WalterM140 wrote:

snip

Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let
alone
1942.

Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the
a/c
was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so
low
relatively late.

If someone had said, "hey, we are going to need long range escorts, and the
only aircraft even remotely capable is the P-38," then these problems might
have been overcome.

But the P-38 wasn't "the only aircraft even remotely capable" of long range escort,
especially not in 1943. Remember that the longest-ranged US escort fighter of the
war wasn't a P-38 or P-51. As I pointed out in another post, the P-38 prior to the
J had 300 gallons of internal fuel, and the P-47 prior to the D-25 had 305. Go
he

http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/More_P-38_Stuff.html

and here

http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/P-47.html

And click on the links for the "Flight Operation Instruction Chart" for both a/c
(it helps if you save them and then tile them side by side). This is for a P-38L
w/410 gallons internal instead of 300, vs. an early model P-47 w/o water injection,
but just compare the cruise ranges and gal/hr. fuel flows in say Cruise Condition
IV at 25,000 or 30,000 feet, with each a/c assumed to have 250 gallons of fuel for
cruise. You'll note that the range is identical at 700 statute miles, with the
P-38L cruising slightly faster (an earlier version without the extra internal fuel
would probably cruise a bit slower for max. range) but burning about 3-4 gal./hr.
more than the P-47. The need was for a longer-range fighter, and the P-38, P-47
and P-51 could all be modified to increase theirinternal/ and/or external fuel
carriage. And they all were.

The P-38's original perceived range advantage was due to its large external,
unpressurized 165 gallon ferry tanks, which was fine in the low/medium overwater
cruise conditions typical of the PTO and MTO, but unacceptable in the ETO owing to
the need to be above 20,000 feet relatively soon to avoid flak on crossing the
occupied Dutch/Belgian/French coasts. Otherwise the P-47's 200 gallon ferry tank
would have been reasonably acceptable in the ETO, and histories would be describing
the P-47 as a long-range fighter from the get go. Instead, the tank was carried
only half full so that all the fuel would be burned by the time the a/c reached
about 22,000 feet or so, above which no fuel could be drawn. Better than nothing,
but the a/c had to pay the drag for 200 gallons of fuel while only receiving the
benefit of 100 gallons. The same would have been the case with the P-38, and there
would have been no point in carrying more than a single 165 gallon tank for ETO
high altitude escort missions.


The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was
available
for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so
roughly
3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to
the
war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared
with
its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges,
turbos,
radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks
in,
then they had to re-tool before they could produce them.

snip


3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production
was
still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same
problems
in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved
IOC
in the
ETO.

That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed
it.
But they did not.

Can't push what you don't know you need,

They could have known they were going to need a lot more P-38's. The kernal of
this whole issue is that Eaker and Hunter didn't divine that they needed a long
range escort, and remained blind to this fact after pretty much everyone else
had tumbled onto it.

Summarizing from Freeman, the first RFI for availability of drop tanks for fighters
was sent from the 8th back to Air Materiel Command on 3 October 1942, which
certainly implies that improved range was on someone's mind quite early. After it
became clear that the 8th would only be dealing with the P-47 for some time,
arrangements were made in January 1943 to ship Republic 200 gallon paper composite
ferry tanks to the UK. A few arrived in February and were evaluated by VIIITH AFSC
at Langford Lodge and by Cass Hough's 8th Air Technical Section at Bovingdon,
numerous operational deficiencies being noted, including poor aerodynamics, lack of
pressurization so fuel couldn't be drawn above 22,000 feet, the tank tended to
impact the a/c upon release, and if fuel was left in the tanks for more than a few
hours it started to leak. The tank also lacked the strength to be pressurized.
Changes were designed and tested to improve the jettison behavior.

Simultaneously 8th AFSC was requested to design a 100 gallon steel tank that could
be attached under a P-47, and which wouldn't suffer from the faults of the Republic
tank. Prototype testing was successful in March, and an order was placed to
deliver 1,000/month starting in June, but shortages of sheet steel in England
delayed production.

Meanwhile, In May 8th ATS had managed to modify the P-47's instrument vacuum system
to pressurize a drop tank, which meant that fuel could be drawn as high as 35,000
feet. Further improvements were made to the design as well as to the tank pipe
connections to ensure a clean break on jettison.

Production delays with the steel 100 gallon tank caused ATS to look at the British
108 gallon paper composite tank as a substitute. It had been examined earlier but
was insufficiently strong to be pressurized. Investigation found that it was
possible to strengthen the tank to withstand 17psi, and it was cleared for
production on 7 July 1943. The first was delivered on 12 July.

Meanwhile, because the need was so obvious, 8th FC decided to use the 200 gallon
Republic tank despite its deficiencies, as being the only tank available in any
quantity (1,150 on hand on 24 July 1943) at the time. It was only filled halfway
owing to the lack of pressurization, and they were dropped at 23,000 feet.

As an additional stopgap, in July 4,000 nominally 75 gallon (actually 84 gallon)
P-39 tanks which had been ordered from the US had also arrived. These provided
about as much radius increase as the half-full 200 gallon tanks owing to their far
lower drag, and could be pressurized. However, modifications had to be made to the
tanks and the P-47s to fit them to belly shackles. First mission use followed in
late August 1943, after the 56th FG's a/c had been modified.

At the beginning of September the first cylindrical 108 gallon steel tanks (the
production version of the ATS 100 gallon design) started delivery, and the same
month the strengthened 108 gal. cylindrical paper tanks began delivery, seeing
first use on the 27 September mission to Emden. A problem with these tanks was
that there was only 4 inches of ground clearance when mounted on the P-47's
centerline, making them unusable on rough airfields. A request for a flat 150
gallon steel tank to avoid this problem was made in August, with the tanks being
delivered starting in the following February.

Meanwhile more 75 gallon P-39 steel tanks had been arriving, but further deliveries
were cancelled in December, at which time 7,500 108 gallon tanks had been
delivered. The 75 gallon tanks were then restricted to P-51 units until used up.

In early 1944, P-47s had wing pylons added (a production change), which allowed a
pair of 108 gallon (or even 150 gallon) tanks to be carried underwing, although
some delay ensued owing to the need to improve sway braces. Only when this point
was reached was the P-47's combat radius limited by its internal fuel capacity.
The P-47D-25 with increased internal tankage and a bubble canopy was in production,
but deliveries would obviously take some time to make it to the operating
theaters. That was less of a problem than it might have been, as the P-51 and
P-38J which had been going through much the same range improvement process (but
without the big fuselage redesign also underway on the P-47D-25) were available in
increasing numbers to provide the TARCAP, while the P-47s provided ingress and
egress escort.

Ultimately the P-47N became the longest-ranged escort fighter of WW2, but it took a
near total wing redesign to do it, and the a/c just barely made it into the war in
the Pacific.

The point of all this is that the 8th was aware of the range issue and was doing
what it could to improve it with the a/c (P-47) and resources available to it, from
a very early stage. They were forced to utilize many stopgaps and work-arounds,
but with two possible exceptions, it seems to me that the 8th was doing everything
in their power to fix the problem (along with thousands of others). The first
exception was Eaker's placing improved fighter range 4th on his priority list (and
I've never seen what Nos. 1-3 were, so am not in a position to judge if the order
should have been changed). The second exception was the relatively long time
between the request for a 150 gallon flat tank and its availability. I assume this
was probably due to materiel shortages, but don't know. Alternatively the P-47
could have been given wet wing pylons earlier, but that's probably requires a
production mod (for wing strengthening at least), not a field retrofit.

and since they didn't have ANY P-38s
in
the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no
opportunity
for them to work out the bugs.

Now that doesn't seem fair, because a P-38 group WAS in England in December
1942. That was the 78th FG. According to Freeman in "The Mighty Eighth", most
of the aircraft and pilots were sent to North Africa.

The 78th arrived in Nov. - Dec., and the a/c and pilots were sent down to North
Africa in February. In the meantime, few bombing missions were flown owing to the
poor weather, and I'm not even sure if the 78th flew any combat missions at the
time - they may well have been training, or rectifying equipment deficiencies.

Also, at the start of 1943, the B-17 groups were dealing fairly well with the
German fighters. By the summer the Germans would modfy the equation in their
favor. Freeman does note that the P-38 was "a complicated aircraft to build and
production was unable to meet the demands both the demands of attrition and
equipment of new units."

Perhaps what it comes down to is this:

Even if Eaker and Hunter had been strongly seeking P-38's for escort, could
those demands have been met by say, "Blitz Week" in 1943, when the GAF really
started to hurt the Fortresses?

You're suggesting that production could not possibly have met the need. I'll
grant that possibility. It's a what-if, and we'll never know.

The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent
to the
MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and
transitioned to
the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above
Eaker's
pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it.

As I say above, the B-17's at the start of 1943 were seen to be coping with the
Luftwaffe defense. But it's also true that the 8th AF was the premier force in
the world as far as Arnold was concerned.

But not as far as the rest of the JCS, CCS and the respective governments were
concerned, and Arnold was going to go along with them.

If the 8th had been seen as needing long range escorts, surely they could have
been provided.

And they were, but only from about Nov. - Dec. 1943, as early as it was possible to
do so, and six months after the requirement was identified. And the same holds
true for every other theater, except that they got their long-range escorts even
later. The P-38F/G/H was a useful interim "long-range fighter" in those theaters
where altitude and climate performance wasn't the issue it was in the ETO, but it
wasn't inherently any longer-ranged than the contemporary P-47. As far as
long-range and combat radius goes, the best 1943 medium and high altitude fighter
was the early Corsair, with 361 gallons internal and a 150 gallon tank. But the
124 gallons in the wings was a bit dangerous (not self-sealing, but inerted), and
was deleted from later versions. Now there's a 'what if' for you, but it suffers
from similar production number limitations as the P-38 in that timeframe.

snip

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that
case
by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

They should have.

Why?

Because they got their asses handed to them.

Not prior to mid-43 they hadn't, so why should they be expected to be clairvoyant
in late '42?

snip

Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't
have
been increased.

And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every
single
P-38 they could get.

Do you know that? Maybe they were straining every sinew to turn out P-38's.
I've gotten the impression that no particular stress was put on. They were
surely working as dilligently as anyone in war production, but did anyone say,
this is the most important fighter we have?

In the MTO and PTO, you bet they did. Which were the only theaters they were being
used in at the time.

The USAAF was sold on the
Thunderbolt.

And was doing everything possible to improve it, in the theaters it was being used
in.

Development of the Merlin Mustangs lagged also.

snip

Not that I've seen, once the performance of the Mk.X conversion was known. But it
took NA quite a while to a production design and then get it into production and
service, and the Mustang was the fastest US fighter development program in the
World War 2 period. I've seen no indication that there was unnecessary delay in
that period; the delay seems to have been in the Mustang I era, when the USAAF was
so dilatory in testing it.

Guy