Concerning LW fighter strength losses etc:

Total German Aircraft losses Fighters only by front 1943:

Westren Front: 3,728

Eastren Front : 1,099

From Jan - June 1943 the average monthly attition rate* fighters only was
19.9%, bombers 16% etc.

*See:*See: Wiliamson Murray. Strategy For Defeat p.182

In July 1943 the LW lost *335 SE fighters in the West, 18.1% of total
available SE fighter force, & 16% of SE fighter pilots.

*See: ibid. p. 181

By the end of August 1943 the LW lost 248 SE fighters in the West*, 16.2% of
the total available fighter force, & 15.6% of SE fighter pilots. & 86 twin
engine fighters, 11.6% of the twin engine day/night fighter force).

*See: ibid. p.182

In 1943 the German aircraft industry produced* 64% more AC then ever before
with 125.2% increase in Fighter production, & 31.4% increase in bomber
production. For the first time in the war the industry produced 1000
fighters, by July production had reached 1,263 fighters.

*See: ibid. p.188

Yet despite this production increase the number of AC in front line units
all fronts decreased Ie, *German Authorized Fighter only Strength 1943:
actual frontline strength in ()'s:

May 31 1943 - 2,016 (1,786) 88.6%
June 30 1943 - 2,172 (1,849) 85.1%
July 31 1943 - 2,172 (1,528) 70.3%
Aug 31 1943 - 2,228 (1,581) 71%


*See: ibid. p.188

September 1943* cost the LW in the West 275 fighters (17.4% of total
available fighter force) & 284 in October (17.2% of total available fighter
force). October cost the Germans no less then 41.9% of their fighter force.

See: ibid. p.225

The below excerpt from an memo from General der flieger Galland , under
pressure from Georing concerning Octobers performance is interesting:

The fighter and heavy formations have not been able to secure decisive
success in air defense against American four engined formations. The
introduction of new weapons... has not appreciably changed the situation.
The main reason for the failure is that the Kommandeure and Kapitane (sic)
do not succeed in secureing attacks in close formation up to the shortest
ranges...

In November 1943 fighter production from factories, and returns from depots;
was only 78% of July. fighter Production dropped to 54.4% in December.

In November the Germans wrote off 21% of their available fighter force from
battle damage & non combat losses, in December it rose to 22.8%. In
Novermber 1943 10% of the fighter pilots in the West were lost, in December
10.4% etc.

From Jan - Dec 1943 the LW averaged 2,105 full & partialy trained pilots
each month. vs losses of 2,967 pilots KIA/MIA/WIA in the West alone.

*German Authorized Fighter only Strength Sept - Dec 1943 All fronts: actual
frontline strength in ()'s:

Sept 30 1943 - 2,228 (1,646) 73.9%
Oct 31 1943 - 2,228 (1,721) 75.2%
Nov 30 1943 - 2,244 (1,789) 79.7%
Dec 31 1943 - 2,244 (1,561) 69.6%

*See: ibid. p.233

In November 1943* 8th AF raids began in increased intensity throughout
November despite the losses from the October Schweinfurt' raid, Ie, Bremen
was hit by 491 B-17s , December 11 523 bombers hit Emden, Dec 13 649 bombers
hit targets in Germany, December 16, 535 hit Bremen, Dec 20 472 hit Bremen
again, Dec 22 Osnabruck & Munster, Dec 30th 650 bombers hit Ludwigshafen
etc.

See: ibid p.232

In January 1944* the LW fighter force in the West wrote off 30.3% of the SE
fighter force & 16.9% of its pilots. In Febuary 1944 33% of its SE fighter
force, 17.9% of its pilots, in March 1944 56.4% of its SE fighter force, and
22% of its pilots etc.

*See: ibid. p.243

Another quote a Galland report to LWHQ in early 1944 is interesting as
well*:


The ratio in which we fight today is 1 to 7. The standard of the Americans
is extraordinarily high. The day fighters have lost more then 1000 aircraft
during the last four months, among them our best officers. These gaps cannot
be filled. Things have gone so far that the danger of a collapse of our arm
exists.

*See: Overy Richard. Why the Allies Won p.124


Regards, John Waters