On 9/25/2015 12:44 PM, Martin Eiler wrote:
Snip...
This thread was initiated because a simple mistake that could easily have
been corrected, eventually led to a crash. The real cause of this accident
like so many others, was tunnel vision. Which may have started sometime
prior to the pilot mistakenly grabbing the gear handle. Rest assured this
pilot did not intend to grab the gear handle nor make multiple passes at
landing and of course he did not realize he was getting so slow that he was
going to stall/spin.

Until someone in higher authority like the NTSB or FAA decides that tunnel
vision is a root cause of far too many aviation accidents and initiates an
extensive study of it's causes, effects and all possible corrective
actions, we will continue to hear accidents were the result of dehydration,
distraction, medical issue or the catch all, pilot error. I would like to
believe a meaningful study will be conducted in my life time, but after 50
years in aviation I seriously doubt it.

If I am ever killed in a glider accident, I honestly encourage all pilots
to use it as an opportunity to openly and seriously discuss accidents and
issues of safety. A year later when the NTSB report is published the
accident will have long faded from almost everyone's memory.

Considerable food for thought above...

I suspect the 1st paragraph is 100% correct. In any event the logic works for me.

Considering the middle paragraph, I likewise suspect "pilot error" will
continue to be a favored root cause catch-all in accidents involving
less-than-perfect situational-awareness/decision-making from Joe Pilot. I
don't think it's fundamentally inaccurate, but it's often not terribly
illuminating of how people (are likely to) think, and consequently WHY J.P.
had/continued-with less-than-perfect situational-awareness/decision-making all
the way to the crunch. Consequently, it's up to us individual pilots to make
these "WHY-connections" as they apply to *us*. Routinely blaming (say) medical
incapacitation or bad luck may be personally comforting, while being
simultaneously a form of ostrichian thinking. You pays your money and you
takes your chances...

+1 to the sentiments of last paragraph. I'll add - for the benefit of readers
unfamiliar with the NTSB's typical glider crunch depth of analysis - that the
NTSB glider-crunch-analytical-norm is *generally* (not always) superficial and
typically unenlightening.

Bob W.