The 'special navigation equipment' carried on Wilde Sau Bf 109s and FW
190s
consisted of a UV lamp and specially coated maps. The special nav
features of
the FuG 16Z were not utilized because they would have required a personal
controller for each "Boar", so instead they were following the
Reichjägerweile
(general information fighter broadcast - "The four-motor bombers are
approaching Kassel; all aircraft within range, strong raid approaching
Kassel",
that sort of thing. No naviads in the cockpits of the Wilde Sau airmen I
have
interviewed.

I believe these aircraft had artificial horizons, the FuG 16Z, ultraviolet
or Radium instrumentation dials.

The guys I have interviewed were in 10./JG 300 primarily, and they were the
only instrument-rated Wilde Sau; the difference is that the rest of the program
were basically day fighters, flying under exceptionally good night visibility.
As I said before, the only thing they said was different from the standard
daylight Bf 109s in use, was the small UV maplight. Its probable that you are
right and that other Staffels in the program had slightly better navaids, but
it was never intended to use "night-flyers" in the program, just standard day
fighter pilots. We had a long conversation with Oberst Herrmann on this exact
subject as part of our interview.

Protecting a fighter pilots night vision
was all important, the Luftwaffe even had a device to measure the speed of
recovery of eyes after being illuminated by light. The the the wild sow
hunted aircraft that had been caught in searchlights.

Yes, as they all said, "The eyes of a hunter is what was needed - no radar, no
controller, nothing was more important than excellent night vision." I heard
that from every NJG pilot we tracked down.

They did perform
ground controled interceptions that this was of course limited by the number
of Wurzburg radars and oppertators:

Not during the actual Wilde Sau program, but following its termination, they
did exactly this. Once the rest of JG 300 went back to exclusively daylight
combat, the sole remaining nightfighter Staffel in JG 300 (the massively
overstrength 10th Staffel at Jüterbog), THEN controllers were used to guide
single Bf 109s toward their targets. From what I have been told, this was not
done during the earlier period, when Wilde Sau's were primarily hunting
Viermots over citiesl

I believe mosquitoes were the main
target.

There were several Mosquito Jagd units, operating from September 44 to April
1945, including NJGr 10, 10./JG 300, two gruppes within NJG 11, etc., but these
were all after the Sept 44 demise of the Wilde Sau program.

The Me 109G6 U4N was equipped with Naxos to home onto bomber
emisions and to also home back to homebase. This type was little used
because it came at the end of wild sow tactics when the Luftwaffe had
managed to get its radars working again.

Also the reluctance of bomber crews to leave the H2S on, since all of them knew
by then that their suspicions concerning the Germans homing on it had already
been confirmed. A Mosquito was deliberately sent up as bait and it was
immediately tracked and attacked by a Naxos-equipped fighter. Later, an H2S
was operating on the -ground-, and a Luftwaffe fighter homed onto it. After
that incident, crews were quite judicious with its use, and the LW realized it
was not going to be an effective tracking tool.

I believe that great of squadrons
in training was between 20 to 75 percent. Finnish pilots trained by the
Germans in night fighting had only a 10 percent death rate simply because
they were far better trained to start with.

The "airman's death" that met most of the Wilde Sau airmen was caused by their
general inexperience, compounded by the rigors of night combat. It was
everything the day fighter nachwuchs faced, multiplied many times. Its a
wonder any of them made it through more than a flight or two.

The correct translation of "Wilde Sau" Wild Sow not Wild Boar. It alludes
to the wild sow's willingness to aggressively defend its young.

I know their songs Its difficult for me to call professional nightfighter
airmen "old lady pigs", so I used Boars - my mistake, but it was intentional.

Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the
ground
and night fighter was not.

They were being jammed and intruded upon for the last two years of the
war.
When the voice RT was 'stepped on', most NJ pilots had their bordfunkers
switch
to Morse, which was not as easier to operate in a dirty environment.

I meant to say it was easier to operate in that environment. Silly slip....

The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system
improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter
exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night
fighter with ground control by a ticker tape.

One cool part of that system is that it was the first on earth to provide
a
blind landing capability, when hooked to a three-axis autopilot. The
Interim
Nightfighter (Me 262 B-1a/U1) 'version 2' carried this setup, as did a
couple
captured Ju 88 nightfighters.

It is a fascinating system. I Would like to know the technology of it?

Look up the K-22 automatic pilot. If you send me a note off board, I will
forward some more info about it.


I have read that the Luftwaffe was heading towards fully automatic
interceptions, this system was perhaps only one step away.

Very close. Allies were always only a step behind, but by late 1944, early
1945, the night arm of the Luftwaffe was playing with amazing toys.

You have any information on the German EGON system which was similar to
"oboe". This was quite an advanced night bombing device on the Luftwaffe's
side but I am not sure where it was used if ever.

Sorry - its at the PRO in England. I focus on nightfighters over Europe, so I
didn't copy that file when I saw it.

Berndard was essentially an early datalink system intended for large
bombers
but it evolved into a fighter director.that was quite advanced for its
day.

Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were
slowed
down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to
achieve.

Crews often scored 4, 5, or even more Abschusse in a single sortie. Other
Experten crews managed up to 7. Faster speed does not help a radar
interception of a slow target in low/zero visibility.

The ideal situation occurred when the night fighter pilots managed to
infiltrate into the middle of the bomber stream, it was in this situation
that these multiple victories occurred. In the middle of the bomber stream
jamming and window was minimal.

Yes - like piranhas in a fishtank, no place for the bombers to turn...

I believe diversionary raids however
frequently lead the night fighters on a fruitless chase: they often were led
to the wrong city and then lacked the speed to defend the correct one in
time.

Exactly so. Other times, they sat in their cockpits on the ground watching a
distant city burn, as their flight controllers denied them permission to
launch, supposedly because the target was not yet known. For the pilots, it
was unbearable.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.