He -was- sacked, after all.

I know this has been pointed out many times but General Eaker
was not sacked, he was transferred to the Mediterranean in what was
a swap of commands with Spaatz and Dolittle.

That is typical of the crap you try and pull. Eaker fought this transfer tooth
and nail and you surely know that.

Of course give the 8th Air Force, say 1,000 P-38Js in early 1943
and watch them rip into an outnumbered western defences. Just
ignore the lack of bombers to take advantage of this wonder gift.
Just ignore the Luftwaffe doing something like new tactics or speeding
up the deployment of the fighter types historically delivered in 1944.
Just ignore the combat record of the P-38 over Europe in 1943/44.

Someone posted over on the WWII board that Galland, I believe, said that the
P-38 was the best allied fighter.

If it would have been so easy for the Germans to force the American fighters to
drop tanks, why didn't they rigorously enforce that against the P-51s?

And the P-38's in my hypothetical don't have to dogfight the Germans. They only
have to break up their massed attacks and make things too hot for the ME-110's.


Now, you'll dispute this of course. But the problems the long range escorts
gave the Germans rested on this:

The Germans had to up-armor and up-arm their single engine fighters and add
twin engine bomber destroyers to the mix, in order to kill B-17's in large
numbers. -Any- of the three main US fighters on the scene (P-38, P-47,
P-51)could have made that up-armoring and use of the twin engine bomber
destroyers impractical.


Let us start with the fact in 1943 the twin engined day fighter force had
been run down, mainly by the conversion of the units to night fighters,
plus the realisation the Bf110 was not a day fighter and the Me210 was
a failure. The twin engined day fighters did not start appearing in any
numbers to defend Germany until the USAAF fighters had drop tanks.

That is just false. The ME-110s played a heavy role in second Schweinfurt on
10/14/43 and earlier.

Hitler wanted his attack at Kursk and defence of Sicily first. Hence the
use of some nightfighters in daylight in the west. The first use of rockets
was actually also the same day as the first use of P-47 drop tanks.

Yes, and even with drop tanks, the P-47's could get no further than the German
border in that time frame.

When
things like rockets proved useful the fighters to use them were deployed.

Instead of giving the USAAF more earlier but saying the Luftwaffe stays
on the historical deployments consider the early appearance of the P-38
moves the Luftwaffe more quickly onto the line of the Fw190 bomber
destroyer.

Which P-38's could more easily disrupt or destroy.

Add for extra spice the Fw190D-9 appearing earlier, the
engine it needed was in production in 1943.

What on earth are you talking about?


The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany,
thanks to a combination of factors.

P-38's were very capable of breaking up the German fighter formations as they
tried to do mass attacks on the bombers and they were also very capable of
engaging the ME-110s. It's not a matter of pure dogfighting ability, just as
the US Navy developed team tactics for the F-4-F's to use to fight the IJN
fighters.


Once the USAAF could deploy
escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day
fighter force was in trouble.

That day -could- have come a full year sooner. First flight of the P-38
prototype was in 1939. First P-51B prototype was in November, 1942. I don't
see any reason why, as a hypothetical, that the problems the P-38's encountered
over Europe couldn't have been worked out in plenty of time to match the
increase in the B-17 force in the spring of 1943. They did have Kelley Johnson
working on the P-38 after all. It's hard to imagine he couldn't have solved
about anything.

Eaker didn't stress it, and Hunter (the 8th FC CG) didn't stress it. I don't
see any reason why the number of P-38's in Europe couldn't have been
dramatically increased, and much earlier, if it had been stressed. The
strategic bombing campaign operating out of England was, after all, the top
drawer element upon which the Army Air Force officers planned to use to make
their case for a separate air force.

And the Mediterranean war was not going to be shut
down, it was needed, at least until the end of 1943.

The most impotant theater to Arnold was clearly in England, and it involved
daylight precision bombing of German targets.

So there were
no P-38s for the England based units,

There could easily have been. That's my point.

So the theatre had control over where the scare P-38 resources
went to, given how much the Pacific wanted them, plus the
requirements of Tunisia?

The most important air force was clearly in England. At least as far as Arnold
was concerned.

Furthermore, given the number of USAAF missions to Germany in
say the first few months of 1943 the results would be so compelling
that the P-38 production line, the only high performance fighter the
USAAF had in combat, should be disrupted to add in the improvements.

That's why it is a hypothetical.

Not only that but the specifications could be drawn up in say April 1943,
sent back to the US, turned into reliable engineering solutions in say
May 1943, with the first types built in say June 1943 with the arrival in
theatre in say July 1943.

Hypothectically, that could all have been done a year earlier.

In 1942 and early 1943 the P-38 was the fighter the Pacific forces
wanted, it had the better overall performance versus the P-39 and P-40
and was doing really well. The experience in Tunisia indicated the
P-38 needed work to tackle the Luftwaffe.

The P-38 could have been very effective ensuring that the Germans couldn't mass
the way they wanted to against the B-17's.

It was working -with- the B-17's that the P-38 could have done well. Of course
the P-51's and P-47's could and did do that too, but P-38's could have been
doing it a lot sooner.

Another hypothetical would be that the Allies could have mated the Merlin to
the Mustang a lot earlier. Sure. Then you would have had the same equation.
But no one, certainly not Eaker or Hunter, was pushing for that.

What I really like is Walter likes to run the line about how good the
B-17 was against enemy fighters, then turns around and accuses
the Generals of not providing enough escorts.

That would just be a flat lie. The B-17 groups could not deal with fighters
after the Germans reinforced and re-armed beginning in the Spring of 1943.
With escorts to break up the German formations, and make it too dangerous for
the heavily armed German fighters (both single and twin engine) to be proximate
to the American formations, that changed.

You've seen me exposit that many, many times.

Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
War for Air to push for a long range fighter.


Source?

I find no corroboration for such a supposed statement.

"Eaker as late as October 1943 still believed the key was in the size of the
bomber formations... Eaker stuck to this belief while high-ranking officers
such as Chief of the Air Staff Barney Giles and commander of the VIII Bomber
Command Fred Anderson had determined that escort was the key to victory."

-- "To Command the Sky, p. 112, by McFarland and Newton

"During June 1943 Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett visited
England to observe Eighth Air Force operations. He spent considerable time
inspecting the VIII Fighter Command and especially the problems of escort. At
an Eighth Air Force comanders' mmeeting immediately after Lovett's visit,
Hunter told Eaker that he feared Lovett would insist on the use of P-38's for
escort. Hunter identified the P-38 as a "wonderful ship," but preferrred to
give the P-47 a "complete trial." In doing so Hunter revealed his
misunderstanding of the basic issue confronting the Eighth Air Force in the
summer and fall of 1943. The bombers needed escorts with range, bot superior
fighters. The P-47 was a better dogfighter, but it did not have the legs to fly
long escort missions."

ibid, p. 114

I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or that
he communicated such with Lovett.

Lovett DID take that idea back to Washington with him, but he didn't get it
from Eaker.


Walt