Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.

Thanks for the minutia.

Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was a
factor.

Gee, that is -my- point.

And the reason they were not there is because Eaker and Hunter didn't stress
it.

Was it beyond normal human kin in 1942 to devine the fact that the self
defending bomber was not going to work, even with the heavy armament, high
altitudes, tight formations and toughness of the B-17's and their crews?

Maybe so. I am not necessarily blaming Eaker and Hunter, just pointing out the
fact that a strong force of P-38's (provided that the technical problems were
addressed aggressively) could have been available a year before the pioneer
Mustang group arrived.

It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much about
escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made things
more complicated, don't you know.

But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the B-17
bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.

Production was very limited at the time.

Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming for
P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

Then there's the extra training
time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting units
operational/providing replacement pilots.

That doesn't seem that big an issue to me.

I recently got DVD's with the B-17 and P-38 flight operation films.

The B-17 flight ops were relatively simple. And the actor (Arthur Kennedy, who
later was the journalist in "Lawrence of Arabia", among many other roles) who
was the B-17 instructor pilot tells the trainee -- "you will -never- fly a
better bird than this." [paraphrased].

On the other hand, the P-38 film is filled with cautions and 'insert shots' of
"turn this handle if this happens" and don't forget to do this "if that
happens." The one speaker in the film is the Lockheed chief test pilot. He
says some thing like -- "hey, don't worry if you get a runaway propeller, it
happens all the time." Whoa.

I am not sure when exactly this film came out -- maybe in early in 1944. The
very first thing discussed is proper bail-out procedure in the P-38.

Don't worry, you won't hit the tail, you'll pass below it. "But don't worry
about that -- your job is to make the other guy bail out."

I wonder if perhaps ol' crazy George Patton saw this film and modified that
line and made it immortal.


The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively
could
have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available
in
England in 1942.

Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.

While Eaker and Hunter were doctrinally blind to the need for far too long,

Thats all I am saying, my friend.

the
need for a long-range fighter in the ETO in 1942 was hardly obvious given the
shallow penetrations we were making at the time.

It wasn't obvious perhaps. That's why kudos go to those who see beyond the
obvious.


Arnold ordered Giles to
increase
the internal fuel of the fighters around June '43 IIRR (don't have the
reference,
"To Command The Sky" by McFarland and Newton, handy), giving him six months
to
achieve it. Besides the P-38 was only in the ETO for a couple of months
before
they were all sent to the Med.

Yes, Eaker could have been screaming bloody murder -- "hey, don't take my long
range escorts!" But he didn't, for whatever reason. Yes, it might to pure
hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted in
supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14
Oct. '43.


Walt