No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go
around,
owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
development due to the crash of the prototype.


"The production in mid-1940 of 30 P-38's saw signifcant design changes
instituted to help mass production. For the first time, the fuselage was split
into left and right halves, and the nose section was built up independently.
The aft booms also were divided into two pieces with the skins adjusted to
accomodate this....The XP-38A was a converted P-38 with pressurization; next
production variant was the P38D of late summer 1940. The ever indeasing orders
for Lightnings prompted more design changes, both to improve performance and to
faciliate mass production."

--Warbird Tech Series vol 2, Lockheed P-38 Lightning pp. 22-26 by Frederick A
Johnsen

Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let alone
1942.

snip


3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production was
still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same problems
in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved IOC
in the
ETO.

That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed it.
But they did not.


It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much
about
escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made
things
more complicated, don't you know.

But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the
B-17
bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that case
by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

They should have.


Production was very limited at the time.

Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming
for
P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s
because
they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production was
what
it was.

Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't have
been increased.

I very much doubt that more screaming would have increased the pace
any
more than it was.

I can't help what you doubt. The 8th AF was the premier USAAF organization in
the world. Arnorld was clearly ready to provide anything needed by his close
friend Eaker. But Eaker didn't ask for it.


Then there's the extra training
time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting
units
operational/providing replacement pilots.

That doesn't seem that big an issue to me.

It was for P-38 units and replacements, especially those that were originally
supposed to get single-engined a/c. Lots of accidents when losing an engine
on
t/o.


The source I quote above says accidents for P-38's were less for the P-38 than
for the P39, P-40 and P47 in 1942.

ibid p. 14

Yes, it might to pure
hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted
in
supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14
Oct. '43.

Not after Second Schweinfurt. That made him a convert. Even so, he still
made the
(apparently) cognitively dissonant decision to give the P-51s to the 9th, but
Kepner fixed that, before Doolittle replaced Eaker. It made undoubted sense
from a
logistic perspective, but none from a tactical perspective.

Guy


Second Scheinfurt was late in the game.

Walt