WalterM140 wrote in message ...
firstly my deleted text, and I note the dropping of the Maxi Hastings data.
"There is a slight problem with this, the combat record of the P-38 over
North Africa in 1942/43 and then again over Europe on 1943/44. Then
add the long range P-38 versions came about when the cooling system
was redesigned and the J-15 version allowed 410 gallons of internal fuel
versus the 300 gallons in previous models. The first J models were
built in August 1943 without the wing tanks, with 10 J-1, 210 J-5 and
790 J-10 models built before the J-15 model was introduced, then add
the time to ramp up the line and send the aircraft overseas. In September
1943 the P-38s in the Mediterranean were classified as having a combat
radius of 350 miles, well short of that needed to escort bombers deep
into Germany."
It would have been quite easy to stop P-38 escorts in 1943, just attack
them early, and force them to jettison their external tanks, they were
carrying about as much or more fuel externally than internally.
It was -shown- that even a few dozen P-38's had a very delerious effect on the
tactics of the German day fighters.
Is this using the same sort of methodology used to "prove" the B-17
could do well against the average German fighter, total all B-17
sorties for the day, when most were not intercepted, and use the
totals rather than the results from the formations actually attacked?
Do we have one or two examples of this "few dozen P-38" phenomena?
Followed by the assumption the USAAF could do it once or twice then
they could do it at will? The P-38 was the most distinctive fighter going
around in 1944 over Europe. The Luftwaffe was quite able to work out
counter tactics of "hit the couple of P-38 formations to leave the bombers
unescorted". They Luftwaffe did quite well in Tunisia.
There's no "it would have been quite easy to..." to it. What you suggest was
not a factor.
A few dozen means one or two escort formations, tell JG26 to
intercept them just back from the coast.
The Luftwaffe actually tried this for a short while in 1943, hence
the RAF Spitfires flying the "insert cover". The extra fighters
meant extra Luftwaffe losses and less chance of picking the
real long range escort formations, since the P-47 was not all
that different to the Spitfire when the other type being compared
was the P-38.
Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.
Thanks for the minutia.
If you are going to accuse someone of not using something make
sure the something was available for use first. Simply put assuming
the Mediterranean war was shut down the above figures are what
was available. And the Mediterranean war was not going to be shut
down, it was needed, at least until the end of 1943. So there were
no P-38s for the England based units, the P-38s were, after a trying
start, proving useful in the Mediterranean, mainly their superior range
compared with the P-40 and Spitfire.
The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively could
have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available in
England in 1942.
Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.
So the theatre had control over where the scare P-38 resources
went to, given how much the Pacific wanted them, plus the
requirements of Tunisia?
Furthermore, given the number of USAAF missions to Germany in
say the first few months of 1943 the results would be so compelling
that the P-38 production line, the only high performance fighter the
USAAF had in combat, should be disrupted to add in the improvements.
Not only that but the specifications could be drawn up in say April 1943,
sent back to the US, turned into reliable engineering solutions in say
May 1943, with the first types built in say June 1943 with the arrival in
theatre in say July 1943. As opposed to the reality it took many months
to accumulate the information and turn it into numbers of improved
aircraft deployed in theatre. The first J models appeared in August 1943,
and as a rough guess it looks like the first J-15s were in December 1943
or January 1944.
In 1942 and early 1943 the P-38 was the fighter the Pacific forces
wanted, it had the better overall performance versus the P-39 and P-40
and was doing really well. The experience in Tunisia indicated the
P-38 needed work to tackle the Luftwaffe.
With nearly 1,700 built by the end of 1942, versus 532 P-47s, it was
not available in quantity, and it would take until mid 1943 to debug the
P-47 over Europe, to prove it was a worthwhile fighter. So the secondary
theatre, at least in early 1943, was given the task of proving the new
fighter in combat.
What I really like is Walter likes to run the line about how good the
B-17 was against enemy fighters, then turns around and accuses
the Generals of not providing enough escorts.
Eaker was not the only one and he did ask for long range tanks on
his fighters. It is not a simple good guy/bad guy situation.
Eaker dawdled on it. It wasn't important to him.
The 8th Air Force placed large orders for drop tanks in June 1943,
placing it fourth on the list of priorities, the USAAF command back
in Washington apparently thought British production would be sufficient.
Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
War for Air to push for a long range fighter.
Eaker thought the B-17's could defend themselves until very late in the game.
He -was- sacked, after all.
I know this has been pointed out many times but General Eaker
was not sacked, he was transferred to the Mediterranean in what was
a swap of commands with Spaatz and Dolittle. He was in command of
the USAAF in the Mediterranean and he was then transferred in early
1945 to Washington as deputy Air Force chief under General Arnold.
Eaker even suggested that the first Mustang groups go to the 9th AF. He didn't
understand the problem. He didn't allow for improvements and reinforcments of
the German AF. P-38's of longer range and better reliability could have been
provided well before they were. An all P-38 force could have done what a mixed
P-47, P-51 and P-38 force DID do-- wreck the German day fighter force. -- if
it had been stressed earlier. But it was not.
Of course give the 8th Air Force, say 1,000 P-38Js in early 1943
and watch them rip into an outnumbered western defences. Just
ignore the lack of bombers to take advantage of this wonder gift.
Just ignore the Luftwaffe doing something like new tactics or speeding
up the deployment of the fighter types historically delivered in 1944.
Just ignore the combat record of the P-38 over Europe in 1943/44.
Now, you'll dispute this of course. But the problems the long range escorts
gave the Germans rested on this:
The Germans had to up-armor and up-arm their single engine fighters and add
twin engine bomber destroyers to the mix, in order to kill B-17's in large
numbers. -Any- of the three main US fighters on the scene (P-38, P-47,
P-51)could have made that up-armoring and use of the twin engine bomber
destroyers impractical.
Let us start with the fact in 1943 the twin engined day fighter force had
been run down, mainly by the conversion of the units to night fighters,
plus the realisation the Bf110 was not a day fighter and the Me210 was
a failure. The twin engined day fighters did not start appearing in any
numbers to defend Germany until the USAAF fighters had drop tanks.
Hitler wanted his attack at Kursk and defence of Sicily first. Hence the
use of some nightfighters in daylight in the west. The first use of rockets
was actually also the same day as the first use of P-47 drop tanks. When
things like rockets proved useful the fighters to use them were deployed.
Instead of giving the USAAF more earlier but saying the Luftwaffe stays
on the historical deployments consider the early appearance of the P-38
moves the Luftwaffe more quickly onto the line of the Fw190 bomber
destroyer. Add for extra spice the Fw190D-9 appearing earlier, the
engine it needed was in production in 1943.
The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany,
thanks to a combination of factors. Once the USAAF could deploy
escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day
fighter force was in trouble. The engineering to provide the escorts
in numbers took most of 1943. Then the long range escorts appeared.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
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