"Emmanuel Gustin" wrote in message
...
"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...

A good example. But, it also is an example of drawing conclusions when
comparing apples to oranges. Certainly Sweden has a history of
developing, producing and operating exceptional aircraft, but the
neutrality of Sweden means that the aircraft are by definition going
to be defensive in purpose and home-based in operation.

Of course a fighter for the US will have to meet more
requirements than one for Sweden. But assume, for the moment,
that it has to be five times as complex and expensive -- I think
that is enough for a whole lot more requirements. That should
still well within budget for a middle-sized country, and certainly
affordable for the USA, if managed well.

Somehow I have the feeling that the F/A-22 is also going to
be defensive in purpose and home-based in operation. With
a force of probably less than 200 operational aircraft, few
will be available for operations outside the 'homeland'.

Why would that be? If the preeminent air-breathing threat to the homeland is
missappropriated airliners, homemade cruise-missiles, etc., why do you have
to have the top-of-the-line, fights-outnumbered-and-wins "silver bullet"
aircraft solely committed to homeland defense? I'd think the later block
F-16's that will be flying for many years to come with the ANG (not to
mention the likely trickle-down of F-15C's to replace the current ANG F-15A
MSIPs) would be more than capable of handling that requirement.


The F/A-22 is heading the way of the CF-105 Arrow -- an
impressive achievement of technology, but too expensive to
be a justifiable purchase.

Only of course if we plan on turning our other cheek in the event we have to
face a serious air/IADS threat in some currently unforseen contingency (the
ones that usually arise to bite you in the ass) over the next fifteen or so
years. One situation arising that requires us to have a world-beater of the
F/A-22 caliber in our pocket is all it takes to make it a "justifiable
purchase".

The USAF needs a fighter that it
can afford to buy at least 500 of, ideally 1000; so that the
development costs can be spread over a sensible production
run. And so that after 30+ years of service and associated
attrition, it still will still have a decent force.

That would be nice, but it appears that *nobody* has that kind of cash
around; ISTR that earlier projected Eurofighter Typhoon production estimates
have been reduced over the years, and that is a cheaper (and yes, less
capable) platform than the F/A-22. How do you quantify a "decent force"? I'd
think that a force that allows maybe seven squadrons in a "silver bullet"
role over the next fifteen years, ramping down if necessary to four or five
squadrons after that (due to attrition), would be A-OK, given that by then
we will doubtless have newer means of handling some of the problems (i.e.,
UCAV's, even better ISR systems, more lethal weaponry to mount on the
remaining aircraft, etc.) that the F/A-22 is to handle.


Your suggest sounds a lot like TFX--the horrendous "one size fits all"
development projection that got the US the F-111.

Actually, I wanted to suggest a procument cycle more like the
F-4... A large shipboard interceptor that proved to be good
enough, with modifications, for a very wide range of roles.

But then you are missing out completely on what the F/A-22 promises to
deliver as it matures--not a "good enough" platform, but a "much better than
anything it will have to face" platform. Your solution is grounded in the
old mass-is-everything paradigm--OTOH, transformation is all about busting
paradigms and leveraging our strengths against our weaknesses. Smaller, much
more capable forces taking using our "high ground" of information
management, ISR, agile decisionmaking, and precision engagement to overcome
new and evolving threats, rather than trying to reinvent the old "3:1 combat
power ratio means we have to win here" Lanchesterian construct.


I think that a good naval fighter design, not too small but not
too large either, has enough ruggedness, capability and stretch
into it to meet most roles that can be reasonable asssigned to
a fighter. Of course "one size fits all" won't work, so you will
need other designs as well; but with less demands on them these
can be much simpler and more optimized for specific tasks.

It can be argued that your approach has yet to be truly successful. The F-4
is not really a great example--it was an adequate aircraft for the USAF, but
it was not what they really wanted (as evidenced by the start of R&D towards
the F-15 while the F-4 was still filling out the active component force and
well before the first Phantoms made it to the ANG/USAFR).


Besides, any fighter needs to be designed to be adaptable to
other roles, and given the lengthy lifecycle for the next generation
of fighters, the designer always will have to make sure that the
basic design can be modified and updated a few times.

True, which is why spiral development seems to make sense--get the basic
system into service, then refine its capabilities as it serves.


While a free-market capitalist business model might be successful with
the phase/stage/substage sequence, when you throw in the political
posturing, competition for budget dollars, mis-information campaigns
and general pacifism of nearly 50% of the American electorate, you
really get a screwed up program.

I am slightly skeptical about the ability of the 'free-market capitalist
business model' to develop good combat aircraft on its own. It really
needs a good requirement and support team on the service side, to
support development and bring in a dose of realism. Without it, the
companies are often excessively conservative.

Disagree. Look at the X-32/X-35 competition and you can see where both were
willing to be quite daring (and obtaining mixed results) in their
approaches, in very different ways.


Politics and blatant 'pork' distibution can really mess up a program.
But I doubt that the lack of knowledge or the unfavourable attitude
of the general public have much of an impact. Anyway, the US public
is largely in favour of a very high defence budget.

Where were you in the nineties? The public's acceptance (and therefore that
of its elected officials) of a "very high defense budget" is susceptable to
almost whimsical change--go through a period where you are stretching out
each and every procurement program due to lack of funds, while at the same
time finding you are incapable of even sending your personnel to their
required service schools due to lack of funds, and you will become a
believer in that fact-of-life.

Brooks



--
Emmanuel Gustin
Emmanuel dot Gustin @t skynet dot be
Flying Guns Books and Site: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/