Kevin Brooks wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
Kevin Brooks wrote:

ess (phil hunt) wrote in message ...

snip

No, it has never, since the days when the LWF morphed into the
multi-role F-16 which entered into service, had an emphasis on "air
superiority" (other than the handful of A model ADF variants mentioned
earlier). Both US and European users placed more emphasis on its use
in the strike role, and its first major combat use, by the Israelis,
saw more strike missions than air superiority use (you do recall what
kind of aircraft toted the bombs to Osirak in 82?).

I'll have to disagree. The Europeans used the F-16 primarily as an interceptor/air superiority a/c in the early days
while they still had squadrons of other types available for A/G work, with a secondary A/G role (there were individual
variations between different nations as to emphasis; some had F-16s in dedicated A/A squadrons, some used them for
both missions, some had squadrons for each), and other countries have also used it as their primary air superiority
a/c if they couldn't afford F-15s (which is to say, almost every customer).

From what I have read, the european partners were also asking for the
multi-role capability from the get-go. I can buy into some of them
focusing a bit more on the air-to-air role than the USAF did, but only
so far, as I don't recall any of them pressing for a BVR capability as
would have been available with even the USAF's early ADF versions.

The ADF wasn't available at the time (AIM-120 was supposed to enter service in the mid-80s, and there seems to have been
some hope that later European F-16s might be equipped with it during production), and besides, there was still considerable
doubt about the utility of BVR in NW European airspace if the Pact had started to move. None of the EPG nations had A/A BVR
capability prior to the F-16; they all used the F-104G as their "all-weather" interceptor, armed with AIM-9s. The F-16s
took over that job first, while the F-104s (and F-5s and Mirages) went pure strike/attack. And at the time the F-16 was
ordered by the EPG, the Luftwaffe had yet to receive their first F-4Fs, specifically ordered without BVR capability. Those
were used to replace F-104Gs, which had been tasked the same as the F-4Fs came to be: two Geschwader of dedicated fighters,
two Geschwader of Jabos.

And while the Israelis used F-16s to bomb
Osirak (in 1981, not 1982), it was because the a/c had the range to get there and back unrefueled, along with
sufficient accuracy with dumb bombs; they'd previously planned to use F-4s with smart bombs and buddy-tank them at
low-level over SA/Iraq, not an idea that anyone could get very enthusiastic about. In 1982 over the Bekaa, along with
F-15s the F-16s were the primary air superiority a/c (and scored more kills than the F-15s did), while A-4s, F-4s and
Kfirs handled most of the strike missions. The Israelis have always wanted multi-role fighter a/c (they were the
first to use the F-15 for A/G); for instance, the main reason they took the A-4 was to get their foot in the door with
the U.S., hoping to get F-4s later. Only afterwards did they discover that the a/c suited their needs very well, and
they ordered a lot more.

Which goes to the point that the F-16 was a multi-role platform.

As was the F-15, in Israeli service. But the F-16 wasn't designed to be one from the start, (the F-15, while always slanted
towards the A/A mission, included A/G capability from the beginning. The "Not a pound for air to ground" nonsense didn't
start until the LWF program appeared, and the F-15 had the CCIP/CCRP capability from the start, while the F-16 added it
during the transition from YF to F).

F-16s were forced into the swing-fighter role by the USAF, so as not to compete directly with the F-15 in the air
superiority business. The USAF was afraid that Congress would stop production of the F-15 (a better place to start if
you want multi-role) in favor of the F-16 for cost reasons if the two a/c went head-to-head in A/A, so they eliminated
the A/G part of the F-15 training syllabus as well as stopped A/G weapons compatibility testing in 1975 or 1976
(problems of a/c availability owing to F100 engine problems and shortages in the early days was also a factor in
eliminating the A/G syllabus, as pilot shortages were occurring owing to an inability to generate enough training
sorties), and made the F-15 a dedicated A/A-only bird while the F-16 was shunted off to be the F-4 replacement and was
not, repeat NOT, to be considered a direct competitor to the F-15. The F-16 has done an excellent job in that role,
and its capabilities in that area have received more and more emphasis over the years, its A/A performance naturally
decreasing as a result. The F-15 is clearly better suited as a multi-role platform owing to its size, but that's kind
of irrelevant if most potential customers can't afford to buy, maintain or operate them.

I can see the point about the internal politics of the decision, but
not exclusive of all other factors. If this had really been simply and
only a matter of protecting the F-15, then why has the A/G function
never been significantly redressed in the past few years, when it was
no longer a factor? The Navy did so with the F-14 (witness the
Bombcat).

I imagine the F-15E and the gaping maw of the F-22 (and latterly the F-35) have absorbed any funds that might otherwise have
gone into F-15A/C upgrades. Horner was complaining about the inability of the US F-15Cs to bomb during DS after the A/A
threat had diminished to zero, owing to lack of training and equipment (he claimed that Saudi F-15s did bomb), so it's not
as if it's a new problem.

I suspect that the difference also has much to do with the navy's greater need for extra strike capacity; they have far less
space available on the carriers so couldn't afford to not use the F-14 multi-role given the reduced threat to the CVBG,
especially when their primary long-range strike asset (the A-6E) was going away, and the air groups were also being
considerably decreased in size.

The Air Force usually has ramp space for F-15Es, F-117s and F-16s in addition to the F-15Cs (if needed), and given the
reduced A/A threats we've been going up against since DS it's probably not that big a deal. We could probably leave the
F-15Cs home without any significant extra risk, and use F-15Es or F-16Cs for the job. To a considerable extent that's what
we've been doing.


I'd imagine that more went into these decisions than just
budget-fights; the F-15 is without a doubt the better of the two in
the air superiority role when you include the BVR capability, greater
AAM load, and better radar (IIRC, though there may not be much
difference today between the latest F-16 blocks and the F-15C in this
regard).

The F-15 will always have a better radar range than the F-16 against the same target (given similar-technology radars) owing
to its larger antenna size. Of course, there's a question of when is enough, enough. The AESA radar for the F-16 was
stated to have achieved a detection range between 80 and 90nm (the exact figure was classified) on a 1 sq.m target; using
the same technology, the larger radar in the F-15 was achieving 105nm against the same target. If the AIM-120 has an
effective max. range of 40nm or so, how much is the extra 15-25nm really worth? Oof course, you could be using part of the
larger array for jamming or comms in the F-15, while achieving the same radar range as the F-16.

But, so much of the targeting info is coming from offboard sensors now, that may no longer be all that significant a
factor. At any given time, which has the better data links may be more important. The Dutch F-16MLUs that scored the BVR
AIM-120 kill(s) over Yugoslavia, had the target info data-linked to them by the other F-16 section, which had detected the
MiGs. There's likely to be more and more of this sort of thing, where an AWACS or other sensor detects, locates and
classifies the target with the shooter staying radar-silent and firing on data generated offboard, never going active
themselves. In that scenario the F-16's smaller RCS may well be of more value (to prevent detection by an opposing radar)
than the F-15's more powerful onboard radar.

As for missile loads, it's 8 vs. 4 (typically) or 6 (air defense). You can buy and operate roughly 1.5 to 1.8 F-16s for the
cost of one F-15, so there's not a lot in it either way.

To summarize, you seem to disagree with the bit about mud moving being
more important to *all* of the initial users from the beginning of
operational use--OK, I can grant that some of the Euro users placed a
higher degree of importance on the AA role than the USAF did.

Not just the Europeans; many of the Asian countries also use the F-16 as their primary air superiority a/c. I think the
Venezuelans do as well, not that they had any need for the a/c's capability.

But in
toto, all of the users wanted a multi-role aircraft (strangely, this
is not true today, as we have seen the Italians lease thier older ADF
variants exclusively for the AA role), and that was the major point of
my argument.

The Italians had a dedicated air superiority/interceptor force equipped with the F-104S (AIM-7/Aspide RHMs), which is what
the F-16ADFs are replacing until Typhoon enters service.

Guy