The "pickle barrel" claim originated with propagandists of the Norden
Company and the War Department, not the brave men who flew the
missions.

It was the standard the crews trained toward. Pickle barrels were common
sights in the grocery stores of the day. In fact, I have the impression they
were larger than regular barrels.

It proved pretty rare to achieve that sort of accuracy in Europe. But if you
don't set a goal, you surely can't do very well.

We know that the USAAF had to abandon the idea of bombing only in visual
conditions. There were too few days when this was possible to justify the very
expensive bomber force nor was it possible to hurt the Germans badly enough.

It proved very difficult to make accurate attacks with blind bombing methods.
In "Half a WIng, Three Engines, and a Prayer" the author relates a mission
that had a German target as primary. That target was obscured. A Belgian air
field was selected as a target of opportunity. The group made a couple of runs
on that target that weren't within the norm. Ultimately, the group broup their
bombs back to Molesworth. At the debrief the group commander said: "Next
time, leave those bombs in Germany!"

And I think that over time it became acceptable to think that any bomb that hit
Germany was a good bomb. That proved not to be the case.

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was quite critical of the
effectiveness of strategic bombing. This in no way reflects on the
courage and sacrifice of the men who flew the missions.

As Art Kramer likes to point out, the US Strategic Bombing Survey authors had
an ax to grind. Their objectivity is somewhat suspect. But obviously, as the
Germans held out until the very end and given the tremendous cost in blood and
treasure, obviously the bombing was a big disappointment.

There was a lot of disagreememt on what to bomb and a general inability to get
enough bombs on decisive targets. The Germans also expended great effort to
repair what damage was done.

The targets that the Americans chose early on, specifically aircraft factories
and ball bearing plants, proved pretty resilient to damage. The USAAF also
early on flew a lot of raids to help suppress the U-Boats. Saint Nazaire was
"flak city" well before the first US bomber went to Germany. The US effort
also suffered from poor leadership in the form of Eaker and Hunter (the fighter
commander). Once they were replaced, things immediately improved dramatically.
Of course having a big infusion of new bomb groups and Mustang equipped groups
didn't hurt either. The Americans also determined to hit oil targets, which was
the one big success of the bombing. The RAF helped on this, but Harris was
reluctant to act, and adamant that this was a waste, when it was the one target
system that could collapse the German economy.

Walt