"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
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"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote



As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was
that
the
Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough
fire
into
the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese
did.
If
you
can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.

I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the
resources
that
it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely
areas
where
ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the
ingress
and
egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of
tube
arty
fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to
around
70
klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the
mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those
submunitions
going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many
of
those
that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing
to
expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly
effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never
know.
But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one
set
of
circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor
in
determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very
supportable postion IMO.


Kevin, why fly the AH strike in the first place if you're going to use
this
much support for ingress and egress?

You really have no idea as to the difference in terminal effects and
capabilities between indirect dire systems and direct fire systems?

You're right about that. I'm a swivel chair hussar with no practical
knowledge of which weapons are appropriate for which particular mission.
And
if it makes you feel better, I don't think all the AHs should be thrown on
the junk heap. I'm a conservative after all.

The plain fact of the matter is that the indirect fire systems can't acheive
the same results that the Apaches can in the EA. For example, the standard
DPICM bomblet, while it can be lethal against troops in the open, thin
skinned vehicles, and even light armor, is not likely to kill an MBT *if* it
hits it. The Apache can kill that MBT quite easily, as we have seen in the
past. Artillery is becoming more capable of killing point targets, but we
are not yet at the stage where we can hand-off all of the killing to such
indirect fire systems. But indirect fire systems can (right now) provide
excellent suppression against the kind of threats that the Apache has to
concern itself with while it ingresses and egresses. Nor are they limited to
providing that kind of support to rotary assets; ATACMS has been used in the
SEAD role in support of fast mover efforts (the SEAD role being one of
ATACMS primary reasons for existing).



You're taking it as a given that AHs
are more efficient at delivering ordnance to some class of targets
than
any
other alternative. That may be true against armor in a maneuver battle
but
in Iraq-2, that wasn't the target set.

Actually, it sometimes was (they did not always remain dug in and
waiting).
I did not say anything about "any other alternative", now did I?


If we were arming for the Fulda Gap, then AHs make a lot of sense.
It's
not
clear to me that it's true for the battles we fight these days.

They guys fighting in Anaconda like their support. As did the USMC units
supported by their AH-1W's (interesting account in last month's AFM on
their
use in OIF). Note that the USMC is also still pursuing their AH-1Z
program
as fast as they can. So where do you get this strange idea that OIF
condemned the attack helo concept to the trashpile?

I don't and I didn't focus particularly on the 11th's engagement. What I
paid more attention to was the air campaign over Afghanistan with
the_extremely_long mission times required.

No, your original statement that I took exception to said nothing of the
sort, and was evidently directly related to that single deep attack mission
by the 11th AVN: "This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq
War-2. Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire..."
Now where do we see any reference to Afghani operations in that statement?
And who in heck has claimed that the Apache should be the *primary* CAS/BAI
platform, especially in long range engagements like those that typified the
early stages of OEF?

Yep, the guys on the ground in
the Anaconda op needed a great deal of CAS. I just want to open the box a
bit on how to deliver those fires, considering what would have happened if
the SF teams had needed urgent support before the Marines opened up shop
at
Camp Rhino.

You are delving into METT-T concerns, not indicting the continuing valid
roles of attack helos. No single system can perform all roles across the
spectrum of combat, and throughout the depth of the battlespace. That the
Apache can't do that either means nothing.



The object is warheads on foreheads. The FARP/short flight time
ordnance
taxi is one model for doing that. A cloud of UCAVs in another. A Giant
Bombtruck In the Sky is still another. Because the Army has been
wedded
to
short range, low endurance platforms is no reason not to open up the
analysis space to consider other alternatives.

Hint--long endurance usually meand long transit time, and long
preparation.

Neither one is necessarily true. Because e.g. G-Hawk-can-fly
intercontinental missions, the temptation on the part of mission planners
is
to use the endurance that way. The same endurance can result in multi-day
time on station using a regional base.

OK, first off, nobody is talking about using Global Hawk in the CAS/BAI role
that I am aware of. And yes, it does take a while to get fixed wing UAV's
regenerated and back into the fight, and yes, their basing requirements will
normally put them some distance from the FLOT. The ground commander needs a
whole plethora of different platforms to support him, including UAV's, and
ideally also including manned helos. The VTOL aircraft, and its ability to
use a FARP and conduct quick turnarounds with task-driven weapons loadout,
contributes to his versatility much more than any of the current (or soon to
be available) crop of armed UAV's can.


The immediate CAS/AI situation may not allow for that. Which is why they
like that whole FARP concept--need more 2.75 inch FFAR's and 30mm to
continue that suppression mission that just moved to the top of the
target
heap? The FARP has them close by--that UAV orbiting with its BAT's is
not
going to do you a lot of good in that scenario. Just a simple example.
Ever
wonder why the USMC also values the attack helo, and for that matter its
AV-8B's? There is a lot to be said for quick response to a changing
situation's requirements.

The Marines love their organic air because of institutional memory that
goes
back to Guadalcanal, when the Navy sailed away, leaving the Marines
holding
the bag (and I'm an ex-sailor).

Who cares about "organic"? The USMC loved the support it got from its
AH-1W's during OIF. Period. Granted that giving the ground force commander
his own dedicated and owned source of CAS/BAI can also be valuable, but the
key fact from the above is that the attack helo was deemed to still be an
important asset by the USMC.

I understand the virtues of organic assets.
But. The Army's institutional experience with CAS systems is strongly
colored by the Key West Agreement and the limitations that put on the
kinds
of aircraft the Army was allowed to operate. Helos were allowed so the
Army
got expert in helicopters. I have a submariners's prejudices that helos
are
unnatural contrivances.

Yes, quick response is the key and since Comanche is dead (and we both
agree
that was the right decision), now is the time to determine the best way to
generate responsive CAS. My prejudices say that the CAS assets should be
organic to the Army but that's Unjoint.

I don't in the end care *who* owns the assets, my concern is that we need to
ensure the commander has *all* of the tools that he can get which contribute
to his versatility and agility on the battlefield. Right now, and for the
foreseeable future, that includes the manned helo; yes, it faces threats
from groundfire (but so does the UAV), but it can perform in environments
that might be difficult for the UAV (ie., effective enemy ECM).



The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages
for
UAVs.
They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage"
of
an
unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
station
for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when
needed.
The
ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
coverage
over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a
platform
overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
benefits
from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off
and
that's
hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs.
It's
a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD
decided
that
in
light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated
program
replans,
to cut its losses.

You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are
normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can
also
get
in
closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role,
all
of
those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load
capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't
still
have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed
wing
UAV's
can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming
and
refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned
around,
take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense
their
munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two
Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over
again.
Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the
fight,
and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can
use
your FARP's is an advantage.

AHs may have their place. The Israelis certainly get a lot of use from
them
(and so do the Iranians from what I've read). In the current
environment,
the target set that needs servicing is the "30 second" target, between
detection and identification and either a warhead on a forehead or
*oops*
he
disappeared. That kind of target requires ubiquitous platforms rather
than
a
heavy loadout on a few platforms.

No, that is just ONE of the target types that need we have to address.
You
also need to be able to address that immediate CAS request from the poor
groundpounder who is sitting there with his SINCGARS and incapable of
talking to the UAV operator sitting a hundred klicks back--so you still
need
those manned CAS assets, to include the attack helos. Do the UCAV's have
a
role? Of course they do, and in all likelihood it will continue to grow
in
the future. But taking the single example of the 11th AVN deep mission
during OIF and extrapolating a result of "no role or mission for the
attack
helo in the modern fight" in favor of the UCAV (which does not yet exist
in
terms of the capabilites you are requiring of them) is not a logical
conclusion.

If the PBI can't talk to the UAV operator a hundred klicks back, he likely
can't talk to the orbiting CAS either.

Bullpoopie. His basic FM *can* let him talk to line-of-sight targets, but he
is not going to be able to hit that UAV site without a retrans chain (and
then only problematically).

You miss a key point. We do CAS very
well now. We-don't- do the 30 second sensor to shooter against a moving
target well at all and that's a hole in our capabilities. The reality is
that we do most things very well indeed, so that we're filling in the
corners that were missed the first time around.

But that does not imply in any way that the attack helo is a product of a
bygone era.




Snooping and pooping is a traditional role that OHs have filled.
There's
a
real question whether they're the best way to do it.

In all circumstances? No they would not be. Are you ready to replace
their
capabilities with UAV's *right now*? No (a glance at the Army's UAV
programs
and history will prove that). Will we be ready to completely do so in
five
years? I seriously doubt it. Ten years? I still doubt that we will be
ready
to fully hand off the scouting role to unmanned platforms at that point,
unless we really experienced a change in luck in terms of tactical UAV
success. So what do use during that time period until your "uber UAV's"
are
ready and fully fielded?

Use AHs. It may come as some surprise that I don't think UAVs are the
Swiss-Army-Knife of airborne systems. The Army has a long and crappy
history
of UAV development (I worked on the tail-end of Aquilla). The various
Unions
seem to be getting their **** together now, in light of real combat
experience but it will take years to field the right systems in the right
numbers.

A platform that flies
in the Predator envelope (about 10Kfeet) misses nothing from a sensor
standpoint that could be gained by flying at a hundred feet.

Really? You can ensure that the same detail is acheived? I doubt that.

I don't. I can go into no detail. There are specific terrains where medium
altititude sensors are at a disadvantage because of geometric issues but
in
terms of militarily useable sensor resolution, there's nothing much to
choose.

Unless things have changed dramatically since OAF, then I can't buy that.
One of the lessons learned there was that the UAV's could not find the
targets with the desired reliability. Terrain and vegetative cover, enemy
camouflage efforts (including multi-spectral systems)--they all can degrade
sensor performance, especially from increased range.



In any case,
you're ignoring the value of fused sensor data from multiple
platforms.

Which you think we have already conquered--but we have not. We are
working
towards it, and guess what--one of those contributing platforms is, and
will
be, the manned scout helo.

No
single scout is_ever_going to operate outside the data network in the
future. To do so would be stupid.

Who ssaid it would?

You're right, that's a bit of a strawman. And the sensor net is nothing
like
complete yet. But it is the future. And once the future is here, it's not
clear what role manned scout helos will play.


There are two missions here.

The first is an ISR mission that's going to be served by a network of
sensors and platforms. Some of the platforms will be under control of
brigade and lower, some will be controlled by higher echelons
but_all_the
take will be available to all the forces.

You are dreaming here. We currently have the ASIC reside at *division*
level. Will we improve the picture at the BCT and even BN TF levels? No
doubt we will. But do we want some poor company team commander, or
platoon
leader, or for that matter the BN TF staff, to have to wade through the
plethora of data that does NOT impact their mission needs? Nope. Do you
want
to crap out the bandwidth with the transfer of data that is not needed
by
lower echelon units? Nope again. And how does any of this imply that the
manned helo does not have a role today, or for that matter during the
foreseeable future? It doesn't.

As I said, I may be premature on the data dissimination issue. You
tell_me_what a manned helo brings to the party as a sensor platform.

Ability to operate in a rigorous ECM environment for one. Better fieild of
view provided by the mark-one eyeballs of a couple of crewmembers.
Observation in 3-D versus the more sanitary 2-D of UAV optical sensors. And
most importantly, the ability to reason while absorbing sensory input. Add
in the fact that we can data link their onboard sensors just as we do that
of the UAV's (demonstrated similarly by USMC AV-8B's during OIF providing
datalinked images from their targeting pods to ground commanders).




The second mission is ordnance delivery. AHs can do that although they
compete with fixed wing assets as well as the artillery crowd.

Used properly they *complement* those systems, just as those systems
complement its use; "compete" is the wrong term of use.

No, they don't. The reality is that helos are what the Army is allowed,
not
that helos have specific mission properties that are unique.

Huh? They don't? Ever try to turn around an A-10 at a FARP cut into the
brush immediately to the rear of the FLOT? How long was it before we had
operational fighter strips up and running in Afghanistan? We had Cobras
operating there in quick fashion (and could have had them even more quickly
if we had so desired). Ever have your A-10 direct your arty? Armed scout
helos do that routinely.

They are
maintenance intensive, expensive and based on the Kosovo experience, not
very mobile strategically. To earn their place, they have to deliver
better
than the alternatives.

No they don't. They have to complement the other systems, as i said earlier.
You really need to look up the concept of "combined arms warfare". Each
system uses its strengths to help overcome the weaknesses of the other
systems. Sort of like the JAAT (joint air attack tactics) missions that the
A-10's and Apaches/Cobras used to sometimes train on.



An AH
integrates sensors and ordnance and it's not clear to me, given that
data
network, where the right place in the number of platforms/loadout per
platform/sensors per platform/endurance per platform space is the
right
place to be. If you're dealing with a Sea O' Tanks heading your way,
that's
one thing. If you're looking to pot a target speeding from one hide to
another, that's another thing. If you're looking for a rascal on a
motorcycle that just launched an RPG at the local headquarters, that's
still
another.

One abiding fault of armies is the desire to equip yourself to fight
the
war
you_want_to fight. That's a cardinal error.

Another cardinal error is trying to take the results of the last
conflict
(in this case of the 11th AVN deep attack a singular battle at that)
and
apply them with undue rigor to all future conflicts.

Didn't do that. As I said. You're the one that obsesses on that
engagement.

"This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between
the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire..." Your words, not
mine.


And you still don't address the fleeting target.

Neither does the 81mm mortar--are you going to want to can them, too?

Brooks