From: Guy Alcala g_alcala@junkpostoffic

Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures?

Part of a project I'm working on. I've been plugging away at a history of the
air war in the MTO off and on for some years and got curious about operations
in other theaters and how they compared.
Whether B-25 or B-26, losses track pretty closely with mission profile. For
example, the 319th, a B-26 group sent to the MTO, was trained in low-level
attacks. But after less than three months, losses were so severe that it was
withdrawn from combat and retrained in medium altitude bombardment, after which
losses plummeted. The 310th, a B-25 outfit, was somewhat similar, although it
kept a specialized low-level squadron for sea sweeps for a long time.
Whether B-25 or B-26, used as medium altitude bombers, losses were in the
roughly one per 150-200 sortie range and 3-4 times higher when they went down
on the deck.
B-26 losses were higher than B-25 losses in the MTO. I suspect the biggest
reason was better single-engine performance by the B-25.
B-26s also had much higher abort figures than the B-25, several times higher,
in fact. I suspect better reliability and easier maintenance of the B-25s
Wright engines, played some role in this, but more important likely was the
problems the B-26 had with its electrically operated props, so that a generator
failure would lead to a mission abort.
Conversely, in the Pacific, with the B-25 groups flying low-level missions, the
hydraulicly operated props caused losses. Typically, a plane would take a hit
in the oil cooler and start losing oil. Had the plane been at 10,000 feet,
that engine's prop would have been feathered and the engine shut down. Good
chance the old bird would make it home or to an emergency field. But on the
deck shutting down the engine was not an option. The plane had to maintain
power on both engines until it got clear of the target. Unfortunately, by that
time, oil pressure might well have dropped so low that the prop couldn't be
feathered.
The B-25 had good short field performance compared to the B-26. That made it
more desirable in the rougher theaters of operation. Turnaround time on the
B-25 was quicker as well, so that it was possible when needed, say as during
the Anzio invasion, for a single plane to fly multiple sorties in a single day.
Maximum lifting capability was around two-thirds greater (depending somewhat
on models compared) for the B-25 compared to the B-26, basically meaning that
B-25s could stagger into the air with seemingly impossible loads. Thus, in the
Pacific, you would have B-25s staging out of Palawan flying missions to bomb
shipping in Saigon, staying in the air 10 or 11 hours.
All the B-26 units in Italy were eventually phased out, as they had been in the
Pacific, so that eventually B-26s only operated in the ETO.


Chris Mark