No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go
around,
owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
development due to the crash of the prototype.


"The production in mid-1940 of 30 P-38's saw signifcant design changes
instituted to help mass production. For the first time, the fuselage was
split
into left and right halves, and the nose section was built up
independently.
The aft booms also were divided into two pieces with the skins adjusted to
accomodate this....The XP-38A was a converted P-38 with pressurization;
next
production variant was the P38D of late summer 1940. The ever indeasing
orders
for Lightnings prompted more design changes, both to improve performance
and to
faciliate mass production."

--Warbird Tech Series vol 2, Lockheed P-38 Lightning pp. 22-26 by Frederick
A
Johnsen

Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let
alone
1942.

Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the
a/c
was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so
low
relatively late.

If someone had said, "hey, we are going to need long range escorts, and the
only aircraft even remotely capable is the P-38," then these problems might
have been overcome.

The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was
available
for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so
roughly
3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to
the
war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared
with
its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges,
turbos,
radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks
in,
then they had to re-tool before they could produce them.

snip


3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production
was
still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same
problems
in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved
IOC
in the
ETO.

That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed
it.
But they did not.

Can't push what you don't know you need,

They could have known they were going to need a lot more P-38's. The kernal of
this whole issue is that Eaker and Hunter didn't divine that they needed a long
range escort, and remained blind to this fact after pretty much everyone else
had tumbled onto it.

and since they didn't have ANY P-38s
in
the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no
opportunity
for them to work out the bugs.

Now that doesn't seem fair, because a P-38 group WAS in England in December
1942. That was the 78th FG. According to Freeman in "The Mighty Eighth", most
of the aircraft and pilots were sent to North Africa.

Also, at the start of 1943, the B-17 groups were dealing fairly well with the
German fighters. By the summer the Germans would modfy the equation in their
favor. Freeman does note that the P-38 was "a complicated aircraft to build and
production was unable to meet the demands both the demands of attrition and
equipment of new units."

Perhaps what it comes down to is this:

Even if Eaker and Hunter had been strongly seeking P-38's for escort, could
those demands have been met by say, "Blitz Week" in 1943, when the GAF really
started to hurt the Fortresses?

You're suggesting that production could not possibly have met the need. I'll
grant that possibility. It's a what-if, and we'll never know.

The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent
to the
MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and
transitioned to
the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above
Eaker's
pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it.

As I say above, the B-17's at the start of 1943 were seen to be coping with the
Luftwaffe defense. But it's also true that the 8th AF was the premier force in
the world as far as Arnold was concerned.

If the 8th had been seen as needing long range escorts, surely they could have
been provided.


It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much
about
escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made
things
more complicated, don't you know.

But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat,
the
B-17
bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that
case
by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

They should have.

Why?

Because they got their asses handed to them.


The Luftwaffe was still working out tactics, had barely started to
attack the
heavies, hadn't yet begun to augment their fighter defenses in the west, and
were
inflicting only light to moderate casualties.

That's right. It's all a big what if. All I am saying is, "what if Eaker and
Hunter had seen the need for a long range escort?"

But they didn't. And they didn't see the need either of them, until after it
was plain to everyone else that the bombers needed help. It's tragic, but
there it is.


We were still flying shallow
penetrations, and didnt even hit a coastal target in Germany (Wilhelmshaven)
until
January 30th, 1943. We were flying few missions every month owing to the
poor
weather, and we only had four heavy bomb groups available (none with Tokyo
tanks
that allowed us to go really deep), so no conclusive test of doctrine was
possible.

Production was very limited at the time.

Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been
screaming
for
P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s
because
they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production
was
what
it was.

Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't
have
been increased.

And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every
single
P-38 they could get.

Do you know that? Maybe they were straining every sinew to turn out P-38's.
I've gotten the impression that no particular stress was put on. They were
surely working as dilligently as anyone in war production, but did anyone say,
this is the most important fighter we have? The USAAF was sold on the
Thunderbolt. Development of the Merlin Mustangs lagged also.

If someone had said, "yes we are handling the GAF now but they might produce
new tactics, new equipment and strongly reinforce," then it might have been a
different story beginning in the summer of '43.


You make some very good points and I appreciate them.

Walt