On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 5:45:05 PM UTC+1, Andor Holtsmark wrote:
At 15:18 09 September 2018, Kevin Christner wrote:
"But I also wonder whether, as a community, we should be applying pressure
to manufacturers to focus more on safety, rather than finding that last
.01% of performance, in their new glider designs. I've watched a lot of
Formula 1 lately, where 200mph+ crashes are a regular occurrence. More
often than not, the drivers walk away without a scratch.

What is to prevent glider cockpits from implementing similar safety
designs?"

Dear Mr. Christner,
this has already been done.
Two directions of research came together in the design of the Antares
crash-cockpit.

First of all, the sailplane crash-cockpit research performed by TÜV
Rheinland and Prof. Röger of FH Achen was utilized.
TÜV Rheinland had crash-tested 4 cockpits, each time improving the next
cockpit based upon what had been learned from the previous test. Lange then
hired these experts to design a 5th cockpit; the cockpit of the Antares.

Secondly, a Formula 1 crash cockpit designer was brought in to provide
additional expertize on crash cockpit design. This designer had, so far in
his career, crashed some 150 F1 crash cockpits, and so he could provide
exact data for how composite structures behave in a crash situation.

The resulting Antares crash-cockpit design was one that all involved
parties take pride in. Its crash worthiness exceeds the latest CS22
requirements by far. In many ways, it IS a Formula 1 cockpit. However,
there are some differences:

1: Whereas the cockpit was lengthened to make room for an energy absorbing
nose-cone, this could not be built as long and straight as that of a F1
racecar. As a result, the energy absorbing failure mechanism of the
composite had to be modified to accommodate for this.

2: Compared to F1 designs of that period, the Antares cockpit does not use
Kevlar or interwoven Carbon-Kevlar. These materials suffer from various
problems, amongst others, with the resin-fiber interface, and their
utilization proved not suitable for the load-cases that a sailplane cockpit
sees.
For more information see:

https://www.lange-aviation.com/en/pr...0e/sicherheit/

As things stand, the question therefore remains whether, as a community, we
should be applying pressure to glider-pilots to focus more on safety, as
well as finding that last .01% of performance, in their new glider
purchases
Disclosu I am an employee at Lange. However, In this post I represent
myself.

Andor, I am curious about how far the Antares crashworthiness figures exceed current CS 22?

For reference CS 22 Amendment 1 requirements a

(b) The structure must be designed to give each occupant every reasonable chance of escaping serious injury in a crash landing when proper use is made of belts and harnesses provided for in the design, in the following conditions:

(1) The occupant experiences, separately, ultimate inertia forces corresponding to the accelerations shown in the following:

Upward - 7·5 g
Forward - 15·0 g
Sideward - 6·0 g
Downward - 9·0 g

(2) An ultimate load of 6 9 times the weight of the sailplane acting rearwards
and upwards at an angle of 45° to the longitudinal axis of the sailplane and sideward at an angle of 5° acts on the forward portion of the fuselage at the foremost point(s) suitable for the application of such a load a suitable point not behind the pedals.