Mr. Sinclair in his usual carping manner:

Firstly the quote says target area, not factory area secondly the reality
is one raid can be more damaging and the other cause more production
loss, people can be reassigned to say night shift in order to get around
damaged machinery.

So what?

The 305th deceived a DUC for the mission, which makes it look like
a very above average USAAF raid.

Of a type far beyond the capacity of the RAF.

What you've also shown inadvertantly is that, given the accuracy over this
French target, defenses over German targets degraded RAF accuracy
very badly indeed.


So we are busy working through Walter's fictional view of the war, still to
come is the attempt to claim the RAF did not drop any 4,000 pound bombs
on Germany before September 1944, amongst others.


You're being very careful, because you know what Martn Middlebrooks said in
"The Berlin Raids" backs me up. The RAF was deterred by the German defenses in
a way that has no parallel with the USAAF.

Walter will ignore the loss of accuracy with distance that all bombers
suffer from, and night bombers in particular. The navigation errors,
the problems with long distance weather forecasts.

It's correct that night bombers were more inaccurate than day bombers. You
couldn't find that ol' pickle barrel in a Lancaster. Only B-17's and B-24's
could find them.

The German night fighters in particular degraded RAF accuracy on many,
in fact most occasions, where they made an effective interception.

Effective interception will no doubt be defined as an interception
where Walter thinks accuracy was reduced.

Me, and the official history:

"In January the British losses rose to 6.15 percent of all sorties against
Berlin and to 7.2 per cent against Stettin, Brunswick and Madgeburg. But the
effectiveness of the German defenses was not confined to destruction. Harrassed
all the way to their distant targets with bombs on board, many of the bombers
were forced to turn back in a damaged condition. Combat and evasive action
scattered the remainder over the sky so that they no longer arrived on the
target as a coherent force. Much as Berlin and the other cities suffered from
the bombing terror of the winter of 1943/44, they were spared the total
extinction that had been the enemy's prognosis.

To quote from the British
official history, "The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany":

"Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to
draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue
its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... The Battle
of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat."

Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.339 by Cajus Bekker

And consider this text from "The Berlin Raids" by Martin
Middlebrook:

"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."

-- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks


"The raid proceded in no better, no worse, manner than so many raids beyond
the range of oboe. Enough of the 49 pathfinder
backers-up and re-centerers arrived to produce a steady supply
of green TIs. The planned route from the south east was never
achieved. It is clear from the evidence of bombing photographs, that once
the early raid markers and bombs were seen to go down, both the pathfinders
backers-up and the main force swung in from due south, neither being
prepared to spend the extra time in
the target area flying to a theoretical turning point futher on."

They were not prepared to fly further to the briefed point because they
were being heavily engaged by night fighters. Middlebrook makes that plain.

"Many of the Main Force crews were bombing the first markers they saw, instead
of the centre of the markers as ordered, or were dropping short of the markers;
a long 'creepback' developed. The night was clear. Bomber Command's
Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."

Ibid p. 66

So we can see that although the RAF had a fairly good attack against the
Renault factory near Paris -- although not as good as the 8th AF raid of 4/4/43
-- that accuracy did not translate onto German targets. The RAF was deterred
by the NJG in a way that has no parallel on the USAAF side.

Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in
winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book.

Are you saying it was darker over Germany than it was over France?

He will then use
ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when
the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away.

Wow. Looks like the Pathfinders had a tough time locating that ol' pickle
barrel, huh?

Not to mention he is comparing RAF bombers under flak and fighter
attack when bombing to USAAF bombers under flak attack only.

I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the
night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters
were.

German defenses degraded RAF accuracy in a way that there is no parallel
for on the USAAF side. In some instances of almost fanatic resistance by
the
Germans, some of the most accurate bombing of the war was still done by
USAAF units.

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

The USAAF people do not need this sort of junk thrown at them, that
they need this sort of bias to look good.

We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences.

Bomber Command had its creep back problems.

Welcome to humanity and the fact the men went out and did their job.

Two instances:

"Over 900 bombers were detailed and 886 actually dispatched
over the Essex coast for plants in the Leipzig area; although the
two leading combat wings attacked an FW 190 repair depot at
Zwickau in the same area which, apart from its own
importance, served to mislead the enemy as to the chief
objectives...Soon after the leading bombers of the 3rd Division
had turned north-east after a south-easterly thrust across Belgium,
they were met by an estimated 200 enemy interceptors. Spaatz
was correct in his speculation that the Luftwaffe would rise to meet
strikes against oil plants, although at this point the
enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination. From
12.25 hrs. for 35 minutes, the two composite 4th wing formations headed for
Zwickau experienced determined oppostion. Mass saturation tactics were
pressed so close that at least one rammed a B-17. From this ordeal the
4th emerged in some disorder. Colonel Vandevanter flying with his 385th
Group in the lead, ordered the formation to reduce speed so that others
could eform; this undoubtedly added to the good bombing later achieved-- the
385th
managed to place 97% of their bombs within 2,000 ft of the aiming
point. Four times the 4th Wing was attacked on the mission, losing 11
Fortresses, 7 from the 447th group.
The 3rd division's 45th and 13th wings attacked the Brux oil plant
leaving it burning and inoperative, while Liberators of 2nd Division
achieved
similar results at Zeitz and Bohlen; great damage too, was inflicted at
Merseburg and Lutzendorf by the 1st Division."

--"The Mighty Eighth" p. 141-42 by Roger Freeman

And yes, Spaatz did not tell the Luftwaffe he was after oil targets that
day, it was good flying weather and the Luftwaffe reacted.

This is the usual stuff, mission 353, 12 May 1944, 1st Bomb Division
2 MIA and 3 written off, 2nd Bomb Division 3 MIA and 5 written off
3rd Bomb Division 41 MIA and 1 written off. "Strong enemy fighter
reaction against leading elements of 3rd Bomb Division." The
96th lost 12 the 452nd 14 bombers. There were 42 losses from 295
despatched, 258 effective sorties, so these two groups lost over half
the total lost.

I should add the 447th group lost 7 aircraft, the rest no more than 2,
the 385th group, praised above lost 2 aircraft including one that
as abandoned over the Thames, and we can presume it was the
best bombing, otherwise why include the result. Look like the
385th took heavy fighter fire or rather managed to escape the
fight but with some disorganisation?

So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was.

Unescorted B-17's could achieve outstanding accuracy despite the worst the
Germans could do.

The 385th formation was in "some disorder" from the German attacks, but still
managed to get a good bomb pattern. They were not deterred by the German
defenses in the same sort of way the official British history says the RAF was.

By the way the Germans reported around an 18% drop in avgas
production as a result of the 12 May raids, down from 5,845
tons per day to 4,821 tons per day. Zeitz, attacked by the 2nd
bomb division is said to have lost all production for a time
according to the USSBS, Leuna attacked by the 1st bomb
division also lost 100% of production for two weeks.

So most of the loss appears to come from the other two strikes,
not the one on Zwickau and Brux, which would indicate the raid
overall was the least effective. Zeitz lost 519 tons per day of
production of all fuels (not avgas) due to the 12 May raids.

So now we go to 11 January 1944,

"Lt. Col Ross Milton, formerly of Polebrook and now of the 91st, was
allergic to tough rides. It seemed every time he led the Wing, he would
ineveitably wind up in the front position, whether the mission was so laid
out or not, and the mission would meet violent opposition. Oschersleben
was no exception. Leading the combat wing formation, he found himself
in front and, for the most part, without fighter escort almost throughout
the trip.
Over an hour before reaching the target, the Wing was jumped by a large
number of Jerry fighters. The lead aircraft was badly hit. An engine was
lost,
several cannon shells exploded in the cockpit, and Col Milton and Captain
Everett, the pilot, were both painfully wounded. The Wing nevertheless
ploughed
through and bombed the target, although 13 aircraft were lost in the attack.
The 91st Group's bombs went astray due to structural damage in the lead ship
which affected the mounting of the bombsight, but the 381st's bombs fell
true
and straight on the MPI, and these bombs and those of the wings that
followed
did a complete demolition job on an important aircraft factory."

-"Mighty Eighth War Diary" pp. 165-66

Note Freeman is quoting the wartime assessments, not the actual
damage report put together by the Germans. The USSBS notes
the acceptances from the Argo plant were 12/43 39, 1/44 67, 2/44
22, 3/44 111. Not exactly a complete demolition job.

Mission 182, 177 B-17s to Oschersleben, lost 34 plus 2 written off,
the 381st lost 8 aircraft that day, so this is an example of a USAAF
formation holding together under heavy attack. The point to make
is if this were the rule that Walter's fiction tries to claim it is then
there
would be no necessity to highlight it.

That's just flat weird.

The 303rd group also bombed Oschersleben on 1/11/44.

"The first pass made at our group included 30 to 35 ME-109's and FW-190s. The
low group, to our left, had three Forts go down from this first pass. We also
saw three German fghters shot down by this group during this time. The No. 4
ship, lead ship of our element and on whose wing we were flying formation, had
it's No. 1 engine hit. It immediately burst into flames and dropped out of
formation. A few minutes later, this plane exploded.

It is impossible to say who was in the "No.4 ship" that Vern Moncur saw go
down. The fight was far too concentrated and violent for an accurate accounting
of all the casualties, and the Group's records are unclear.' It is easier to
account for the first three losses in the Hell's Angels low group that Moncur
recorded. "Bad Check", a Fortress Hullar's crew had flown early in their tour,
and one of the Group's original aircraft, was one of the first to go. Lt. G.S.
McClellan's crew was aboard her in the No.7 slot of the low group's low
squadron. Lt. Robert Sheets's crew aboard the "City of Wanette" in the squadron
lead saw "Bad Check" at 12,000 feet circling in a tight turn. Other crews
reported her going down with the wheels down, and Lt. James Fowler learned that
night that 10 chutes were seen to come from her. Lt. McClellan was on his 18th
trip and the rest of his crew was not far behind except for Lt. W.A. Fisher,
the copilot from B-26s who was on his first B-17 raid. "Bad Check" was on her
45th mission. She reportedly went down some time between 1055 and 1105 near the
town of Lienen, 20 miles Southwest of Osnabruck.

Next to die was probably "Flak Wolf", Woddrop's favorite and the Queen that
had taken Hullar's crew on their first mission. She was flown by Lt.
J.W. Carothers's crew, most of whom were on their fourth mission. They were in
the No.6 slot of the low group's low squadron, and from the nose of "The Flying
Bitch", at the head of the low squadron's second element, Lt.
E.L. Cronin, bombardier of Lt. K.A. Hoeg's crew, "saw Carothers pull off to the
left and explode. Had time "to get men out. Saw three chutes plus some,objects,
perhaps men." "Flak Wolfs" end was also observed by Lt. T. Lamarr Simmons
aboard S for Sugar in the No.5 ,low squadron slot: "I saw several bombers
explode before this, maybe three or four, but this one made a really vivid
impression on me. I saw a wing fall off the plane, and then the whole fuselage
just came apart with a whole bunch of pieces in the air and fire all over the
place. I didn't see anybody get out." "Flak Wolf" was on her 40th raid. She
crashed at Kloster Oesede, just South of Osnabruck.

Lt. Hallden's No. 896 in ttle No.6 position of the low group's lead squadron
was another early loss. From the No.4 squadron position, Lt.
F.F. Wilson's crew in B-17G 42-31471 saw Hallden's bomber at 1055, just as an
FW-190 was attacking from seven o'clock low. They reported his ship "in
distress at 19,500 feet on a heading of 120 degrees...The aircraft was on fire
and went out of formation into a spin. The tail section came off. Three men but
no parachutes were seen." Most of Hallden's crew were on their fourth raid. No.
896 crashed near Kirchlengren, due Eastof Osnabriick and North of the Group's
inbound track to the IP.
The 190 that got them did not get away. Lt. Wilson's tail gunner, Sgt.
W.G. Hubley, opened fire and "the fighter blew up and pilot bailed out." Hubley
got credit for a kill.


.. Schwaebe's crew, flying the "War Bride" in the No.2 slot of the low group's
high squadron, peeled out of formation. This Fortress, which had taken Lt. Jack
Hendry home from so many missions, was last seen at 17,000 feet by Lt. E.S.
Harrison's crew from B 17G 42-39885 in the No.6 position of the lead group's
low squadron. They reported her going down "under control" but no chutes were
noted. It was the War Bride's 35th mission, and the seventh for half of Lt.
Schwaebe's crew. The ship crashed near Detmold, about 30 miles Southeast of
Osnabriick.

These observations are consistent with what Lt. N.E. Shoup's crew, flying B-17F
41-24605 in the No.5 slot of the low group's high squadron, reported. At 1113
they saw a "B-17 out of control,-eight chutes," together with another B-17 that
exploded with no chutes. Two minutes later they saw a third Fortress with the
tail shot off and no chutes.

At 1117 another Fortress fell. This bomber was Lt. W.A. Purcell's "Baltimore
Bounce". Lt. Purcell's crew had gone on the raid as a spare, taking a.position
in the lead squadron for one of four 303rd ships that aborted from the two
group formations. Vern Moncur had the best view of her end:

"Soon after the loss of the No.4 ship, the No.3 ship ahead of us also caught on
fire in the No.1 engine and peeled out of formation. This ship exploded, also.
Lt. Purcell was the pilot, and he and his crew didn't have a chance. (Purcell
and I had been together through all of our training.) I then moved my ship up
into the No.3 position, flying on the left wing of the Wing Leader, General
Travis." The "Eight Ball's" crew saw "Baltimore Bounce" blow up, as did Lt.
H.S.
Dahleen's crew from B-17G 42-31183 in the No.5 slot of the lead squadron
formation....

According to Darrell Gust, "Bombs were away at 11:48 and our tail
gunner/observer reported an excellent clustering of bombs right on the target."
The groups' photo interpretation report provides further confirmation of just
how good Fawcett's aim had been:

"The pattern of bomb bursts is seen centered squarely on the target with a
heavy concentration of both high explosives and incendiaries scattered on and
among the buildings of the plant. Three hits are seen on" a storage area in
which aircraft are stored under a camouflage netting. An undetermined number of
hits are seen on the Main Machine Shop, the Final Assembly Shop, and a probable
Components Erecting Shop. Direct hits or near misses are seen on another
Components Erecting Shop, a possible repair shop, and seven other smaller
unidentified buildings...In addition, high explosive bursts are seen scattered
over approximately one-third of the factory airfield and on an adjacent road
°and railway.

Incendiaries fell in the target area and across the railway sidings and the
freight depot immediately south of the target...The high explosive bombs on the
target were dropped by the 303rd lead Group and apparently by the 303rd low
Group. Incendiaries dropped by the 379th Group flying high fell on the target
and also immediately south of it...Fires appear to have been started in the
plant as a result of the attack."

The Hell's Angels had succeeded in their mission, but the enemy continued to
make the Americans pay. As the formation pulled out to the north, homeward
bound on a westward track running from Brunswick to Hannover, the German
fighters were making attacks only slightly less intense than those going in."

--"Half a Wing, Three Engines and a Prayer" pp.314-331 by Brian D. O'Neill

The USAAF was not deterred by German fighter attacks the way the RAF was
deterred by night fighter attacks. The 8/17/43 raid by the Fourth Bomb Wing on
Regensburg was another example of very accurate bombing despite heavy
opposition by the Germans.


The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

All well and good. The RAF could be deterred by the German defenses in a way
that had no parallel with the USAAF.


The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction.


There's no fiction involved. The RAF was deterred by the defenses over Germany
in a way that has no parallel with the USAAF. The RAF raid on the Renault
plant gives us an insight into exactly -how- badly Bomber Command accuracy was
degraded by that opposition-- quite a lot.

Walt