"Denyav" wrote in message
...
But had few such resources. There were only 36 trained cryptographers
available and at any one time only a small number (2 to 5) was assigned
to
JN-25
When Japanese fleet assembled during early Nov.JN25 became the top
priority and
all resources,that included cryptographers too,were assigned to JN25
reading.
There are a couple of problems here
1) Which woud hardly give them time to crack the code by Dec 7
2) Your favorite source (Safford) reports that this happened
AFTER Dec 7th
Evcen had JN-25 been cracked Pearl Harbor attack plan was never broadcast
in JN-25 or any other cipher and the fleet maintained complete radio
silence.
They did broadcast it indeed on Nov.25.
Feel free to prove this
Japanase Task force broke radio silence at least 28 times during its
voyage to
Hawaii.
See above
n the Pacific was likely. This had already been surmised which is why
the carriers of the USN were delivering extra aircraft to Midway
and Wake in early December 1941
Thats the reason why Washington cancelled Halsey's plan and removed
carriers
from Pearl Harbor only a few days before attack.
The mission was real and Halsey, unlike Kimmel, put his command
on full alert.
Washington knew exact date and exact name of target.
Unsupported assertions are not facts.
WAshington was interested in producing an shock and awe event,but not
interested in losing war with Japan.
Washinton is either a city or a state and has no plans. The US government
didnt want war with Japan, it was planning to fight Germany and
unless the Fuhrer was stupid enough to declare war on the USA
a Japanese entanglement would be a serious problem.
Events unfolded only a couple of months later around Midway proved that
US-British calculations were sound indeed.
The battle of Midway happened 6 months after the Pearl Harbor
attack. Last time I checked 6 is not a couple.
By moving carriers away from Hawai just a few day prior to attack
Washington
(Stark)accomplished several goals at one time.
1)The force that might deter Japanese from making the attack was no
longer
available
The carriers were the main target as far as Yamamoto
was concerned and in harbour could neither launch
aircraft or recover them. Their presence would be
an incentive not a deterrent.
2)Even if they were not deterred,an off shore naval battle using carriers
would
not produce desired shock and awe.effect.
It was the Japanese who were pursuing shock tactics.
ANY attack would take the USA into war so there
was no advantage whatever to having Pearl harbor
not be on alert.
3)The carriers were in safety for later missions (for example Midway)
whereas
Japanese were allowed to bomb useless WWI relics in Pearl Harbor.
Trouble is the USN of the time viewed the Battleship as
the primary weapon of war and the carrier as an ancillary
vessel, it was the loss of the battlefleet that forced a
change of view.
Note those 'useless' WW1 relics went on to destroy the Japanese
fleet in the battle of the Surigao Strait in the sort of battle the
pre war planners envisaged
Yamaoto's biographer (Hiroyuki Agawa) served under him in
the IJN and is quite clear that orders for the attack were
hand delivered and extreme precautions taken within the
navy to avoid compromising the plan.
No,Sir attack order came by radio waves and it also included instructions
about
how to proceed if diplomatic negotiations with US were concluded
succesfully.(No attack).
The message confirming the attack read 'Climb Mount Nitaka'
and was transmitted on Dec 2nd
This dispatch read by British on Nov.25,Dutch by Nov.27.
When US read this message?
Its is still classified !!!.
Ah one of your mysterious 'sekrits'
No sir they were not, the data released from Bletchley Park
as written about in 'The Emperors Codes' by Michael Smith
makes it quite clear that neither nation was reading
JN-25 at that time. This is reinforced by the
"History of OP-20-GYP-1"
US intercepted acc.to NSA 26581 JN25B coded messages and were able to read
2413
of them.
Not by Dec 7th 1941
Again according to 1946 naval inquiry 188 of them clearly indicated Pearl
Harbor as target.
The text of this inquiry is at
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/hewitt/hewitt-0.html
At no point does anything there support your claim, indeed it states
"The critical period commenced on 27 November 1941, when the Japanese
force, which was to attack Pearl Harbor, secretly left Tankan Bay,
Etorofu Island and, in radio silence, proceeded undetected toward Pearl
Harbor."
and
"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of
identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However,
since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the
change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been
recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."
This of course flatly contradicts your claim that the attack
force broke radio silence.
Do you know a kind of radiowave that needs days or even weeks to reach
receivers a couple of thousand miles away?
Nope but I know that coded dispatches are often only read
weeks or months AFTER their transmission
Only problem now we mere mortals are not allowed to read them,except 30 or
40
of them as almost all of them were the subjects of NSA withdrawal notices.
I am familiar with and disdainful of your claim
to sekrit information. Its an extremely childish
debating technique.
Keith