Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Kristan Roberge" wrote in message
...


Michael Wise wrote:

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

...
What did we get out of it? We changed the way we organize, train and
fight our wars. We lost one F-105 for every 65 sorties over N. Vietnam
in '66 and '67. We lost one fixed wing aircraft for every 3500 sorties
during Desert Storm. We lost one fixed wing aircraft...period, in
Iraqi Freedom for 16,500 sorties. We learned some lessons.

Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time
super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training,
and "advisors" has anything to do with it?

nevermind the fact that the US didn't really have air superiority over
vietnam,

air superiority: That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force
over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its
related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without
prohibitive interference by the opposing force.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dod...a/a/00291.html
It appears that by that definition (though maybe you are not using the
definition agreed to by the US military branches) we did indeed have air
superiority--can you identify any targets we wanted to strike that we were
prevented from striking, whenever we so chose?

nor
did they have the benefit of having waxed almost all the SAM batteries
already,

An unfortunate political decision, but regardless, having ADA and SAM's does
not by definition deny us 'air superiority". Though you are getting a bit
warmer here--the US did learn a lesson in regards to taking down the IADS,
instead of letting some politico back DC decide it was not a worthwhile
target...

nor
did they have AWACS aircraft to tell their fighters where the Migs were
200
or 300 miles
out.

Maybe not to the degree that we have now, but we did have these nifty things
called EC-121's...

Yeah...learned some lessons... learned how not to do it next time.

I don't know about that; yes, we did learn from the mistakes we made (which
is why we are the best, right?), but everything we did was not a mistake.
LBII seemed to be on the right track, and accomplished its goals. The first
truly effective use of heavy bombers in support of tactical ground units on
a widespread basis, the use of modern PGM's, effective use of helicopter
gunships (to include use of reliable ATGM's from helos, during the 72 Easter
Offensive IIRC), and the most effective use of heliborne airmobile assets up
to that time, etc.

And
how not to do it
is against someone as capable as themselves again.

Well, after we get finished with round one, the opposition tends to not be
very effective at all; witness ODS.

Go after the small
enemies, then your president
can look good on tv. ignore the big fish that'd kick yer arse again.

And which fish would that be?

china, ya know...that great country full of human rights abusers/oppressors that
the USA is so buddy-buddy with lately because they need their help in dealing
with north korea.