In article yGHvc.37385$3x.8154@attbi_s54, "William Wright"
wrote:
"Howard Berkowitz" wrote in message
...
In article IImvc.32080$3x.1788@attbi_s54, "William Wright"
wrote:
Before the TORCH invasions, Vichy had been given a British ultimatum to
have the North African fleet sail to a neutral or allied port, scuttle
them, or suffer the consequences of having them destroyed. Britain was
at war with Germany, and had substantial concerns that the French
vessels might be taken by the Axis.
Hmmm. Sounds like us, Iraq and WMD.
Similar enough situations to be worth using. There also have been many
cases, by many nations, of hot pursuit of attackers into other
countries, once the country to which they escaped has been warned that
they need to take action.
By 1942, of course, the US was also at war with Germany. The French
were sheltering and supporting German forces. Neutrality becomes
stretched or violated when one side is providing protection or support
to the others. The principal purpose of TORCH was to go after German
and
Italian forces that happened to be in French territory. The US and UK
also had not recognized Vichy. Much the same as recently in
Afghanistan, where the Taliban were told they would be left alone if
they stopped providing al-Qaeda with sanctuary.
Sounds like Iraq again.
I'm not sure I follow your point, unless you are referring to Iraq as a
large-scale supporter of terrorism. The al-Qaeda relation to the Taliban
was much more apparent.
Also you left out the part about supporting the grand strategy of the
United States.
No, I didn't leave it out -- it wasn't relevant to the discussion, which
was dealing at the operational level of the French fleet and Vichy
support for Germany. I wasn't aware the discussion was extending to the
strategic level.
It was the strategy to defeat Germany first. It was politically
important to get US forces into combat against the Germans in 1942 lest
those forces get siphoned off to the Pacific.
Politically important to whom?
The British made it abundantly clear that a return to Europe
The US SLEDGEHAMMER proposal, which the British (quite correctly)
rejected, was for a major landing on the scale of Normandy. The British
were not opposed to raids and peripheral actions.
was flat impossible in 1942, something the
Americans had a hard time letting go of. TORCH was the compromise.
People should be some what cautious about judging our current strategy
because unless they are on the National Security Council, they are making
an
awful lot of assumptions.
In like manner, US intelligence had to be somewhat cautious in judging
the strategy of the fUSSR Defense Council, or whatever strategy was
inside Hitler's head. That still doesn't mean that it isn't necessary
to make judgements, in order to select one's own actions. A National
Intelligence Estimate is an estimate, not revelation.
One thing is for sure. We are deluged in
information and most of it is crap. A good portion of what we see
reported
is just plain wrong and another good portion is just plain lies. But then
misinformation is also a weapon of war.
Of course. See _Bodyguard of Lies_ (Anthony Cave-Brown) for the
primarily British cover and deception history of WWII. Unfortunately,
the US Field Manual on Cover & Deception is no longer available for
public release. The fUSSR put disinformation at a very high level of the
General Staff.
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