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WalterM140 wrote in message ...
Mr. Sinclair in his usual carping manner:

Walter needs to editorialise the facts away.

This is quite amusing, apparently the attacks on Billancourt are
an accuracy measure, a base line for how much the defences
affected accuracy, but only for the RAF, not for the USAAF.

Not surprising really, if the claim is 498 out of 500 USAAF "fell
on the factory". This was 4 April 1943.

Now go to Huls, in Germany, 22 June 1943, it was a 541 acre site,
0.845 square miles. The bombs fell over a 12 square mile area,
with 20% within the factory fences, not on the factory.

Given the amount of open space in the factory area we have gone
from 99.6% to around 5% or less accuracy. And under the rules being
used this must all be due to the effects of the defences.

Just ignore the attacks on Billancourt were much more effective
mainly because of the weak defences, both fighter and flak, enabling a
lower bombing altitude. Choosing them as a baseline is bad enough,
using it as a baseline for only one air force shows the standard agenda.

It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level,
a quote from a master bomber on an area raid and ignore the
problems master bombers had with such raids and the other
problems that night. Having done that go find a couple of the
well documented missions where USAAF bombers performed
above average. Announce this as the USAAF standard and
ignore the USAAF and USSBS reports on bombing accuracy
and, in particular, the way defences degraded accuracy. If one
RAF bomber crew flinched once it is the RAF standard, it one
USAAF formation took heavy losses but bombed accurately it
is the USAAF standard.

Just like before when USAAF success is based on the Luftwaffe
moving 4% of its fighter force but RAF success is measured on
the effects on the German economy, the output of tens of millions
of workers. Walter must really hate the USAAF to smear it like
he does, the way he claims it needs the contest rigged to look
good.

Think of it this way, go find the stories of the RAF bombers that
continued on to attack the target despite heavy damage on the
way out, then go look for the times USAAF bomb groups missed
their target, use these to compare the effects of the air forces.

The men who flew the missions do not need this sort of damage
to their reputations.

Firstly the quote says target area, not factory area secondly the reality
is one raid can be more damaging and the other cause more production
loss, people can be reassigned to say night shift in order to get around
damaged machinery.

So what?

As usual with Walter anything that disturbs his view is dismissed.

The 305th deceived a DUC for the mission, which makes it look like
a very above average USAAF raid.

Of a type far beyond the capacity of the RAF.

Yes folks, after being told an RAF raid was credited with destroying
40% of the factory Walter will simply ignore it.

What you've also shown inadvertantly is that, given the accuracy over this
French target, defenses over German targets degraded RAF accuracy
very badly indeed.

So we are busy working through Walter's fictional view of the war, still to
come is the attempt to claim the RAF did not drop any 4,000 pound bombs
on Germany before September 1944, amongst others.

You're being very careful, because you know what Martn Middlebrooks said in
"The Berlin Raids" backs me up.

You know Walter is in trouble when he throws other people's names
in front of his opinions. The 4,000 pound bomb idea gives a measure
of his detachment from reality. Most of this post is cut and paste, it
saves so much work, and gives you an idea of how Walter will simply
repeat the same discredited claims over and over.

The RAF was deterred by the German defenses in
a way that has no parallel with the USAAF.

Walter will go through the hundreds of raids launched in WWII, find
good USAAF ones, find bad RAF ones, and "prove" his case with
the careful selection of evidence. In this case the baseline is RAF
raids on Berlin in the winter of 1943/44.

Walter will ignore the loss of accuracy with distance that all bombers
suffer from, and night bombers in particular. The navigation errors,
the problems with long distance weather forecasts.

It's correct that night bombers were more inaccurate than day bombers. You
couldn't find that ol' pickle barrel in a Lancaster. Only B-17's and B-24's
could find them.

The USSBS went out and counted the bombs on 3 major German oil
plants, they found, in late 1944 and early 1945 the night bombers were,
on average more accurate than the day bombers. They also found the
bigger bombs and longer raid times mean the night raids were more
destructive. People know the night bombers started off with very bad
accuracy, on average, but the rise of electronic aids changed that.

Killing pickle barrels only matters if they are the great secret weapon,
and it is interesting to note these wonder weapons were invisible to
the B-26s etc as well, even when they had the same bomb sights as
the B-17/24s. Makes the agenda quite clear, claim everything for the
USAAF heavy bombers.

The German night fighters in particular degraded RAF accuracy on many,
in fact most occasions, where they made an effective interception.

Effective interception will no doubt be defined as an interception
where Walter thinks accuracy was reduced.

By the way, Walter has never read the British Official history,
relying on selected quotes of the work in other books.

Me, and the official history:

"In January the British losses rose to 6.15 percent of all sorties against
Berlin and to 7.2 per cent against Stettin, Brunswick and Madgeburg. But the
effectiveness of the German defenses was not confined to destruction. Harrassed
all the way to their distant targets with bombs on board, many of the bombers
were forced to turn back in a damaged condition. Combat and evasive action
scattered the remainder over the sky so that they no longer arrived on the
target as a coherent force. Much as Berlin and the other cities suffered from
the bombing terror of the winter of 1943/44, they were spared the total
extinction that had been the enemy's prognosis.

Note the above quote says that bombers were shot down or forced to
turn back early by the defences, nothing unique there. Now note it goes
on to note how the defences disrupted the timing of the attack, again
nothing unusual there (remember the claimed slow down to reorganise
quote about a USAAF mission?). Timing was important, at night to
arrive while the markers were visible and maximise countermeasure
cover, by day to minimise smoke and dust problems and maximise
fighter cover.

It says nothing about healthy bombers failing to attack.

To quote from the British
official history, "The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany":

"Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to
draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue
its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... The Battle
of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat."

Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.339 by Cajus Bekker

Walter loves this quote, he continually uses it without noting it is a
manufactured one. Nor that it says nothing about individual bombers,
only the force as a whole, the parallel with the USAAF pull back in
October 1943.

The text in the official history is actually,

"The Battle of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat."

(13 pages)

"Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to
draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue
its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... "

From December 2000,

Well yes Bekker is quoting the official history. The final two sentences
are from page 193 volume 2. The first is from page 206 volume 2.
Bekker makes it clear the quote is from two separate pages, without
noting the final sentence appears pages before the first one.

Walter has been told this before and as stated he actually has
entered the text in the correct order, without noting the 13 page
gap between parts of the text.

So it is a non quote, since the last sentence of it appears on a
page before the rest of the quote.

Walter replied to the above sentence with:

Well of course that is incorrect.

Oh good, and there is a reason for the declaration? The way I
see it reversing the order of the sentences means it is not
quoting the author. Let alone the fact the final part of the "quote"
is from 13 pages before. I gather Walter would be happy if posters
came along and rearranged his posts to suit when replying then,
and claimed them as his meaning. The "quote" is made up of
two separate quotes, as Bekker makes clear in his book, without
specifying what came from which page.

So, Walter, why do you think it is a valid way to quote a work?

The quote makes it very clear Bomber Command had been
defeated in the Battle of Berlin, it had to withdraw. And it clearly
shows the quote says nothing at all like the "conclusions" about
deterrence on individual raids Walter has drawn, it exactly parallels
the need for the 8th to pull back in October 1943.

From November 2000,

The text in the Official History is from the section detailing the
effects of the battle of Berlin. It does not deal with any particular
raid as such, it deals with the fact the defences were then usually
able to inflict unsustainable losses on the attackers. In other
words Bomber Command had been defeated and would need
to change things to be able to continue to bomb the preferred
targets, exactly the same as what faced the 8th Air Force in
October 1943.

To state it again, the official history is misquoted, misinterpreted
and talks about the ability of Bomber Command to continue to
mount a series of raids, not about the effect of the defences on
a raid.

From November 2000,

Page 193 British Official History. Putting the text Walter
really likes to use in its proper context,

"The expectations of the Commander in Chief had not been fulfilled,
and by that standard the Battle of Berlin had been a failure. The
attacks on the capital itself had not "cost Germany the war" nor
had the broader Lancaster offensive brought the enemy to, or,
as events were to show, anywhere near, the point of capitulation
on 1 April 1944. **Moreover, in the operational sense, the Battle
of Berlin was more than a failure, it was a defeat.** The disastrous
Nuremberg operation, in which the missing rate was no less than
11.8% brought the Bomber Command tactics of massed and
concentrated attack against major targets to a dead stop and
they were not again resumed until the entire air situation over
Germany had been radically altered."

(Bomber Command bombed German targets 5 times in April
mainly in the south and west of the country, including an attacks
to take advantage of moonlight nights, Friedrichshafen for
example).

To continue the quote, after removal of slightly over a paragraph
where Harris talks about losses and asks for nightfighters, bottom
of page 193 and on to page 194.

"The implication was equally clear. The German nightfighter force
had interposed itself between Bomber Command and its
strategic object, at any rate in so far as the latter involved sustained
operations of deep penetration. Thus, as for some time the Air Staff,
and in particular, its deputy chief, Air Marshal Bottomley, had
feared, the night offensive was brought to a situation dangerously
similar to that which had already checked the day offensive of the
US 8th Bomber Command.
The operations against Schweinfurt and Nuremberg became
famous as isolated disasters, but their real significance lay in
the fact that they marked the culminating points, the former in
the day and the latter in the night offensive, of two rising tides
of insupportable casualty rates. These made the relevance, if
not the means of application, of the Pointblank intermediate
objective (Luftwaffe destruction) abundantly clear not only to
those charges with the preparations for Overlord but also to
those responsible for the continuation of the Strategic Air
Offensive or, in the code of the time, the Pointblank ultimate
objective. This was because they had destroyed the American
theory that formations of heavy bombers would be able to
defend themselves in daylight and because, equally, they
had shown that the British night offensive could not be
indefinitely sustained by the tactics of evasion, deception
and radar counter action alone. It was well that they also
introduced, only partly in the relationship of cause and
effect, the era of the long range fighter which, fortunately,
was no longer an insoluble technical problem."

To complete it here comes the text before the rest of the
text Walter uses, page 206, the previous paragraph in the
history is about how it was discovered most of the night
fighters were in northern Germany.

"It was this which led Bomber Command to change not only
its tactics but also, and in the process, its strategy. The
attack on Berlin was almost broken off. In fact, there was
only one further major operation against the capital in this
phase of the campaign and that did not take place until the
night of 24 March. Meanwhile a much greater proportion of
the effort was brought to bear against towns in the Southern
part of Germany and these were generally approached by
southerly routes. The number of route markers which
served to guide the nightfighters as well as the night
bombers, was severely reduced, the attacks were often
divided into two waves which approached by different ways
and struck at different times and a much greater effort was
thrown into diversionary operations. **Thus Bomber
Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter
force, to draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse
its effort and to persue its operations by apparently less
efficient means than hitherto.** The situation, in view of the fact
that Berlin was by no means destroyed, meant that the Germans
had already won the Battle of Berlin."

The history notes the southern raids had about 2/3 the casualties
of the northern raids.

Now consider the following text,

The 8th Air force was compelled, largely by the German day-fighter force,
to draw away from its primary target, German industry, to disperse its effort
and to persue its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto.
.... The Battles of October 1943 were more than a failure. They were a defeat.

You see Walter tries to announce any RAF defeat is absolute, no
chance of coming back, the USAAF may suffer defeats but has
a near instant answer and carries on.

Now to the next quote.

The text before the passage used by Walter is a quote from
Farquier's navigator

"It was a good, clear night below and we had an excellent view
of the city. I was in the bomb aimers position. My main
function was to assess the accuracy of the T.I.s. Johnny would
then broadcast the information to all crews: "those green TIs
are short - aim for the red ones further on" "disregard the TIs
on your left" etc. Then he would encourage the Main Force with
such comments as, "Come on in, fellows! The flak is nowhere
near as bad as it looks!". He had an excellent R/T voice which
came over loud and clear to all we later talked with. It no
doubt helped to calm jittery nerves and, I believe, it helped
produce a better concentration of bombs on the aiming point"

Note how the master bomber is trying to tell the bombers there
are badly placed markers.

And consider this text from "The Berlin Raids" by Martin
Middlebrook:

"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."

-- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks

A master bomber aircraft had been used on two of the recent
raids but little success had been achieved. Group captain
John Searby who had successfully used the (master bomber)
technique over Peenemunde says

"There was a big difference between a limited "moonlight
special" like Peenemunde and the area attacks which were
much more difficult, with the sheer confusion of the
bombing, the defences, smoke, fires and, of course, the
terrific mass of searchlights. It was not like the relatively
easy target conditions of Peenemunde. The master bomber
on a area attack was a refinement that did not make much
difference, because a chap could just could not see the
ground properly.

"And Wing Commander Ken Burns, who had been the Master Bomber
over Nuremberg, says:

"I think that the reason for the discontinuance of the tactic
may have been that on very large areas in poor visibility it was
extremely difficult to drop the primary markers accurately, and
that most crews of the Main Force and some of the backers-Up
had only one thought in their mind at the target and that was to
get in, release their bombs and get out, and not let their own
intercom be messed up by incoming instructions." "

A Master bomber was used only once more in a raid to
Montlucon in France mid September, before the practice
was discontinued for 6 months.

The impression I receive is the master bomber effectiveness is more
to do with the confusion of a large raid coupled with the newness of the
tactic, if the instructions do not make sense then by definition they will
be ignored.

"The raid proceded in no better, no worse, manner than so many raids beyond
the range of oboe. Enough of the 49 pathfinder
backers-up and re-centerers arrived to produce a steady supply
of green TIs. The planned route from the south east was never
achieved. It is clear from the evidence of bombing photographs, that once
the early raid markers and bombs were seen to go down, both the pathfinders
backers-up and the main force swung in from due south, neither being
prepared to spend the extra time in
the target area flying to a theoretical turning point futher on."

They were not prepared to fly further to the briefed point because they
were being heavily engaged by night fighters. Middlebrook makes that plain.

When Walter runs an editorial you know the quote does not say what
he claims for it, the Middlebrook words do not even appear.

Ignoring the problems with raid timing and fuel loads on a long distance
raid, things like the wind shift. The briefed point was beyond Berlin, in
an attempt to lay a bomb pattern in a different direction to normal, the
bombers would fly beyond and then turn back. Things like the timing
going astray changed that as well as the idea of spending minimum
time in the Berlin defence zone.

"Many of the Main Force crews were bombing the first markers they saw, instead
of the centre of the markers as ordered, or were dropping short of the markers;
a long 'creepback' developed. The night was clear. Bomber Command's
Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."

Ibid p. 66

Like I mentioned, Walter will measure accuracy from an aiming point
that was not marked.

The raid caused scattered damage including villages outside Berlin and
every government building on the Wilhelmstrasse. Note the quotes Walter
uses make it clear there were markers away from the correct aiming point.

If you look up the Bomber Command War Diaries you discover
the following, the Pathfinders did not identify the correct aiming
point, in the centre of the city, but rather marked one on the
outskirts. The main force was late, another reason why the
crews were in a hurry to bomb and go on a long range mission.

So comparing the actual bomb pattern to the planned aiming
point ignores the fact the crews were bombing the wrong
aiming point.

The RAAF history notes the Germans dropped dummy markers,
parachute flares were dropped over the bombers, and the main
problem was apparently a major wind shift that upset the
pathfinders, which would be another cause of anxiety for the
crews on such a long distance mission, running out of fuel on
the way home thanks to being late and a wind shift would not
be wanted.

Defences (passive and active) were part of the reason, tight
concentrations of markers were the way to achieve accurate raids.

Actually the Berlin raids makes a point that creep back was
also effected by the accuracy of the marking, if a number of
scattered markers went down then the bombing was dispersed
leading to a bomb trail at times.

So we can see that although the RAF had a fairly good attack against the
Renault factory near Paris -- although not as good as the 8th AF raid of 4/4/43
-- that accuracy did not translate onto German targets. The RAF was deterred
by the NJG in a way that has no parallel on the USAAF side.

Yes folks, the only thing that stops RAF night bomber accuracy is
German defences, nothing else. The WWII RAF has an all weather
ability the modern USAF would really like.

Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in
winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book.

Are you saying it was darker over Germany than it was over France?

As can be seen from the remark Walter is going to ignore the difference
between a shallow and deep penetration

He will then use
ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when
the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away.

Wow. Looks like the Pathfinders had a tough time locating that ol' pickle
barrel, huh?

Yes folks, as can be seen Walter needs to simply mismeasure everything
to push the fiction. It was a major reason the Berlin raids failed to do the
sort of damage Harris wanted, the inability to normally accurately mark a
target that far from Britain in early 1944.

Not to mention he is comparing RAF bombers under flak and fighter
attack when bombing to USAAF bombers under flak attack only.

I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the
night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters
were.

Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.

See above how Walter posts quotes he either does not read or simply
cannot comprehend, the last line on fighters.

"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
attack were not always inclined to listen."

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

The USAAF people do not need this sort of junk thrown at them, that
they need this sort of bias to look good.

We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences.

Bomber Command had its creep back problems.

Welcome to humanity and the fact the men went out and did their job.

(snip)

So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was.

Unescorted B-17's could achieve outstanding accuracy despite the worst the
Germans could do.

Yes folks, when in trouble change the subject, ignore the number of
kill claims the fighters assigned to the mission recorded, just pretend
there was no escort. Above all no mention the candidate for receiving
"almost fanatical resistance" suffered 1 aircraft MIA.

The 385th formation was in "some disorder" from the German attacks, but still
managed to get a good bomb pattern. They were not deterred by the German
defenses in the same sort of way the official British history says the RAF was.

This is good, firstly the force lost 1 bomber, so you would hope they
were not heavily disorganised, but it appears they did suffer some
problems. Secondly Walter is in trouble again, this time throwing
the RAF history in, since the book does not say what Walter is
saying.

(snip)

Note Freeman is quoting the wartime assessments, not the actual
damage report put together by the Germans. The USSBS notes
the acceptances from the Argo plant were 12/43 39, 1/44 67, 2/44
22, 3/44 111. Not exactly a complete demolition job.

Mission 182, 177 B-17s to Oschersleben, lost 34 plus 2 written off,
the 381st lost 8 aircraft that day, so this is an example of a USAAF
formation holding together under heavy attack. The point to make
is if this were the rule that Walter's fiction tries to claim it is then
there would be no necessity to highlight it.

That's just flat weird.

The 303rd group also bombed Oschersleben on 1/11/44.

The 303rd lost 11 bombers on 11 January 1944. I will snip the
description of the losses, most of which occurred before the
target, the quote is noting at times different views of the same loss.

(snip)

According to Darrell Gust, "Bombs were away at 11:48 and our tail
gunner/observer reported an excellent clustering of bombs right on the target."
The groups' photo interpretation report provides further confirmation of just
how good Fawcett's aim had been:

"The pattern of bomb bursts is seen centered squarely on the target with a
heavy concentration of both high explosives and incendiaries scattered on and
among the buildings of the plant. Three hits are seen on" a storage area in
which aircraft are stored under a camouflage netting. An undetermined number of
hits are seen on the Main Machine Shop, the Final Assembly Shop, and a probable
Components Erecting Shop. Direct hits or near misses are seen on another
Components Erecting Shop, a possible repair shop, and seven other smaller
unidentified buildings...In addition, high explosive bursts are seen scattered
over approximately one-third of the factory airfield and on an adjacent road
°and railway.

In other words these bombs missed their target and came down on
facilities nearby, we are talking accuracy here, hitting the official
target, not nearby ones, under the current absurd rules.

Incendiaries fell in the target area and across the railway sidings and the
freight depot immediately south of the target...The high explosive bombs on the
target were dropped by the 303rd lead Group and apparently by the 303rd low
Group. Incendiaries dropped by the 379th Group flying high fell on the target
and also immediately south of it...Fires appear to have been started in the
plant as a result of the attack."

The Hell's Angels had succeeded in their mission, but the enemy continued to
make the Americans pay. As the formation pulled out to the north, homeward
bound on a westward track running from Brunswick to Hannover, the German
fighters were making attacks only slightly less intense than those going in."

--"Half a Wing, Three Engines and a Prayer" pp.314-331 by Brian D. O'Neill

The USAAF was not deterred by German fighter attacks the way the RAF was
deterred by night fighter attacks.

Yes folks, if you can find two examples over the period of the war your
case is proved, just ignore the cases where the USAAF bombers missed.
Especially if you can use wartime assessments of accuracy and, in
particular, damage. Note there is no measure of how many bombs
missed the target, only that some did and implying most.

The 8/17/43 raid by the Fourth Bomb Wing on
Regensburg was another example of very accurate bombing despite heavy
opposition by the Germans.

As people have gathered by his choice of references Walter has decided
the USAAF is "Magnificent Men in their Flying Machines" and everyone
else are short sighted fools.

Note the holes in the bomb damage quote above, with Walter
it is a good bet to assume there are things in there that do not help
his fiction. Note the 379th is mentioned, it lost 1 aircraft.

The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

All well and good. The RAF could be deterred by the German defenses in a way
that had no parallel with the USAAF.

Yes folks, when confronted with the facts Walter simply repeats the lies.

The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction.

There's no fiction involved.

Walter is basically wall to wall fiction.

The RAF was deterred by the defenses over Germany
in a way that has no parallel with the USAAF.

It seems Walter is going to simply pretend the range of radio aids
had no bearing on night raid accuracy.

The RAF raid on the Renault
plant gives us an insight into exactly -how- badly Bomber Command accuracy
was degraded by that opposition-- quite a lot.

USAAF raid on France, 99.6% accuracy claimed, on Germany, Huls
around 5% accuracy.

It is simple really, to make the comparison erase the bad USAAF results
and pretend real hard, find the worst RAF raids and pretend real hard.

Strenuously ignore the many factors like weather, training and luck
that make a difference in bombing accuracy, just claim it is all
defences.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.