On Sun, 13 Jun 2004 17:37:13 GMT, Michael Wise wrote:

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time
super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training,
and "advisors" has anything to do with it?

You might want to check out the equippage, advising, training and
doctrine in place at the start of Desert Storm

What part of "real-time" support, arming, training, and advisors do you
not understand?

What part of "in place" doesn't equate with "real-time"?

... before repeating that bit of revisionism.


The only revisionism here are people trying to imply that battlefield
opposition in Iraq was even a fraction of what existed in Vietnam (or
Korea, for that matter)

At the start of Desert Storm, the military of Iraq was ranked as fifth
largest in the world. Battlefield opposition at the start of Vietnam
was strictly small-arms, guerilla forces. Ia Drang was an
enlightenment. But, there was no armor, little artillery, zero modern
logistics possessed by the VC at the start in '64-'65. The Air Order
of Battle possessed by NVN was never more than 120 aircraft and
usually closer to 75 throughout the war.


Some analysts even contend that the failure of
Soviet militarysupport so clearly displayed contributed to the
collapse of the SU.


Some analysts also claim Elvis was hiding in the same rat hole with
Saddam...but escaped. Gorbachev's glasnost/perestroika policies are the
main reason the East Bloc collapsed.

Gorbachev's policies can also be attributed to the generational shift
from the leadership of the Stalinist cronies to the thirty year
younger generation that he represented. His glasnost (what a
concept--free exchange of information with the non-communist world)
and perestroika (participating in a free-trade global economy rather
than continuing the failures of central planning) were little more
than acknowledgement of the shortcomings recognized by George F.
Kennan in 1947.



--Mike

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8