments.

As can be seen, the verdict is determined before hand and the messy
evidence side of things is ignored.

Then the key point, tell us how this means the Luftwaffe
was "denuding" the other fronts of fighters which was the original claim.

LWD does indicate that at Hitler's insistence, and against the advice of Milch,
Jeschonek and Goring, that many aircraft were sent both to the Med and the
Eastern Front in this time frame:

In other words Walter is finding evidence that shows his claims about
the effects of the 8th air force are exaggerated. It was not until the
July/August period that the 8ths attacks caused significant changes
in Luftwaffe fighter deployments.

"But the most striking evidence of Jeschonek's failure emerges from the last
months of his life. The Luftwaffe staff was fully informed about the American
aircraft construction programme, and at last Jeschonek recognized the mortal
danger that such swarms of four-engined bombers represented for Germany. "A
danger of such magnitude, that by comparision the disaster of Stalingrad was
trifling.

His volte-face in favor of defense put him on the side of Generals Galland and
Kammhuber who, while the Luftwaffe was bled to death on the eastern and
southern fronts, had for long tried to draw attention to the threat from the
west."

-- LWD p. 316

This at a time, when the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy bombers available,
and was bombing only by visual means.

Yes folks, note how Jeschonek is reacting to the US potential and
Walter tries to give credit to the actual raids being run at this time.

It wasn't all "area bombing", as one poster suggested.

It wasn't all 8th air force as Walter keeps trying to claim.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans felt the need to
disperse the aircraft production in May, 1943.

Now the a bigger attempt at fiction, a "request" is turned into action

Deleted text,

"ignoring the lack of dispersal work actually done."

That's pathetic.

Walter you are the one that turned an Air Ministry request into action.

A request that was brought on by operations of the the 8th AF with @ 100 heavy
bombers on any given raid, bombing exclusively by visual means.

Yes folks, after telling us the Air Ministry, with people like Jeschonek,
were reacting to US potential Walter goes back and claims it was
all due to the 100 aircraft raids, as if they were expected to continue
at that strength indefinitely.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that this reinforces what Galland
said
-- the day bombers received more attention than the night bombers as 1943
wore
on, even though the night bombers were more numerous.

The largest 8th Air Force raid on Germany in December 1943 was
722 bombers on 24 December, the largest Bomber Command raid
was 712 bombers on the 29th (there were larger night raids in November)

Hello? Anyone home?

We're talking about the operation of @ 100 B-17's and B-24's and their
operations through mid-May, 1943.

Sorry, I had to go away for a good laugh. Note the Walter words, "as 1943
wore on". The above Luftwaffe fighter locations quote from August 1943.
Now all of a sudden we are back in April/May 1943. Why?

Because in December 1943 there were more day heavy bomber sorties
than night and the biggest raid was by day. This blows away the cherished
claim about the USAAF being smaller. So delete the evidence. Galland
says 1943 in the quote Walter is pushing.

snip a lot of really strange and pedantic stuff

The evidence deleted,

Using the figures in E R Hooton Eagle in Flames,

December 1943 bomber sorties to Germany night 3,389, day 3,692
(140 from the 15th Air Force). The day bombers had fighter escorts,
some 4,926 sorties, the night bombers an extra 35 nightfighter and
electronic warfare sorties.

There were an additional 1,137 day heavy bomber and 288 night
bomber sorties to non German targets in western Europe.

However now we have "day bomber" as the criteria, which means
the sorties of the lights and mediums. In this case the number
of day bomber sorties exceeded the night sorties in November
1943, 4,790 to 4,607 and in December 1943 the numbers were
7,733 to 3,677. These ignore the thousands of day fighter sorties,
12,263 to be precise.

It is clear the day defence in the west became the priority over the
day defences in the south and east in the July/August 1943 period.

It's also clear per Freeman and LWD that this build-up started in April, and
per LWD increased the Day fighters by 1/3 between "April and early May". This
at a time when the USAAF had @ 100 bombers available on any given day and was bombing entirely by visual means.

Freeman gives two dates without stating when the build up began
or when units arrived.

Walter fails to mention the fact this dramatic 1/3 build up is from
120 to 162 fighters. In other words aground a gruppe at a time
when the overall Luftwaffe fighter force was growing from 1,090
on 20 January to 1,328 on 20 April and 1,704 on 20 June.
Serviceable figures were 771, 980, 1,261 respectively.

Galland may claim there was some sort of priority day versus night
but the numbers say it was day over the west versus day over the
other fronts.

After 1 year of BC operations under Harris, the RAF failed to achieve its
objectives.

After 1 year of 8th air force operations the USAAF had failed to achieve
its objectives.

After 1 year of USAAF operations, the day fighters were quadrupled. And all the
US raids were done solely by visual means.

It wasn't all "area bombing."

Walter needs to hang onto this chant, it provides a useful distraction.

As of 1 April: 100 US heavies 120 German day fighters.

As of 17 August: 300 US heavies 500 German day fighters.

People can go up above and note things like JG26 was not in
Germany, they can also look up records like the 108 aircraft
B-26 strike on 19 August 1943. Walter will ignore even the
rest of the USAAF in order to credit the 8th air force heavies.

By the way I believe the quote being used is

"Hello? Anyone home? We're talking about the operation of @ 100
B-17's and B-24's and their operations through mid-May, 1943."

Walter usually convicts himself.

Did the night fighters quadruple in strength?

Easily, the Luftwaffe had something between 0 and 30 night fighters
in April 1940, a gruppe of Bf109Ds as part time night fighters, but
were apparently really dusk and dawn fighters. Within a year there
were over 240 night fighters, that is the numbers went up at least 8
fold. The problems of a low starting base when doing percentages.

Put it another way, with the RAF doing around 170 aircraft missions
in mid 1941 the Luftwaffe allocated 240 fighters to stop them.

With the USAAF doing 300 aircraft missions to Germany the Luftwaffe
allocated around 500 fighters for defence, of which 158 total, 127
serviceable had been there before the USAAF began bombing.

Note the difference, 170 RAF bombers for 240 fighters, 300 USAAF
bombers for under 400 fighters. Do not worry though, Walter will
now change the rules about when such numbers should be compared,
or drop the idea of measuring success by the number of fighters
deployed after a years bombing.

It is his usual tactic, find something that looks good and instead reveal
a great ignorance in logic and facts.

After the raid on Hamburg which produced the firestorm, things changed. But
that was over three years after the war began.

After 1 year of RAF operations against Germany, the effect was negligible. Not
even you can say -- honestly-- that the effect of the first year of USAAF
operations was negligible. In fact, the first year of USAAF operations scared
the Germans very badly, and defnitely impacted the number of aircraft they
planned to produce.

The criteria for negligible for the RAF, impact on German industry,
The criteria for negligible for the USAAF, deployments of Luftwaffe fighters.

If you use the same criteria for both you discover the reality is the effects
were about the same, minimal impact on the German economy, but similar
movements of Luftwaffe resources.

Walter's claims about German aircraft production were debunked in
the post he decided not to reply to.

My pre-conceived notions don't show me, but the data above does -- that it
was
not all "area bombing" as one RAF apologist -- maybe it was you --
suggested.

Somebody with "uk" in their e-mail address indicated it was all "area bombing."
But that is not true. That's how this particular iteration started.

Not for Walter to track down who said it, since it is too useful to spray
about as an accusation.

When stuck answer another question, not the one being asked, and
throw an accusation without any supporting evidence.

You have no answer. But then, you never do.

Yes folks, this thread looks like it will start up again, Walter has tried
to wipe the slate clean and will now start again, even if he contradicts
himself.

The story so far, the attempt to over credit the effects of the early
1943 USAAF attacks.

Firstly start with the definition of 100 bombers as a few dozen,
then give a careful list of the early May 1943 raids, ignore the
fact the 13 May raids despatched 169 bombers, the 14 May
raids 217 bombers. Indeed omit the 72 aircraft raid of the
13th. This way you can claim any reaction during May 1943
as due to 100 aircraft sized USAAF raids.

Next find a quote that gives the Luftwaffe fighter numbers in the
west in April and August 1943, announce this proves how the
Luftwaffe denuded the other fronts of fighters to oppose the
USAAF 100 aircraft sized missions. Never stop to ask when
the extra fighters arrived, from the quote it could have been in July.
It needs to be in mid May at the latest in any case.

Do not provide a list of Luftwaffe fighter units transferred and when,
after all the last time such a claim was made the list included front
line units like JG101, 104 and 108 (training units) and also if a
Gruppe was sent back it was counted as the whole Geschwader.

For additional proof of what happened to May 1943 tell us about
fighter deployments in December 1943 and Luftwaffe operations
in 1944. Tell us about how Galland says "in the course of the year
1943" the emphasis shifted towards day defence and then announce
this happened in April and May 1943, no numbers provided. Ignore
the increase in nightfighter strengths and the formation of the JG300
series of units for night fighting. Do not mention Galland's quote
from February 1943 where he said they had solved the problem of the
4 engined bomber by day.

Ignore when it comes to priorities Galland is simply wrong, especially in
early to mid 1943. Check out when he was in the Mediterranean for
example and the increase in day and night fighter strength.

Ignore the heavy Luftwaffe commitments to the defence of Sicily and
the Kursk offensive and the failures there in July 1943. Just announce
it was all pressure in the west that caused redeployments of fighters
and ignore the fact the Luftwaffe gave defence of the Reich a lower
priority until those two operations had failed.

Then slip in the big lie, the conversation of 28 July 1943 where Goering
tells Milch defence of the Reich will have the "main emphasis" in Luftwaffe
planning. Ignore the events of 27/28 July, the firestorm at Hamburg, one
of the biggest shocks the allied air offensive ever delivered the Nazi
leadership, the blinding of the night defences followed by the apparent
destruction of a city. Simply excise that information from the quote, then
decide the quote says Goering tells Milch to give the "main emphasis"
to day fighter production.

Find quotes about the USAAF effects in the summer of 1943, so June,
July and August, announce these quotes apply to spring, February, March
and May, despite all the references in them to summer.

In claiming the USAAF effects on German aircraft production assume
the 1943 plan was achievable and was only stopped by the effects of the
bombing. That is one of the few production plans made by anyone that
was going to be hit 100%. Ignore the figures that show otherwise.

Announce a request to disperse aircraft industry plants in May 1943 is
proof of how good and effective the USAAF was in May 1943, or in fact
in one strike in April 1943, which according to the USSBS did little to
the number of acceptances at the plant. Ignore the fact dispersal did
not begin until a series of raids later in the year, including RAF ones.
Ignore the allied inability to suppress German fighter production before
the middle of 1944.

Finally when comparing the RAF effort delete effective RAF raids and
do comparisons between the B-17 raids and those done by the RAF
in aircraft like the Blenheim, Hampden and Whitley and so on. Ignore
the reality Bomber Command was a majority twin engined force until
September 1942 and in May 1943 was around 71% four engined.

Announce the 1,000 bomber raids the RAF ran in 1942 should be
considered as normal strength and used for later comparisons with
USAAF raids, just ignore the use of training aircraft, the use of
Coastal Command aircraft, or even in June 1942 the average aircraft
with crew availability was 427 and this fell to 388 in July 1942.

When looking at the use of Luftwaffe night fighters in the spring of 1943
emphasise that a Luftwaffe ace was shot down, ignore the western
nightfighter units claimed 18 day kills January to July 1943 inclusive,
according to Tony Wood's list, they claimed 852 night kills according to
Tony and 902 according to Aders. Instead claim the nightfighters were
putting in major daylight efforts. Downgrade the efforts of JG300 from
mid 1943 and JG301 and 302 from October 1943 onward. Night fighter
units that used day fighters and some of the best instrument trained pilots
the Luftwaffe had. Ignore the fact these units claimed some 180 kills at
night during 1943, compared with 82 by the twin engined night fighter units
flying by day. Announce the nightfighter effort by day shows how good the
USAAF is, but a greater effort by day fighters at night in terms of aircraft,
sorties and kill claims, means nothing.

The basic tactic is standard, find a quote, edit it, ignore factual errors,
even embellish it, ignore any quote that contradicts the preferred fiction,
announce it as "truth", say people who disagree are contradicting the
person being quoted, not the meaning assigned to the quote. If a quote
by that person contradicts the fiction they are declared wrong, only if the
quote is liked is it declared beyond contradiction.

The truth is this sort of approach does a horrible job on the USAAF, if
it needs to compare the B-17 to the early twin engined RAF bombers,
if it needs to rig results to obtain a favourable outcome, if it needs to
time shift results to make it look good and so on. It insults the people
who flew the missions, overcrediting them and at the same time
belittling their opponents and allies.

Repeat the above methodology for the duration of the war in further
attempts to overclaim what the USAAF did, and underclaim what
everybody else did.

Now for some figures,

In June 1941 German aircraft acceptances were 880, down from
1,078 in March, and stayed below 1,000 for the rest of the year.

In June 1942 1,235. In June 1943 2,258. In June 1944 3,597.

USSBS figures.

The USSBS figures are acceptances and go like this
9/43 2,214, 10/43 2,372, 11/43 2,077, 12/43 1,702, 1/44 2,410,
2/44 1,988, 3/44 2,640.

E R Hooton, Eagle in Flames, reports the following day fighter dispositions,
(Based on the figures in K Gunderlach Die Deutsche Luftwaffe in Mittelmeer
1940-45. Band I 1940-1942. Band 2 1943-1945, page 716).

All for the year 1943, table is date, Luftflotte Mitte (Reich) / Luftflotte 3 /
total Mitte + Reich / total fighters / % in west.

20 Jan / 163 / 241 / 404 / 1,090 / 37.1
20 Apr / 188 / 232 / 420 / 1,328 / 31.6
20 Jun / 343 / 353 / 696 / 1,704 / 40.1
20 Sep / 677 / 222 / 899 / 1,500 / 59.9
20 Dec / 572 / 312 / 884 / 1,588 / 55.7.

Alfred Price in his survey says Mitte had 309 and Luftflotte three 250
day fighters on 17 May 1943.

According to the Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe by the British Air
Ministry the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean received over 40%
of new fighter production in the period 1 May to 15 July 1943,
plus additional units.

G Aders in The History of the German night fighter force gives the night
fighter strength as

10 December 1942, 375, 10 February 1943 477, 26 August 1943 627.
At the end of 1942 the night fighter force was 5 Geschwader controlling
15 gruppen, except some of the gruppen were still staffel size, by the
middle of 1943 there were 6 operational Geschwader plus 1 training
unit controlling 22 gruppen, 18 of which were in the Reich.

Note this is all nightfighters on all fronts, the majority were in the west.
Again not surprising given the effects of raids like Hamburg. The
Germans reacted to the allied challenges by strengthening the day
and night defences, holding off as long as possible as usual.

In July 1943 the first USAAF light and medium bomber sorties were
flown, as opposed to some flown with RAF units. In day operations
in July 1943 the allies managed 10,412 fighter, 451 light and medium
bomber and 777 heavy bomber sorties over France and the low
countries, plus another 839 heavy bomber sorties over Germany.

For the whole of the year 1942 the figures were 44,727 fighter, 1,794
light and medium bomber and 1,394 heavy bomber sorties over France
and the low countries. So you can see the increase, and the tempo
kept going up,

In September 1943 the USAAF mediums and lights alone flew 2,009 sorties.

Under this sort of pressure the results are clear, in terms of both numbers
and percentage allocations, the Luftwaffe was forced into redeploying
in the west. But this happened when the USAAF was flying 300 aircraft
missions to Germany, as well as many more missions to France and
the low countries, not when "a few dozen" bombers were flying during
the first few months of 1943.

It is a strong achievement, mainly by the USAAF, to force the Luftwaffe
to make such a change, the cheap shot here is trying to claim the
change occurred much earlier.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.