In article ,
"John Carrier" writes:
SNIP

The FLying Tigers rarely, if ever, met up with Zeros. The Japanese
air effort in Western China was performed by the Army, not the Navy.
Be that as it may, I don't think it would have mattered. The Energy
Maneuverability "Blow through disengage, climb back, repeat as needed"
tactic goes back to the First World War. While dogfighting is fun
when nobody's shooting at you, it's like hand-to-hand combat. You
only engage in it if you have no other choice. (As in weaponless,
naked, and with at least one foot nailed to the floor.)
It does, however, require foreknowledge of an incoming raid, so that
the interceptors can take off, form up, and climb to their height
advantage. Once they've got that, they can blow through the escorts
and hit the bombers before the escorts can counter them.
That certainly wasn't something being newly re-learned - It was the
main thrust of Fighter COmmand during the Battle of Britain, after
all.
Chennault went to a great effort to build an early warning net, which,
even though it didn't have radar, allowed the Tigers to be ready when
the attacks came. That sort of warning/command and control network
didnt' exist in Hawaii, the, Philippines, Malaysia, or the Dutch East
Indies. The first warning that they got was when the Japanese came
over the horizon, and by then it was too late.

It still works, even in modern contexts. During Rolling Thunder,
F-105s shot down something over 20 MiG-17s, while losing 4. While teh
MiG-17 has astonishing maneuverability, it wasn't an actual advantage
in combat. Close to 20 105s were shot down by MiG-21s, using hich
speed pop up tactics to blow through the formation, fire their
missiles, and get gone before the Thuds could react.

The Mig-17's maneuverability was only useful in a turning engagement. The
105's, once they delivered their ordnance were intent on DISengagement (at
very high speed). The guns-only (1500' range in rear quarter),
speed-limited (very limited G above 450KIAS) Mig-17 couldn't hunt in that
environment. You are correct, the missile carrying Mig-21 was far more
suited to the environment. But tactics had little to do with it.

Just so. Maneuverabulity, in the turning adn burning sense, isn't an
offensive tool, unless you can sucker somebody in. And, yes, nobody
expected an F-105 to turn with a MiG-17 at low EAS, so I don't think
anybody tried. What I found interesting was that despite the
relatively high number of engagements, (Indicated by the number and
spread-out nature of the F-105's kills, and, as you say, the F-105's
interest in getting gone after dropping their bombs, so most shots on
MiG-17s occurred in passing, as it were) The Frescoe had a fairly poor
record.

I'd say that tactics, although not at the ACM level had a lot to do
with the relative success of the MiG-21. They knew that at that
stage, their pilots were, in general, rather weak, in terms of
experience and training, and used their GCI system and preplanning
cleverness to load the dice in their favor. Using their GCI system to
place them low and behind (out off the view of the radar cover from
either Red Crown or the RC-121s - they'd only get 3 or 4 radar paints
as the MiG climbed out of the clutter - not enough to build a track or
issue a coherent warning) with a pop up into a slashing attack
and blow through was a tactic that minimized the difference in pilot
and airplane capabilities. Somebody on the PAVN staff had their
thinking cap on.


It's always great to discuss the concept of blowing through an engagement,
extending out and then choosing whether or not to re-engage. But, if a
particularly bogey decides you're "It" that can quickly deteriorate into the
engagement you don't want. Been there, done that countless times on both
sides of the arena ... as adversary and as fighter.

If you can disengage and reattack, it's a better move. If you can't -
it's like a street fight - you run what you brung.


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster